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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to provide an exegesis of Paulo Freire's
writings and of currently available critiques, to examine his philosophical
assumptions and to attempt to identify their implications for a theory of
pedagogy applicable in the United States of America.
Paulo Freire, Brazilian educator and philosopher, is known in the
United States chiefly as an adult educator whose psychosocial method of
literacy
training may have applicability outside the Third World. However,
data to
put his thought into historical and philosophical perspective
has not been readily
available, nor a comprehensive exergesis of his writings.
This study attempts
to fill this need. It then describes his methods for literacy
training and lists
the basic postulates of his philosophy: his theories
of consciousness, of
knowledge and of person.
vii
The study is significant because it addresses issues that are currently
important in education: the role of education in sociolization of the individual,
in changing societal structures and in promoting humanization of peoples,
particularly oppressed or marginal peoples, and their incorporation into the
^
decision-making processes of their society. It then explores, through the
lenses of Freire's philosophy, the dialectic between changes in consciousness
and changes in the existential situation, and the dualisms that are still
prevalent in education and promote dehumanization.
The second part of this study compares the philosophy of John
Macmurray with Freire in an effort to provide a systematic grounding for
the philosophy of Freire. Macmurray bases his philosophy on the fact that
persons are not primarily thinkers but rather agents who develop only in
relation with other persons. Macmurray defines the form of the personal as a
positive which includes and is defined by its negative. He carries this schema
into all the activities of the human person. The centrality of relationships in
personal development and action is extrapolated to explain the forms of fear-
oriented and love-oriented societies.
This schema has many points in common with Freire' s thinking and
provides further clarification to Freire's concepts of dialogic and antidialogic
communities. It also indicates the dangers which flow from a dualistic
perception of the human person and provides a means of examining some
of the
contradictions in Freire's work.
viii
The third part of the study examines in detail Freire’s published
works, establishes the concepts of praxis, of the nature of oppression as
prescriptive, or outside decision-making, of the various levels of consciousness,
of the nature of knowledge, and learning versus 'iDanking" education, of the
non-neutrality of education, and of dialogic or love-oriented community. The
study then examines the mechanistic and organic metaphors in American
education, and the centrality of the dialectic as resolution in Freirean notions
of person and society, knowledge and education. Finally, assumptions and
guidelines for content and process are offered as a first tentative step toward
theory of pedagogy. It is suggested that this theory of pedagogy be based on
dialectical humanism and have a two-fold goal: to prepare persons to take a
self-determining part in a free (non-oppressive) society, and to enable the
future adult to help create a humanizing society: one which promotes the
humanization of persons. This implies an education which will promote
awareness of what is dehumanizing, commitment to change at a radical level,
and skill in creating that change.
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INTRODUCTION
Paulo Freire is an educator and philosopher of the Third World. He
is one of the most important influences on the Latin American scene (Perez,
1971) both for his use of conscientizacao and for this thought about the role of
pedagogy in perpetuating, or changing, economic and political structures. In
the United States there is an increasing interest in that thought, and partial
imitations of his methods. ^ But there is a lack of clarity about both, a
tendency to generalize from his ideas without adequate regard for their
situationality (Coutinho, 1968) and a superficial use of his statements to attack
concepts of institutionalized education. These statements become superficial
when they fail to read the meaning of liberation which inspired the original
statements of Freire.
Statement of the Problem
The problem underlying this situation is the lack of easy availability
of data to put his thought into historical and philosophical perspective.
Recently three dissertation studies have addressed these needs, from the
perspective of a comparison of Freire's and Illich’s thought (Elias, 1974),
from the perspective of andragogy and social literacy (DeWitt, 1971), and
from the standpoint of applicability to early childhood education (Sherwin, 1974).
2What has not been done in the publications available to date is a serious
systematic study of the philosophical assumptions underlying the pedagogy
with respect to their coherence and adequacy as a system on which to build
a theory of pedagogy, applicable in other cultures.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to provide an exegesis of Freire's
writings and of currently available critiques, to examine the philosophical
assumptions of his positions and to attempt to identify their implications for
a theory of pedagogy applicable in the United States of America.
Significance of this Study
This study is significant at this time because it surfaces and attempts
to clarify Freire's position on some of the most critical issues that education
faces today. For the sake of organization, I shall call them the issues of
ends and means. The ends involve us in the moral issue, the literacy issue,
the philosophical issue, and the political issue; the means, in questions
of
content and method. The division is artificial, and for the sake of
organization
only, for ends and means are everywhere in dialectic tension.
The moral issue is, par excellence, the question of ends.
Education
in the United States has been assigned the task of
education anywhere: to
socialize the child
2 into the existing mores and values of the culture in
which
s/he is to live and to provide him/her with the tools to
achieve what that
3culture values. Today American education is being widely criticized. The
core of criticism (Silberman, 1970) seems to be that it has done the task too
well: enculturating the student to what the surrounding society values, rather
than to what society ought to value, says it values, or would like to value.
Because schooling is, in fact, the arm of society which herds to
conformity the marginal people: the young, the poor, and the adult illiterate,
it becomes the whipping boy for the sins of society. It is criticized for not
being the agent of change. But can a society change itself? Can persons,
entrapped in institutions, change institutions? What Freire has to say about
the stages of consciousness is particularly relevant here. And if institutions
can be so changed, can education in particular become the means of value
change, while still performing its socializing and tool-providing role?
DeWitt reminds us:
. .
.were schooling in our country actually doing
the job of democratic socialization then the "products"
of the schools would have a feel for the general
contours of knowledge and human experience and the
possibilities of undetermined futures. School
graduates would re-create, participate in and deepen
the social rationality of the American public. But
even as respected an educational critic as Christopher
Jencks suggests that to entertain such notions as
though they were realities is sheer dream-talk
for. . . (the schools) ’are part of the system which
produces the disorders. ’
... In short, it is the schools themselves, the
most
prestigious and most elitist in particular, that en-
gender and foster the ’society-managers' of today
and
4tomorrow, the very ones who are convinced of
the rightness of their deciding for others—for
all the others—how an entire people should live.
(DeWitt, 1971)
Freire says that people, and societies, can change themselves—but
only within the limits of their stage of consciousness. He provides a
methodology for opening consciousness to higher and more critical stages of
development. His critics say that the method is politicizing and ideologizing.
But the moral issue in education goes deeper. What are the values
toward which education leads ? Who chooses these values ? Are they the ones
we want? Are they overt and explicit? Are the means to achieve them, the
means of education, neutral?
Freire’ s response is that educational ends are unexamined on the
grounds that it is not necessary to examine them, since the means are assumed • /
to be neutral. But he argues that means are never neutral. They inculcate
values and views of men and women, which perpetuate false thinking and
oppressive-submissive actions. If we accept that education is a means of
preparing and motivating for change, as well as a means of development of
individual potential, we cannot leave the values guiding educational practice
unexamined.
Morality is the theory and practice of relationships. This is the
central issue of the Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire, 1970) and one of
Freire’s most significant theses. Moral issues in education have little
to
5do with prayer-in-schools, and much to do with the quality and furtherance
of dialogic human relationships, or with their frustration and death.
The literacy issue. Freire is primarily identified in the United States
as an adult literacy trainer. Here we are confronted with the moral issue on
another level. The concept of literacy is fundamental to education and to the
study of Freire. In literacy Freire includes the common meaning: the
ability to read, write and compute. But this is at a technical and derived
level of meaning. The UNESCO definition is closer to literacy in the usual
pedagogical sense:
A person is literate when he has acquired the
essential knowledge and skills which enable
him to engage in all those activities in which
literacy is required for effective functioning
in his group and community and whose attainments
in reading, writing, and arithmetic make it
possible for him to continue to use these skills
toward his own and the community’s development
and for active participation in the life of the
community. (Freire, in Stanley, 1972)
In line with this definition was the perception of the Acao Popular
and
the Basic Education Movement (MEB). These were two groups in Brazil of
the ’60's who directed their literacy efforts to consciousness-raising as
a
means to provide the essential knowledge and skills for participation
in
democratic processes.
n y
But Freire goes further. Literacy to him is primarily a
quality of
consciousness by which men and women, together, critically
perceive, name,
6and transform their reality. It stands in contrast to illiteracy, which ranges
in meaning from unconscousness of the "internalized oppressor's presence,"
to silence (robbed of one’s power, right, opportunity or desire to speak and
interpret one’s world), to a lack of realization that the actions of the human
person are "transforming, creating, and recreating.
"
(Freire, 1970;
Stanley, 1972)
This conceptualization of literacy is related to the ability to read and
to write but it is far from mere phonics instruction. Nor is Freire’s first
concern that of creating a relevant decoding technique, as has been, wrongly,
assumed. (Griffith, 1972) The means of becoming literate, given these kinds
of ends, assume serious moral significance. Stanley notes the implication
that a "properly literate man is immune to political oppression. " (Stanley,
1972b) He asks whether we in North America, who are ordinarily in the role
of the "haves, " or even "the dominate*rs" can export education—even at the
minimal literacy level—without exporting our value set, i.e. , without cultural
imperialism. Further, "have we ourselves learned what we ought to have
learned in an institution that engages our undivided attention for
up to a quarter
of our lives." (Stanley, 1972b) Are we ourselves literate?
Thus literacy,
as well as the means to achieve it, is a moral issue in
education. Although the
moral issue concerns primarily the end product, it impregnates
all the content
and process means to that end.
7Integral to both ends and means in education is a perception of the
nature of the human person, the nature of knowledge and knowing, and the
relationships of men and women to each other and to their world. These are
philosophical issues .
Freire denies that human beings are organisms to be nurtured, or high
level computers to be programmed. He holds them unique in their humanness,
and situates that humanness in their iitentionality and their ability to distance,
objectify and name their reality. But these things are done only together, in
dialogue, and only at the level of consciousness which their history and
political conditions allow. Knowledge itself, is not static reified contents.
There is no knowledge except between persons, Freire maintains, persons in
relation, reflecting together upon action. Similarly Freire denies that a true
educational process can be based on an inequality in the teaching-learning pair.
In his insistence upon respect and co-learning dialogue, he negates the
superior-inferior relationships of teacher and pupil as well as the dichotomy
between knower and world. He proposes instead the dialectic unity of the
"man-world entity" and the continual tension between subject and object,
theory and practice, co-learners in dialogue.
The political issue : Education, and the means of education, as we
have
said, are not neutral. To Freire education will either be
for domestication
or for liberation. By liberation he means the enabling
of human persons to
their world. At its surface level the Pedagogy of
the
define and determine
8Oppressed deals with adult literacy within a context of political relevancy. On
the surface, the method is not too unlike the contextual methods of Ashton-
Wamer (1963) and Dewey (1916) who draw the content of learning from the
life situation of the learners. But the Pedagogy of the Oppressed spends very
little time on details of methodology and a great deal of time on consciousness-
raising with respect to socio-political reality.
It is this aspect that has given the book its appeal to the oppressed, or
the self-styled oppressed, throughout the world. Questions have been raised
as to the weaknesses introduced by dichotomizing the world into oppressors/
oppressed (Griffiths, 1972; Boston, 1972; Woock, 1972) and by the apparent
redefinitions of the word "revolution. " (Woock, 1972) As we shall see,
revolution is, increasingly, a central concept in the Pedagogy .
The issues of freedom/determinism, oppression/liberation, and their
relationships to pedagogy cannot be avoided. I believe that clarifying the
philosophical assumptions of Freire's writings and the place therein of
agency and inter-relatedness of persons permits a rigorous development of
these concepts with respect to their educational implications. This is the
major focus of this study, as well as an examination of the political implications
of such education.
The question continually teases the reader of Freire's writings: "What
kind of revolution is he talking about?" Is the Pedagogy meant to be a
revolutionary handbook? This is, I believe, still an unresolved question
lor
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Freire himself, part of the life-tension in which he lives. But there can be
no question that the scope and purpose of education as he sees it, is political.
By political I mean concerned with ends determined by human beings for human
beings in their social, legal, and governmental structures, and with the means
to achieve them efficiently.
The pedagogical issue : Although educators today evince much greater
interest in processes and values, and the self-image of the learner, than in
years past, the "content" to be disseminated is still the dominant concern in
pedagogy in most secondary, and almost all university, classrooms. The
methods of handing over those contents (called knowledge) are still primarily
verbal: lecture, discussion, and/or research papers to be handed in—and
the goals of so doing are "possession of knowledge."
Freire’ s conceptualization challenges this. He will not accept
as
"knowledge" something which can be deposited by one person
into another. To
Freire, knowledge is not a static thing, but a continually
changing dynamic
process whereby two persons, mediated by the reality under
scrutiny, together
analyze and name that reality by acting on it.
Because of this view of knowledge Freire's only
pedagogical method is
praxis. He relates praxis to the stage of
developing consciousness the student
has reached, and bases it squarely on his
philosophical views of what it means
to be a person in the "man-world dialectic.
" The dialectic tension between
theory and action is the tension of his own
life and the driving force of the
10
methodology of conscientization. The pedagogy is dialogical, respectful, and
demanding of collaborative action; action as both fruit and means of learning.
Praxis can be summed up in the ongoing cyclic processes of naming, reflecting,
acting, and re-evaluating.
Freire himself uses a variety of techniques to arrive at the end, but
all within the context of praxis. In the United States, where the method is
often confused with the message, this seeming paucity of methods is a subject
of criticism . 4 However, the theory-practice unity which is praxis, is a larger
life-issue, and perhaps more central challenge to the validity of the whole
concept of an educational community. A valid and adequate praxis incorporates
both the method and the message.
The metaphorical issue : A key issue of Freire’ s writings for North
American educators is the metaphorical issue. In Freire’s method the usual
categories of teacher/pupil, content/process, time rate/evaluation, must be
' redefined. Two metaphors have, historically, dominated American education:
that of the machine and that of the organism. The machine metaphor sees the
student as a mechanical entity, whether like to an empty vessel, a machine,
or an electronic computer. As already implied, the input is
itself a thing,
"knowledge", programmed into the machine in some useful and convenient
way. The decisions as to content and process are outsider
decisions; the
control is from outside. The mode of thinking is scientific; that
is, a
continuing search for generalizable prescriptions—and
it is assumed that
11
this goal inevitably is reached. Problems of education then become problems
in systems analysis: Where is the mechanism breaking down?
The machine metaphor is an unquestioned assumption under most
compensatory and behavior modification approaches, as well as competency
based teacher education method, standardized testing, and a host of programmed
materials.
The other favored educational metaphor is the organic metaphor. From
this viewpoint, the child is an organism, growing according to internal laws
and timing. The growth can be stunted or deformed by improper environmental
conditions. But where these are warm, nurturing and stimulating, growth
will inevitably occur and will be directed toward the desired goal.
The role
of the teacher is to study the stages of this development and
to arrange the
environment to nurture it. The control is within the child,
according to
'’Nature” and again, where the proper nurturance is present,
the outcome is
inevitable and predetermined.
Freire criticizes both metaphors as dehumanizing.
The person is more
than machine; more than plant. He offers us
instead a view of the person as
intentional, and a psycho-social methodology
requiring choice and social
action.
However, in his focus on literacy, his
methods of decoding a situation,
and his analysis of language, he also
reaffirms the leading power of metaphor.
By this I mean, that the language we
use leads and forms our thoughts.
We
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cannot with impunity use metaphors inappropriate to human beings, with the
casual assumption that we, and everyone, understand their limitations. When
we begin with the proposition that there are certain ways in which children are
like, subhuman animals or things, we are likely to act as if learners were
indeed merely vessels to be filled or animals to be trained.
It will be beyond the scope of this paper to pursue these linguistic
metaphorical issues with the thoroughness that they invite, but Freire
continually reminds us of the danger of carelessness in the words we use,
and of the pemiciousness of actions that rob the people of the right, or the
power, to "say their own words. " This notion is at the heart of Freire’s
critique of the "culture of silence." (Freire, 1969, 1970)
To conclude : the metaphors in which we clothe our pedagogical
processes are expressive of our concept of the person: Mechanistic, organic,
cybernetic, or human. But they can lead our thought: to certain views of
the person, and thence to the structuring of educational experiences based,
not on examined positions, but on metaphorical implications. We can be
subjugated by unexamined metaphors. A part of the process of situating
Freire in the matrix of American education must be to examine its organizing
metaphors.
Conclusion
The questions that will guide this study of Freire will probe
his
pedagogical method, his underlying philosophy of the person,
his moral
13
stance, his political goals, his analysis of consciousness, knowledge, and
learning, and the challenge or irrelevance he presents to the educational
community in our country.
The study needs to be done since many of the objections to Freire’s
views seem, to this writer, to result from partial knowledge, basic dis-
agreement on the nature of education, or an inversion of ends and means.
The thesis of this study is that Freire has identified the key issues of
education and integrated them into a coherent philosophical position; that
X
his goal is the total, basically non-violent, revolution of the present order in
oppressed societies; and that his psychosocial method can only fully succeed
in the work to which he sets it, there where the ideal of "Love your neighbor
as your (other) self" is the societal and educational norm.
To provide the data, the background, the exegesis, and the analysis
needed to demonstrate this thesis, I shall first present a brief overview of
the biographical and historical situation out of which Freire's writings grew,
a description of his method, and his own sociological analysis of that situation
as he presents it in three of his works: Educacao Como Pratica da Liberdade ,
Education As Conscientization , and Cultural Action for Freedom.
I shall then attempt to define the implicit philosophical assumptions
and statements about the human person, the nature of knowledge and of the
process of knowing; of society, and of development, found in Ireire s
writings. These will be compared, for further clarification and
philosophical
14
grounding, with the social philosophy of John Macmurray.
I shall examine individually three of Freire's most important writings
t
to elicit the pedagogy for democratization which he developed, its relationship
to his philosophy of the person and his critique of dehumanizing educational
practice. This will lead us to the heart of his ideas, the life-word tension
that is present both in the pedagogy and in his life, and to the unresolved
questions raised.
In order to explore the appropriateness of the above theories to
American education, I shall briefly attempt an overview of current practice
in the United States, under the form of its guiding metaphors. The thought of
John Macmurray, already discussed, will provide the guide to the inter-
relationships of these metaphors, and their usefulness or harmfulness.
I shall then explore where Freire seems to fit into education in North
America, with respect to his philosophy, politics, and sociological position,
and the dilemmas he poses for us.
The essay will close with unanswered questions concerning the thought
of Freire and my own attempt at some of the answers, an attempt which will
lead us toward a Theory of Pedagogy.
INTRODUCTION — NOTES
No\<
i
Since 1970 there have been one or two symposia per year and four
lecture series or tours by Freire in the United States. The number of
published articles has increased from 2 or 3 (1968) to about 10 per year, with
notable increase in depth. There were 30 graduate level studies in
progress in 1972, with 17 reported by author and title. (Ohlinger, 1972)
However, with the exception of a very few publications (Stanley, 1972; DeWitt,
1971; Evans, 1971; Grabowski (ed. ), 1972) the publications indicate that
Freire is considered narrowly as a proponent of anew methodology for adult
literacy training, or as a stimulus for an attack on institutions and schooling,
an attack repeating many of the ' 'what ’ s-wrong-with-American-s chools 1 '
cliche’s. Only two articles spend significant time on what Freire himself
identifies as the heart of his pedagogy: (Preface to Pedagogy of the Oppressed,
1970 edition) i.e.
,
the nature of oppression/liberation and its relationship
to the nature of the human person.
2American Educational Studies Association Symposium, New York,
1972, particularly papers presented by Grambs, Raywid, Epstein.
^Interview with author, Detroit, 1974.
^Discussions at AESA meetings, Chicago, Illinois, February 1974.
PART I
Paulo Freire: Man of Brazil
CHAPTER I: Biographical Background
Paulo Freire styles himself a "Man of the Third World. " He was
bom in Recife, in Northeast Brazil, in 1921, of a middle class family, which
later came to know acute poverty in the Depression of the Thirties. Freire
fell behind almost two years in elementary school. He later ascribed the
retardation to hunger. The delay was quickly overcome when family
circumstances improved, but the fact made a profound impression on the
boy, and was causal in his adult dedication to fighting the causes of poverty.
He attended the University of Recife where he studied law and philosophy.
After graduation, he worked briefly as a labor union lawyer in the emerging
trade unions (sindicatos) of the Northeast of Brazil. Here he became involved
in the Popular Culture Movement. With others in the movement, he evolved
the method of conscientizacao for adult education, in an effort to prepare the
people to take their place in a nation which was rapidly industrializing and
which had moved, almost without transition, from a feudal to a democratic
structure of government. The method called conscientizacao, involved
discussions, stimulated by visuals and schematic representations, by which
17
the people, in "culture circles" rather than in traditional classes, explored
such themes as nationalism, remission of profits abroad, development,
dependence, and literacy. The aim of the popular culture movement was
the democratization of culture. The leaders hoped to raise class conscious-
ness, and to provide some of the essential skills for converting an increased
awareness into action.
The early 1960 T s also saw the beginnings of both urban and rural
unions in Brazil. About 1,300 farm workers’ unions were founded in twelve
months (Elias, 1974) and in 1963 farm workers’ strikes in Pernambuco
involved 84,000 workers the first time, 230,000 the second. Central to all
efforts at reform, however, was the movement to increase popular literacy,
since literacy was a requirement for voting.
It was the striking success of conscientizacao that gave Freire the
idea to apply the method to literacy training. Thus evolved the "Metodo
Paulo Freire. " (see Chapter 4, p. 52) Freire had been involved in adult
literacy work since 1947, had received his doctorate at the University of
Recife in 1959, and was at that time teaching educational philosophy and
history there. Except for the brief period as a lawyer, his principal
interests at this time were educational rather than political (Elias, 1971),
and in fact, when the popular culture movement began to show pronounced
communist leanings, he removed the base of his literacy training program
to the University, where he continued to involve students in it.
18
The success of his program was such that in 1963 the Minister of
Education of the Goulart government adopted the method for a Brazil-wide
literacy campaign. Although only a "pilot program" was actually completed,
this campaign proved so highly successful that 300 workers learned to read
and write at the newspaper and paperback book level in 45 days (Elias 1974).
With the military coup of 1964 this, along with almost all other
consciousness-raising literacy efforts, was suppressed as subversive.'1'
After seventy days in jail, Freire was invited to leave the country, and moved
his wife and five children to Chile.
There he worked with the ICIRA (Agrarian Reform Training and
Research Institute) and with UNESCO. Here he had an opportunity to reflect
critically on the Brazilian experience and to publish the first edition of the
book begun in prison: Educacao Como Pratica Liberdade. It contained his
-
—
sociological reflections on societies in transition.
In 1968, he published Education or Conscientization , his reflections
on his own experiences with the educational arm of the agrarian reform
movement in Chile and on its underlying assumptions. In it he describes
an already mature view of the role of education in the liberation of the
peasant, as opposed to education for modernization, or mere technological
training of the peasants. In the same year, Pedagogy of the Oppressed
appeared in Portuguese. It was later (1970) published in English. Obscure
and awkward in translation, the Pedagogy nonetheless represents a much
19
deeper reflection on the key philosophical components of conscientization
and on the revoluationary praxis it implies. It is not primarily concerned
with literacy in the 'literal’' sense but with a metaliteracy of cultural
revolution. Here are foreshadowed, in the last chapter of the Pedagogy
,
the
concepts of conversion and commitment found in many of Freire’s more
recent statements.
In 1969-70 Freire was visiting scholar at Harvard. There he
published two essays: "The Adult Literacy Process as Cultural Action for
Freedom, " and "Cultural Action and Conscientization. " These contain many
of the ideas which had appeared in papers delivered each year, and especially
in 1970 and 1971, at the CICOP Conferences. (Catholic International
Cooperation Program, sponsored by the Latin American Bureau of the
United States Catholic Conference.
)
Freire is now a consultant for education with the World Council of
Churches in Geneva. In addition to shorter articles, there exist a rather
long taped talk given in Rome in 1970: "Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating,
"
an article appearing in October 1970 on "The Educational Role of the Churches
in Latin American, " one on "Education, Liberation and the Church," and an
important interview: "Conscientisation and Revolution. " These carry
i
further the notions of revolutionary conversion and commitment foreshadowed
in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed. There is also a 1973 article on the
"Demystification of Conscientization" in which Freire clarifies notions on
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various kinds of false consciousness, and the price of critical consciousness.
In all of these it is possible to see an evolution and development of his
o
thought which he is constantly re-thinking and refining. By his own word
he seems to have moved through several levels of naivete to a critical
consciousness in a path paralleling that which he traces for societal stages
of consciousness. (See Chapter 3.)
Freire's position with the World Council gives him an important
opportunity to influence educational and political thinking on a broad scale.
It makes concrete his own commitment to liberation, for he admits that
accepting the position meant rejecting more lucrative offers. But it
continually confronts him with the dilemma of his personal life: the
contradiction between the call to active involvement among the oppressed
and the "ivory tower" reflection of a life of writing and speaking. He is
committed to praxis, yet forced by the medium of writing to some measure
of "banking" or depositing information.
3 However, the contradiction goes
deeper than a mode of educating. The dilemma: to continue writing,
speaking, thinking, from afar, or to leave Geneva and become wholly
involved in action. The dilemma is precisely what he means by praxis: a
dialectic of theory and action whose resolution lies at neither extreme.
This is the tension with which he presently lives. The contradiction
is not
resolved by the fact that he spends a portion of each year in
the Third
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World4 although he verifies his hypotheses there. Action or Theory: a
superficial solution opts for one or the other. Freire is more faithful to
the dialectic process, and holds both in tension until a synthesis emerges. ^
PART I - Chapter I - NOTES
1 , ^MEB, Movemento Educacao de Base, was not suppressed but
according to DeKadt (1969) and Perez (1971), greatly changed its nature.
O
Talk with students of New School of Religion, St. Basel's Institute,
Pontiac, Michigan, July 1974.
*^By praxis, Freire means the integral interaction and dialectic unity
of theory and action; a method of learning and of action which involves a group
of persons who'analyze a situation, name its contradictions, develop and act
upon strategies to change it, and reflect on the new situation thus created.
By "banking education" Freire means a mode of education where the
"contents of knowledge" are treated as a thing and the student as a bank vault
or spatialized container into which this "thing" is deposited.
^The 1973 "Third World Experience" was a walking trip through the
southern United States, and in particular Appalachia and other migrant
worker sections. In July 1974, speaking in Pontiac, Michigan, before a
seminar sponsored by the Institute for Justice and Peace, Freire expressed
astonishment that American graduate students go to Latin America to study
the problems of the "Third World" when they have so depressed, and oppressed,
an example on their doorsteps.
5Personal data in this, and the following chapters, was received, or
confirmed in a series of interviews with Paulo Freire, in the summer of
1974 in Detroit and Pontiac, Michigan.
CHAPTER 2: Historical Background: Brazil **r
__
Emerging into the arena of world democracies in this century, Brazil
carried forward from its past two significant, and related, characteristics:
dependency and silence. It was in no way prepared for participatory
democracy. This is the thesis of the essay: "Closed Society and Democratic
Inexperience" written by Freire from Chile, in 1968.
In the colonial period the plantation was the economic unit, the family
unit, and the political unit. Economically, it was the unit of production,
based on slave labor. Socially, it was organized as the clan, or extended
family, with blood relationships extended and tightened by an extensive
network of godparents and ritual kinships. Politically, there was no effective
external agency to exercise power or to dispense justice except the landowner.
(Freire, 1964) DeKadt characterizes the relationships that developed, at
every level, as "patron-dependent. "
All who operated under the Senhor were bound to
him by the principle of personal loyalty, accepted
and internalized by all involved, thereby bestowing
a quality of legitimacy (emphasis not in original)
on the Master’s exercise of power, despotic though
it may have been. (DeKadt, p. 12)
The Master's commands and position of authority were generally seen
as proper "within a framework of values accepted by all. " DeKadt cites Blau
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that "authority entails voluntary compliance in contrast to coercion, since
the influence of the superior on subordinates rests upon their own social
norms, " and sees this as one of the critical bases of the dependence
relations. (DeKadt, p. 37)
For the dependent, as well as for the master, this relationship
entailed certain goods, reminiscent of those of feudal times: protection,
land, education, sometimes privileges. But
the exchange is (always) asymmetrical: the
benefits for the dependent are conditioned by
the very existence of the system of unequal
distribution of power and resources which
operates to the advantage of the Master.
(DeKadt, p. 13)
The authority and feelings of personal loyalty engendered were not
based on free consent, for it was, de facto, the Master who controlled
economic resources: land, capital, and slaves.^ Further, the widespread
polygamy practiced by the masters engendered a large mestizo population
and added a biological, to the psychological foundation for what we will
later hear Freire naming "the internalized oppressor. " (Chapter 3)
The dependency that was evident from the beginning within the social
and political units inside Brazil, was also evident in its external relationship
to the Portuguese crown which claimed full personal loyalty and patronage
relationships. However, in practice, except for draining off resources,
the power of the central government was minimal, and the
powerful plantation
owners were not interfered with.
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When independence came, a few of the functions performed by the
patriarchal units were taken over by new organs of government, some of
whose members, "usually from the large landholding families" were used
by the Empire to strengthen its centralizing power. In practice, the power
base—in spite of the existence of newly created political parties—had shifted
very slightly.
Outside the urban centres—and even to a large
extent in the towns—these political parties were,
from the start, vehicles for the expression of
the personal power and the fulfillment of the
personal ambitions of the heads of particular
clans. (DeKadt, p. 15)
Thus Brazil developed an intensely personalist political system which
it retained throughout modem history, a system characterized by principles
taken straight from the patriarchal plantation, i.e. , the principle whereby
authority is upheld and legitimized by the expectation of personal loyalty,
and the principle that new functionaries would, and should, reward personal
loyalty from those beneath them. The stage was set for a spoils system.
Although voting power gradually increased and other democratic
structures were established, the patron-dependent relations remained
unchanged. What was new was that peasants no longer "gave" their vote to
their own landlord. They had discovered the commercial value of
the vote
and gave it to those patrons who promised the greatest favors—
in the form
of roads, or medical assistance, or housing. The
dependency relationship
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might now be called a "patron-client" relationship. But one could still not
speak of any kind of peasant or worker "class, " or "class interest" nor of
any widespread "class consciousness" among the rural peasants, not even
among those in areas where they were free from coercion in voting. (And
this was by no means universal.) Rather, an enlightened self-interest
replaced the loyalty motivation of the extended family, and gradually led to
party bosses, machine politics, and favors, without having changed at all
the basic pattern of dependency and ignorance of rights.
The basic mechanism on this level. . . remains
that of exchange of support for favors, for a
reciprocation to which no rightful claim exists.
(p. 32)
Accompanying dependency and nurtured by it was the "culture of
silence"—a term Freire applies to the situation of those who have no voice
or control over their socio-economic situation, and are, most often, unaware
and undesirous of such control. On the large landholdings, the social
distance between peasants and masters, even the most humanistic, prevented
dialogue.
The proper climate for dialogue is found in open
areas where men can develop a sense of participation
in a common life. Dialogue requires at least a
minimum of transitive consciousness, which cannot
develop under the closed conditions of the large
estate. Herein lie the roots of Brazilian 'mutism’;
societies which are denied dialogue in favor of
decrees become predominantly 'silent'. (Freire,
1973, p. 24)
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In the urban centers, the colonial municipal councils were controlled
by the privileged class. Common men were excluded from the elective
process and had no voice in their destiny, (p. 26) The arrival of the royal
court in 1808, and the ensuing reforms in urban industry and education,
promoted the power of the cities but not the participation of the common
man in the life of his community. Instead it promoted importation of
European ideas into universities and urban centers and further silenced
those who were rural, native, or backward. According to Freire in the
essay "Closed Society and Democratic Inexperience"
It was upon this vast lack of democratic experience,
characterized by a feudal mentality and sustained
by a colonial economic and social structure, that
we attempted to inaugurate a formal democracy.
Acting in accord with our state of cultural alienation,
we turned to societies we considered superior to ours
in search of a prefabricated solution for our own
problems. 3 And so we imported the structure of the
national democratic state without first considering our
own context, unaware that the inauthenticity of super-
imposed solutions dooms them to failure. Not only
did we lack experience in self-government when we
imported the democratic state; more importantly, we
were not yet able to offer the people either the
circumstances or the climate for their first experiments
in democracy , (emphasis not in original) Upon a
feudal economic structure and a social structure
within which men were defeated, crushed, and silenced,
we superimposed a social and political form which
required dialogue, participation, political and social
responsibility, as well as a degree of social and
political solidarity which we had not yet attained. (We
had reached only the level of private solidarity,
^ 4
demonstrated by such manifestations as the ’mutirao’.
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• • • Before it becomes a political form, democracy
is a form of life, characterized above all by a strong
component of transitive consciousness. Such
transitivity can neither appear nor develop except as
men are launched into debate, participating in the
examination of common problems. (Freire, 1973,
pp. 28-29)
For one hundred years the patron-client relationship between the
people and emerging municipal councils, or later, populist leaders, remained.
It was to receive an important new twist during the Vargas regime of the
1930's. One of the "favors" by which Vargas won the support and loyalty
of the urban workers was the passage of labor and social security legislation.
Gradually the meaning of the rights they had acquired
through labor and social security legislation was
apprehended by the urban working class. And it was
this changing consciousness which led to the trans-
formation of the urban masses at least into a
potentially autonomous force on the Brazilian
political scene. (DeKadt, p. 37)
Once the conception of rights begins to spread, other things can
happen:
1. People can insist that the gap between the rights acknowledged
on paper and the actual practice be closed;
2. Further rights can conceivably be won.
Out of this legislation was to emerge, for some at least, a sense of
citizenship, and the overthrow, in principle , of the patronage system. The
potential was present for a new consciousness. The members of the popular
culture movement set themselves to actualize this potential in urban areas
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and to generate awareness in the "submerged" people of the rural backlands.
Another movement pregnant for consciousness-raising was the
appearance, in 1955, of the first peasant league. Originally, it was a
modest association of peasants on the Fazenda Galilea, which was threatened
with dissolution and eviction from their land by the landowner. It was
defended through the courts and in the State Assembly by Francisco Juliao.
Eventually, in 1959, a decree was won, expropriating the land in favor of
the peasants. Use of the courts and legal structures in this way "was a
step in the direction of getting the peasant to shift from thinking in terms
of privileges and favors granted by the patrao, to seeing themselves as
citizens with rights under the law. " (p. 27) Leagues (ligas) of peasants
began to be organized elsewhere. At first these had limited objectives such
as the right to land tenure, the right to organize and to vote, but later they
developed a much stronger ideological position under the leadership of
Juliao, and demanded wholesale land reform. However, DeKadt cites several
sources to show that Juliao "acted like a new style ’coronel’ (petty political
leader) whose political power rested on the support of his followers" and
r
who was primarily interested in furthering his own political career. In
response to the question: "Was this a traditional 'following' on
the part of
the peasant, or did they act as a class?" DeKadt and the sociologists
he
cites, say no.
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The peasant behavior in the emerging peasant movements
should be considered as essentially continuous with their
behavior as dependents. . . they saw these organizations
—
and the sindicatos—fundamentally as providers of personal
services: medical, legal, economic, even educational,
and hardly as entities which promoted their collective
class interests. (DaKadt, pp. 27-29)
The people, by and large, even in the 1950's, were dependent on
external, paternal caring. The lack of critical awareness of their dependency,
of the political structures which maintained it, and of their own contributions
to a uniquely Brazilian culture became the focal point for efforts of
conscientizacao .
Alongside this system of patron-dependent, or patron-client relations,
with their orientation to privileges, favors, and donations rather than rights,
there existed a parallel dependency relationship. From colonial days to the
present, Brazil has been a being-for-others. It was exploited as a source
of raw materials and taxes by Portugal during the colonial period. Its
resources were developed by foreign capital for a foreign market
from the
days of independence onward. Today it is a market for foreign
consumer
goods manufactured in the United States and other Western
nations. Thus,
Brazil has developed only in dependence on, and for the
advantage of,
others outside her borders. Often local leaders within
Brazil have served
as agents or branch managers for the foreign
power. In order to change its
state of economic underdevelopment Brazil has to
rupture simultaneously
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two kinds of dependency relationships: at home, those of peasants to leader-
ship, and underdeveloped backlands to the metropolises; and abroad, the
economic ties that bind her as a dependent people to First and Second World
countries. In both cases consciousness is conditioned by the economic
dependency.
We will examine in greater detail the culture of silence already
referred to. With respect to the international situation, DeWitt comments
The fact that First and Second World powers provide
competing centers of attention for Third World
intellectuals only sustains the pattern whereby the
intellectual and spiritual dependence on the so-called
developed countries is sustained. . . . This intellectual
distortion of perspective has a concomitant atrophy of
social imagination that goes along with it. (DeWitt,
1974, p. 9)
\
DeWitt goes on to show, quoting DeTela, that where intellectuals
react against "cultural invasion by imperialist powers" they are influenced
by contents put forward by the mass media even when they rebelliously take
the logical extreme opposite view.
This logical opposite is usually as little suited to
guide action intelligently as the platitudes coming
from the international news agencies, (pp. 31-32)
Brazil was in 1959, and in many ways is today, a dependent people.
Both the internal and external dependency relations became the
target for radical thinkers in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s.
The movement
of protest was spearheaded by the student group: JUC (Juventude
Universitana
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Catolica), the AP (Acao Popular), and the Catholic clergy of the Northeast.
They rejected dogmatizing and imposition of ideologies and began meeting
with the workers and rural peasants in culture circles where various aspects
of culture were discussed, out of the everyday reality of the people. Thus
the people's consciousness was awakened to the fact that they themselves
were creators of culture every bit as much as the foreigners whose models
they had indiscriminately imported. The first aim of these culture circles
was consciousness-raising, but integral with that aim was that of literacy.
This goal was also that of the massive efforts made by the Goulart govern-
ment through SUDENE (Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast)
and by the Catholic Bishops through MEB (Movimento de Educacao de Base).
All these efforts were primarily consciousness-raising efforts, and by this
fact were subversive to any governmental regime which depended upon keeping
people unaware and manipulable. This fact was clearly recognized when they
were abruptly suppressed at the time of the military coup in 1964. Further,
All these efforts were going to reveal themselves
(in retrospect) as too young and fragile for their
purpose of an effective integration of the Norther-
eastern peasants into Brazilian society, to which
they had been kept marginal for years and for
centuries. (Perez, 1971)
Hence repressive action quickly returned the peasants
to their former state
of "silence.
"
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In summary: Brazil had been from colonial times a dependent and
relatively silent people. The apparent need for political consciousness-
—
,
(US
raising was perceived by the members of the popular culture movements of
the 1960’s. But life attitudes and patterns of thought are less susceptible
to mass education techniques than are technical training, including literacy
training. Political literacy requires time, and experiments in real action;
without these, discussion circles effect little at any depth. DeKadt observed
in 1966 and 1968 the same dependency patterns among peasants with whom
MEB had been working, as had been observable four decades before.
(DeKadt, Ch. 10, 14) Against this historical background, the following
review of Freire's sociological reflections on societies in transition and
the stages of consciousness associated with them, can be evaluated.
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PART I: CHAPTER 2 — NOTES
*See also comments by Freire in "Cultural Freedom in Latin America"
a paper delivered before the CICOP Conference in 1969, published in
Colonnese, Louis M. Human Rights and the Liberation of Man in the
Americas, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970,
p. 169.
^Transitive consciousness is a term used by Freire to mean the
accurate though superficial perception of their reality that persons have who
are beginning to realize the nature of their situation, to see that its limitations
are not absolute but can be transformed, and that they have certain powers and
rights. They have not, however, yet penetrated to the causes of what they
perceive. For example, a person formerly unaware of the racism within his
social group, and now becoming aware of it, often enters a period of transitive
consciousness and naive activity. He/she does not perceive the real causes
of racist behaviours, but does begin to name the situation at a superficial
level. Transitive consciousness is a middle stage between complete unaware-
ness ("submerged" or intransitive consciousness) and true understanding
(critical consciousness).
3
See also DeWitt, 1974, pp. 31-32.
^A common work project, such as roof-building.
5
See also DeWitt, 1974, ch. 2.
Chapter 3: Sociological Considerations: A Society in Transition
hi Education as a Practice of Freedom
,
Freire tells us that a society
in transition is a society moving from one historical epoch to another, from
an epoch characterized by one set of aspirations, concerns and values, the
themes of that epoch, to another where these are being superseded by a
different set of values and aspirations. In this chapter I shall review Freire's
analysis which he presents in the essays "Society in Transition," and
"Education versus Massification" in order to further solidify the perception
of the concrete situation in Brazil out of which his theories were bom, and
to clarify the most significant of the analytical tools he gives us: the
developmental stages of consciousness. This will also be an introduction to
Freire’s own writings, while we are still at the stage of establishing the
sociological and historical backgrounds of his work. These writings will be
treated in greater depth in Part III.
Freire reminds us that it is a mistake to believe that the transition
stage by which a society emerges from "silence" to full critical consciousness
is a short one. Nor is the ebb and flow of retreats and advances a cause for
distress: it marks a normal interplay while old values, ways of being and
understanding, which have still not exhausted their validity, clash with new
ones coming onto the scene.
The important thing, Freire says, for those who would take their
place in making history, and not be merely swept along by it, is that they
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perceive the marked contradictions occuring, the themes and tasks emerging.
For this they need a critical kind of consciousness. By critical consciousness
Freire means an awareness which penetrates beneath the surface of a situation
to discover the contradictory elements hidden in it, and the structures
(economic) which maintain the situation as it is. 1
Brazil in the 1950’s was moving out of the situation of a closed society.
A closed society is one where all decisions relative to economic and political
development are outsider decisions, made to the advantage of outside nations,
business agglomerate or Church, or made by the metropolis with respect
to underdeveloped backlands. Closed societies are
’’totalities in themselves" but also "parts of a
larger totality in which they find themselves
dependent upon central, manipulating societies.
"
(Freire, 1970c)
Within a closed society there is a total lack of popular participation
in public affairs, a lack, as we have seen, which characterizes the "culture
of silence. " In "Cultural Action and Conscientization" (1970 ) Freire
expands the description:
Latin American societies are closed societies
characterized by a rigid hierarchical social
structure; by the lack of internal markets, since
their economy is controlled from outside; by the
exportation of raw materials and the importation
of manufactured goods, without a voice in either
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process; by a precarious and selective educational
system where schools are an instrument for
maintaining the status quo; by high percentages of
illiteracy and disease, including the naively named
'tropical diseases' which are really diseases of
under-development and dependence; by alarming
rates of infant mortality; by malnutrition, often
with irreparable effects on mental faculties; by a
low life expectancy; and by a high rate of crime.
In the Third World all of these are the effects of closedness in the
Freirean sense. He reiterates that the essence of a closed society is the
lack of internal decision-making and the unawareness that the situation can
be otherwise: i.e.
,
the lack of perception of the structures of domination.
Corresponding to the state of a closed society is a semi-intransitive
mode of consciousness. Semi-intransitive consciousness is dependent on
the ideas of the master; it is dominated, having internalized, without
realizing it, the prescriptions of another. Freire calls it "submerged,"
unable to perceive the challenge of the situation in which it exists, nor its
structure, unaware of causality; hence given to magical explanations and to
fatalism. (1970d, p. 35) Models, values, consumer goods and education are
imported into a closed society because what one has, and what one is, is
considered inadequate.
The oppressive presence of authority, heartless
or paternalistic, makes these people introject
the image and myths of domination. This is one
of Freire's most powerful insights: submerged
people 'house the oppressor' within themselves.
(Perez, p. 33)
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But the Brazil of the ’ 50’s was what Freire calls a splitting society:
a society in transition.
The particular meaning and emphasis given by a
closed society to themes like democracy, popular
participation, freedom, property, authority, and
education were no longer adequate for a society in
transition. (Freire, 1973, p. 8)
Societies begin to split open due to economic changes. Freire believes
that the beginning of the split for Brazil was the abolition of slavery, which
diverted capital to industry and stimulated German, Italian, and Japanese
immigration, (p. 30) The industrialization trend became even stronger in
the 1920’s and the period following World War II. With this crack in the
structure of the closed society, people began to emerge and demand a
presence in national life.
Culture, the arts, literature, and science, showed
new tendencies toward research, identification with
Brazilian reality, and the planning of solutions
rather than their importation. (Freire, p. 31)
Suddenly, at least to the intellectuals and students,
the different evidence of underdevelopment
and oppression became unbearable irritants.
(p. 40)
People were beginning to be aware of the contradictions in their
situation, of myths that they had introjected, and which had served to keep
them inactive. They became noisy, demanding, and rebellious. These
characteristics are typical of people emerging from a closed society and
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Freire calls this a positive intermediate phase in the transition toward
critical consciousness. However, their awareness was only emerging.
There was no assessment, at this point, of the degree to which they had
been conditioned by old ideas and values
,
nor of the price required to bring
new perceptions to full practice. And so they were particularly vulnerable
to manipulation by populist leaders and to "massification. " A massified
society is one which is manipulated by its leaders, given answers rather
than stirred to question, and which accepts slogans and propaganda. ^
Brazil was both open and closed: open in the urban centers, still
closed in rural areas. Such is the ground from which popular leaders
spring. The politics of populism is a ’’response to the emergence of the
masses and their yearning for justice and participation. (Freire, 1967, p. 33)
They are allowed to vote and participate but the choices offered them are
not real choices. Whichever leader they elect, the same economic and
social conditions will obtain.
As DeKadt indicates, the patron-dependent relationship continues in
a populist period. It is symbiotic: populist leaders use the masses in their
own rise to power. But to rise they must preserve the semblance of
participatory government. Hence the masses gain some voice and economic
favors. And because of this minimal participation in the action of govern-
ment, educational changes take place in the people. Action
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creates conditions for the masses to further unveil
reality, furthers their knowing, and becomes a
factor in their democratic mobilization. (Freire,
1971, p. 465)
In spite of the fact that they are largely manipulated by populist
leaders, the people begin to discover that they can have power. Effective
action becomes conceivable only after there has been some action. This is
what occurred in Brazil during the Vargas regime. And Brazilians here
reflected in miniature what was taking place throughout the world: the
phenomenon of emergence of Third World people from silence, in juxtaposition
with the phenomenon of domination. Although the structures of external
dependence still exist
the total phenomenon of emergence in this transition
period consists, on the one hand, of the emergence
of the Third World from the whole world, and on the
other hand, of its underprivileged sectors from their
own totalities. (Freire, 1970c)
The mode of consciousness corresponding to societies in transition
(splitting societies) Freire calls naive-transitive, or "emergent. " Members
of transition societies have greater ability than formerly to perceive the
sources of the ambiguous existence of their society in objective conditions.
(Freire, 1970, p. 463) For example, they begin to recognize that there is
a profit being realized on the mines, and to ask why workers should not own
the fruits of their labor (although they would probably not use such words).
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One of the characteristics of this stage of consciousness is the
presence within it of the residues of previous conditioning—in the forms of
myths, naivete, and a continuing tendency to magical explanations and
solutions. Examples of myth-making are found in convictions that they
(the peasants) are less capable of learning, or that MGod wills them to be
content with their lot. "3
While there is an almost automatic transition from semi-intransitive
to naive -transitive consciousness as societies begin to open, there is no
automatic development to the next stage: that of critical consciousness which
is characteristic of an open society. Education is needed.
An open society resembles closely the ideal of a full participatory
democracy. It exhibits characteristics of sharing and public solidarity:
involvement of the whole group in the common problems of all. There is a
more even distribution of property; thus the structural support for social
distance is removed. There is also a tendency to demystify authority, a
healthy critical attitude, and openness to change. The mode of consciousness
corresponding to an open society, Freire calls critical-transitive, or
"inserting'’ consciousness. It is characterized by depth rather than
superficiality in the interpretation of problems, by substitution of causal
explanations for magical ones, by dialogue instead of polemics, by testing
and revising insights, and by detachment from preconceptions. Rejecting
irresponsibility, immobility, and the closing of options, whether new or
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old, it makes the perception of the reality itself an object of knowledge. The
movement from a naive to a critical level of thinking is effected by "perceiving
one’s former faulty perceptions, " and replacing them. The critique is of
self and of knowledge as much as of society.
Critical consciousness.
. . implies a questioning of
the relationships between men and the structured
world.
. . a heightened sensitivity to sloganizing,
mythologizing and ideologizing, that is, to any kind
of manipulation. (Perez, p. 35)
But not all societies achieve the level of critical consciousness, nor
do all members of a society achieve it simultaneously. The transitional
stage characterized by naive transitive consciousness, is peculiarly
susceptible to being diverted to that of a massified society, with a fanaticized
consciousness. As we have seen, a massified society is one which allows
the leaders to do its thinking and accepts manipulation in the form of slogans
and propaganda. A massified society is one which makes its myths those
of production, technological development and consumerism. It espouses
law and order, but without justice or real exercise of freedom. (Perez,
1971) The common people are excluded from the realm of decision-making.
Massification is a natural development of populism, wherein dependency
of the many is nurtured for the sake of political and economic gains of a
few. Not infrequently revolutionary leaders for the sake of quicker gains
in solidifying the revolution, use dependence-creating educational techniques
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which contradict their ends. See for example, the highly effective educational
program in Castro s Cuba, and the direction taken by the Acao Popular in
Brazil in 1963-64. In the short essay, "Education versus Massification"
(1973) Freire outlines both the direction and the danger of such development.
The ease with which emerging societies can be massified is related
to their extraordinary and irrational fear of freedom, a fear based on
generations of dependence. They evidence what Freire calls a fanaticised
consciousness: sectarian, mythologized, and frightened, which rigidities
positions and restores the people to the "culture of silence" without their
realizing that they have lost any real voice in their destiny.
Summary
All consciousness is awareness of the surrounding world but the modes
described above differ in the degree of responsibility or agency they assume.
A semi-intransitive consciousness is incapable of passing beyond considerations
of survival or biological necessity, of seeing causality, or of assuming a
place in a causal chain. As people begin to get some perspective on their
context and transcend the immediate, they perceive and respond to questions
arising from the world—to dialogue with it. But their naivete leads them
to over—simplification, underestimation of the common man, and gregarious-
ness (which is a clustering but not formation of a "class"). Their arguments
are fanciful, fragile, emotional polemics rather than dialogue, and they
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show little interest in scientific investigation. (Freire, 1973, p. 18)
Rebellions rather than responsibility characterize their action, but rebellions
quickly .palliated by "bread and circuses. "
Stages of Consciousness
The schema reproduced on the figure which follows, summarizes the
modes of consciousness described in the preceding section by orienting them
around the three generalized activities of praxis: naming, reflecting and
acting. Persons functioning in the semi-intransitive or magical mode avoid
identifying, or misidentify, the problems of their situation. Instead of
naming causes, they identify effects or symptoms as the real problem.
Example: "We are poor because we have poor health. . . " When asked to
go deeper, they ascribe causality to fate, luck, or divine powers, and
accept fatalistically that "nothing can be done. " They have internalized the
notion of their impotence and inadequacy, and acquiesced in dependency and
conformism.
Persons functioning in an ingenuous, naive-transitive model also
misidentify the problem and reduce complex situations to a "good guys -bad
guys" pattern, blaming individuals or groups among their fellows, or
superiors, for oppressive conditions. (For example: a slumlord or a chief
of police, or the president.) They operate on the level of doxa^ and have
not yet seen that the structures of the system are oppressive. If they place
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the problem in their own ranks they blame their failure to live up to the ideal
set by the rulers, and try to take the rulers and their way of life as models.
To be a man is to be like the oppressor. " Anger and violence are not
directed against the causes of injustice but horizontally, against one another.
If, on the other hand, they have identified the "bad guys" among the ruling
group, they tend to cluster together and defend themselves, more by rhetoric
than by significant action. Example: white liberals newly aware of racism
tend to play a "Get the Racist" game.
When people functioning in an ingenuous mode, begin to discover the
real extent of the problem and the cost of commitment, they often withdraw
from it, as impossible of solution. Individually they may become "astute"
and rationalize their lack of commitment. As a group, they are vulnerable
to charismatic leadership, emotionalism, and empty rhetoric. They want to
reform existing systems, not create new ones.
Unless they move on from this mode to that of critical consciousness,
they fixate and become fanatacized or massified: easily manipulated, they
"follow the crowd."
Persons functioning on a critical level of consciousness are able to
identify the problem. They penetrate below the surface phenomena to find
causes in the nature of the system itself whose unjust evaluations and ideology
they reject. They begin to recognize and eject values they had unconsciously
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held, and to form their own explicit value system, and they attempt to
understand the system, if necessary by trial and error, so as to begin to
transform it. Action tends to be quiet, cooperatively planned, effective,
and carefully evaluated. Key words are dialogue and commitment.
However, if the movement from ingenuous to critical consciousness is
obstructed, the group begins to exhibit the rigid, polemical, gullible
characteristics of a fanaticized consciousness. This identifies what Freire
calls a state of massification. Psychically they have returned to the culture
of silence even though they may be very vocal. For they have given up the
power to nsay their own word" and instead accept the words and slogans of
another.
It is Freire’s judgment that only a responsible leadership and a
special kind of education can bring quasi-children to critical citizens of an
ideal democracy, "highly permeable, interrogative, restless, dialogical"
but also responsible, and determined to remain intentional.
It was with this goal in mind that he evolved the consciousness-raising
literacy method for which he is famous and which will be described in the
next chapter.
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PART I - CHAPTER 3 — NOTES
1
For example: In Chile three years ago, critical consciousness
would have perceived that the power of external nations to control the economy
would necessarily destroy the effectiveness of the non-violent (cultural)
revolution in progress.
2
DeWitt in an unpublished paper, 1970, makes a case that the United
States of America is a massified society. Significant decisions, he claims,
are made only by technocrats and at a level of technological information that
excludes participation by the common people. Nor are the citizens aware
of the degree to which their lives are programmed for them.
^Examples of mythmaking regarding the "disadvantaged" in American
schools can be multiplied: "They have poor home situations, so they cannot
learn. " "They lacked early stimulation. " "They have poor attention spans. "
"They are less capable, inferior genetically."
^Doxa is used by Freire to mean knowledge on the level of opinion
without understanding of causality. See glossary.
^1 am indebted for this schema to William Smith and Dr. Alfred
Alschuler of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst who are engaged
in developing a coding system for the stages of consciousness based on field
experiences presently being conducted by Mr. Smith in Ecuador.
CHAPTER 4: Educational Methodology
To bring an ingenuous group of people to perceive the structures of
their society and to perceive them in an entirely new way, without at the
same time imposing outsider ideas on them, and without manipulation: this
is the task Freire envisioned for education. The task presents a dilemma
to the change agent, who sees the necessity
to achieve economic development as a support for
democracy, thereby ending the oppressive power of
the rich over the very poor. (Freire, pp. 18-19)
and yet is committed to follow the slow pace of a truly conscientizing
education.
Such was the situation in Brazil: without opportunities to act on
their reality, the Brazilian people could not reflect realistically on their
state of massification nor move to a critical consciousness.
The special contribution of the educator to the
birth of a new society would have to be a critical
education which could help to form critical attitudes,
for naive consciousness with which the people had
emerged into the historical process left them an
easy prey to irrationality. (Freire, pp. 37-38)
A conscientizing education is one which promotes growth toward awareness
and provides stimuli and the analytical tools as the learner finds a need
for them. However, the educator cannot bypass the process required of
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tliG learners themselves: that of naming the reality and creating change,
nor can the educator eliminate the dissonance out of which learning is bom.
In this chapter I shall describe the "Metodo Paulo Freire" in order
to show that the method had for its goal these awarenesses and activities
in the learner. But it coupled this goal with a phonetic approach to literacy
training, since literacy was a functional need peculiar to the socio-political
reality of the people.
According to Freire’ s analysis (p. 36) the education required by
Brazil and by other societies in transition would have to provide a way of
seeing the significance of the rapid changes in society and of participating
in them in ways more sophisticated and effective than rebellion. The
traditional education, given to irrelevant content, abstractions, and high-
flown phrases, was simply not adequate to the task of bringing men to
confront their problems and attack them scientifically. Above all, the
education Freire sought would have to be based on faith in people.
I was concerned to take advantage of that climate (of
transition) to attempt to rid our education of its
wordiness, its lack of faith in the student and his
power to discuss, to work, to create. Democracy
and democratic education are founded on faith in *
men, on the belief that they not only can, but
should discuss the world, their work, the problems
of democracy itself. Education is an act of love,
and thus an act of courage. It cannot fear the
analysis of reality, or under pain of revealing
itself as a farce, avoid creative discussion.
(pp. 18-19)
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Education like this is slow and difficult of development. It is based on a view
of the learner as one capable of self-determination. It is a view not shared
by those who unilaterally judge a nation or group 'backward, " "underdeveloped,
»
in need of modernization, " and who correspondingly give the techniques and
information for modernization.
Freire contrasts education, massification, domestication, and
modernization. He claims that mass production, while greatly increasing
man’s sphere of participation in production, so narrows his field of
specialization, requires him to behave mechanically, and separates his
activity from the total production, as to be a major instrument in his
domestication, or massification. (Here he seems to equate domestication
with "made one of the herd, conformed to the masses. ") Yet the dilemma
of the absolute need for improved technology is not solved by "turning back
the clock" but by confronting the contradiction: "not by rejection of the
machine but by the humanization of man. " (p. 35)
Freire demands that critical education not discount the paternalistic
cultural roots of Brazil, nor the activist mental attitudes being generated by
rapid advances in technology. He considers the confusion and rebellion of
the emerging masses positive. He challenges education, through the medium
of social and political experiences, to further the passage from naive
r
rebellion to critical consciousness. Instead of the traditional curriculum,
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disconnected from life,
we needed an education which would lead men to take a
new stance toward their problems—that of intimacy
with those problems, one oriented to research instead
of repeating irrelevant principles.
. . vitality instead
of insistence on the transmission of inert ideas—
that is to say, ideas that are merely received into the
mind without being utilized, or tested, or thrown into
fresh combinations, (p. 36)
Freire’s answer to the need was the "Metodo Paulo Freire.
"
The Pedagogical Method
Freire's literacy method integrates consciousness-raising about the
social and political situation and literacy instruction. The aim is conscious-
ness-raising; the immediate vehicle literacy, but a literacy whose mode of
instruction attempts to avoid imposing values or cultural content on the
people. 1 Originally in his method Freire distinguished between a pre-
literacy phase, a literacy training phase using generative words, and a post-
literacy phase where the focus was on generative themes. In Brazil, he
had been accustomed to precede the literacy phase by several discussions on
the theme of culture in general, the difference between what the earth
produced without people, and what people produced. The aim of these
sessions was to bring the people to recognize themselves as creators of
culture, to progress from a magical toward a critical consciousness, as
they distinguished the world of nature from that of culture, and to see
culture,
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not as the property of the learned who bestow it on
the unlettered but as the prerogative and possession
of all men who work, and by working, modify their
world. (Freire, 1971)
In Chile, at the request of the people, Freire' s followers collapsed this
culture exploration into the first stages, and indeed throughout the literacy
training, using codifications for the generative words that plunged the
people into discussions of the whole cultural as well as political situation.
(See Appendix II)
The literacy phase consists of the following steps: ^
1. An intense hearing of the thought-language of the
people in their day-to-day living situation.
-A team of people move into the area and live
with the people there, identifying those natural
leaders who would like to work with them on an
educational project, and building trust and
commitment with and to the people.
-Both these "experts" (sociologists, psychologists,
educators) and the volunteer "coordinators" from
the area begin to "decode" the situation: listening
to the conversation: syntax and idiom of the
people, observing interaction patterns, typical
moments of life, life-style, behaviors and metaphors.
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2. An analysis by the experts and their collaborators of
the recorded data to begin to identify the generative
themes which seem to hold highest priority in the life
of the people.
-The team discuss the themes and key words and
then return to the area to recheck what was
perceived; gradually the nuclei of contradictions
begin to emerge and be identified. 2
-They also study the inhabitants' level of awareness
of these contradictions which
a) constitute limit situations (conditions
which limit the peoples’ growth or freedom)
b) involve themes
c) indicate tasks
An incident from another context may serve as an example to clarify
some of these concepts. Generative themes are contained in what Freire
calls limit-situations: situations which by the contradictions they contain
impose limits on human beings, and imply tasks opposing them: limit acts.
Limit acts are acts which challenge or test the limits of the present
situation. Because the situation contains contradictory realities,
people
respond to them in contradictory ways—some to preserve the status quo,
some to oppose it by limit acts.
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For example: An urban community is faced with the fact that their
teen-age children are not going to school, not wholly because they do not
want to learn, but because they have experienced rigidity, abuse, failure
and irrelevance. The alternatives of the parents are to continue to try to
coerce their children to attend, or to do nothing and see their children sent
away to training schools, or to try to establish a school their children find
more compatible. This is a limit situation. The dominant group, in this
case the school system, will try to maintain the schools as they are, and
only these; to reject any implication of fault in the system itself, and to
prefer that the "misfits" be sent away. As the community attempts to
establish another alternative a new problem emerges: money, constituting
a new limit situation, and calling for its own action: on the part of the
system, to maintain the status quo and disburse funds only to standard
programs; on the part of the community to raise funds from other sources
or find legal means of obtaining it from the system.
The limit situation described contains contradictory realities: to
those in power the original "crisis" was "normal" and any effort to change it
is seen as a threat to their dignity, professional competence, or pocketbooks.
To those suffering from it, it seemed unjust and unnecessary; effort to
change it is work for justice. Thus people respond to limit, or boundary
situations, in contradictory ways depending on which side of the boundary
they are on.
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The inhabitants' awareness of contradictions can binng them in this
way to an awareness of a task. But the team of experts may also find the
inhabitants of a region so "submerged" that they are unaware of the contra-
dictions in a situation. For example, if the people are totally unaware of
the oppressiveness and lack of the freedoms to which they have a right in
their present situation, the most evident theme is fatalism. Instead of a
task they see no alternative; there is no task. If however, the people are
aware of the situation and their place in it, and have begun to get a little
perspective on it (to objectify it), the theme may appear as domination, and
the task before them: liberation.
3. A selection by the team of the generative words. These
are words charged with emotional content and existential
meaning, recurring in the language of the people. They
contain the central themes, concepts which are significant
in the culture and in the political subjugation of the
people. They are called "generative" because they can
generate other words, the themes, and the whole
political context.
The words chosen are tri-syllabic, capable of being broken
into syllables. Because of the syllabic nature of the Spanish
and Portuguese languages these syllables can be built into
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whole families of words. For example: the word FAVELA
(slum, in Portuguese) gives rise to syllables: FA, FE, FI,
FO, FU, LA. ... which in turn build into other words.
The method is deeply contextual: Freire developed different
lists for rural and urban groups, and for Brazil and Chile. 3
The choice of words is also influenced by their capacity to
include the basic sounds of the language, to enable the
pupil to move from simple letters and sounds to more
complex, and most importantly, to confront the pupils
with their social, cultural, and political reality. Freire
objected to standard primers on the grounds that they
lacked emotional content in the vocabulary, were
insufficiently contextual, and overly paternalistic. ^
4. Codification of the generative words.
-These codifications maybe pictures, slides, stories,
dramatizations, or other materials which contain
or "encode" both word and theme. (See Appendix
II) The codifications become the stimulus for
discussion in the culture circles: groupings which
serve the purpose of classes, but are structured to
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avoid implication of traditional teacher-student roles.
The codifications must
a) represent situations familiar to the people,
while encoding the contradictions in the
situation
b) be not too explicit of the theme (avoid
sloganizing or propagandizing) nor yet too
enigmatic
c) be organized as a thematic fan: i. e.
,
open
out in the direction of other themes. This
is essential for the perception of inter-
relationships among themes.
d) represent contradictions inclusive of others
which constitute the system of contradictions
under study.
e) relate to the felt needs of the people.
The thematic characteristics of the codifications are the point of
focus for those used during the post-literacy phase of conscientization but
there is not a sharp difference between the two phases. The difference is
rather one of complexity and the intensity of analysis. Although the educators
attempt to avoid value imposition5 and to listen only to the metaphors and
themes they hear in the language of the people, it is undeniable that the choice
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of themes and words, and the method and philosophy are all explicit ethical
choices. The investigators are guided by a set of values relative to the
socio-political situation and hence there is high potential for manipulation
in the codifications.
5. Use of the codifications as stimuli for discussion groups:
"decodification.
"
-During the discussions, participants identify what is
happening in the picture and how it relates to their
own lives. They learn the key word, its syllables,
and the words that they themselves form from these
syllables. Most important, they become aware of
the political and social reality represented. As they
hear themselves stating the hitherto hidden themes
"and thereby make explicit their real consciousness
of the world" they also review what they had thought
about this situation previously and how their perceptions
have changed. Thus they increase in consciousness
of the facts, and, slowly, of the structures which cause
the oppressiveness of their situation, while making
their sortie into reading. With this method, Freire
found that 16-20 words were sufficient to teach a group
to read and write.
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Summary
The analysis of what Brazil needed in education, coupled with the
•
statistical evidence of widespread illiteracy^ shaped the famous Metodo
Paulo Freire. Illiteracy was an obstacle both to development and to the
creation of a democratic mentality. The development of culture circles where
themes such as illiteracy and voting rights, democracy, development and the
political evolution of Brazil were discussed, were the way the popular culture
movement began to address the need. Out of the cultural discussions grew
the literacy method.
From the beginning, we rejected the hypothesis of a
purely mechanistic literacy program and considered
the problem of teaching adults how to read in relation
to the awakening of their consciousness. We wished
to design a project in which we would attempt to move
from naivete to a critical attitude at the same time we
taught reading. We wanted a literacy program which
would be an introduction to the democratization of
culture, a program with men as its Subjects rather
than as patient recipients, a program which itself
would be an act of creation, capable of releasing other
creative acts, one in which students would develop the
impatience and vivacity which characterize search
and invention.
We began with the conviction that the role of man was
not only to be in the world, but to engage in relations
with the world—that through acts of creation and re-
creation, man makes cultural reality and thereby adds
to the natural world, which he did not make. We were
certain that man's relation to reality, expressed as
a Subject to an object, results in knowledge, which
man could express through language, (p. 43)
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In the post-literacy phase, planned for but not executed in Brazil
because of the coup, the aim was a widespread investigation of the themes
of the Brazilian people (20,000 culture circles were planned). At the same
time the investigators were preparing codifications to teach the people the
"art of dissociating ideas as an antidote to the domesticating power of
propaganda. " (p. 57) From Freire's illustrations it is easy to see why this
would be frightening to a regime whose stability depended on keeping people
from thinking and choosing independently. He says today (July 1974) that it
has always been his aim to defend, not subvert, democracy, but the defense
Freire intends is to lead the people to the state of "militant democracy"
(Mannheim), which is intelligent and critical, unafraid, without privilege,
rigidity, or hate; that is, a democracy wherein the people make rational
decisions which are effective for change.
To acquire literacy is more than to psychologically
and mechanically dominate reading and writing
techniques. It is to dominate these techniques in
terms of consciousness; to understand what one
reads and to write what one understands; it is to
communicate graphically. Acquiring literacy does
not involve memorizing sentences , words, or
syllables—lifeless objects unconnected to an
existential universe—but rather an attitude of
creation and re-creation, a self-transformation
producing a stance of intervention in one's context.
The educator's role is fundamentally to enter into
dialogue with the illiterate about concrete situations
and simply to offer him the instruments with which
he can teach himself to read and write, (p. 43)
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. . . I wish to emphasize that in educating adults,
to avoid a rote, mechanical process one must make
it possible for them to achieve critical consciousness
so that they can teach themselves to read and write.
As an active educational method helps a person to
become consciously aware of his context and his
condition as a human being, as Subject, it will
become an instrument of choice. At that point he
will become politicized, (p. 56)
Conclusion
From what has been said it is clear that consciousness-raising,
politicization and a vision of men and women as creative of knowledge and
of the world are inextricably associated with the concept and mechanic of
literacy, are logically prior to it, and in no way are they merely motivational.
For this reason, the next section will make explicit the important philosophical
concepts that shape Paulo Freire's view of the person, the world, consciousness,
knowledge, and education.
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PART I - Chapter 4--NOTES
1
This is not to say that values were absent. Freire argues cogently
i*1 Education for Critical Consciousness against the possibility of a neutral
or value-free education. But he argues equally vehemently in the Pedagogy
of the Oppressed against the right of any group to impose its value set on
another by manipulative means. Cole S. Brembeck and others at the
American Educational Studies Association Seminar on Freire, (New York City,
February 23, 1972) raise the question as to whether Freire is not naive in
thinking that it is possible to educate without manipulation and particularly
without inculcating the values held by the educators.
o
One example of a ’’contradiction" can be found in our American
society’s goal for the education of the so-called "disadvantaged. " Com-
pensatory education programs proliferate to "raise" them to the level of the
rest of the society, bring them to conformity with the rest of the school
population. The truth is, however, according to Freire (see Pedagogy)
that the oppressed are not "marginal" people, living outside society.
They have always been inside—inside the structure
which made them ’beings-for-others*. The solution is
not to 'integrate' them into the structure of oppression
but to transform that structure so that they can become
'beings-for-themselves. "’ (Pedagogy of the Oppressed,
pp. 61,65)
These are two different ways of viewing the problem, and lead to contradictory
solutions.
3Elias, 1973; also, Freire, Seminar, Fordham University, New
York City, 1972; Freire, 1973a.
^Freire in Colonesse, 1971, p. 118; Freire 1973a; M. E. B.
(Movimento Educa^ao de Base) is an educational organization de veloped by
the Bishops and Catholic Action groups of Northeast Brazil. Refer to Part
I, Chapter 1, note 3.
^Interview between author and Paulo Freire, July 8, 1974, Pontiac,
Michigan.
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Uon school-age children lacked schools.
16 million illiterates, 14 years and older.
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Chapte r 5 : Philosophical Assumptions and Postulate
s
In this chapter I shall list the philosophical postulates and assumptions
culled from Freire's writings in order to bring them sharply into focus and
to facilitate evaluation of their validity. From a clear understanding of the
philosophical springboard, rather than a translation of culture-oriented
methods, Freire's usefulness to us in evolving a theory of pedagogy will
emerge. What follows in educational methods should be consistent with the
philosophy. If we have today inconsistent and contradictory methods it may
be that we have not elucidated their underlying philosophies, to own them or
reject them. The following assumptions and postulates should be seen as
implicit in Freire's method, are explicit in his writings, and grew out of
his personal and historical context.
To summarize the philosophical concepts of Paulo Freire we can ask
three kinds of questions:
What kind of being is the human person ?
What kind of world does he or she live in ?
What are the relationships of the human person with
that world and with other persons who are part of it?
Out of these questions evolves the fourth: What is the task of education?
Although we separate the questions for the sake of clarity, the dialectic;
person-world, world-consciousness, person-person cannot be broken into
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separate entities, except for the sake of analysis. They are unities, which
can only be understood in relation.
The Human Person: The Meaning of Full Humanness
Freire's image of the human person is of one becoming, perfectible,
critically different from other forms of life and having the power and right
to know and shape his/her world, while being to some degree shaped by it.
The most important notes of humanness drawn from his writings can be
listed as postulates
:
1. The human person is essentially different from animals
and from non-living beings.
2. The difference centers in human intentionality: the
power of persons to anticipate, and to act for an end.
3. Intentionality implies and requires a second important
difference: the ability of human beings to objectify or
distance themselves from reality in order to reflect on
it.
4. Intentionality implies the power of choice.
5. Choice takes place in action. Deprived of possibilities
of significant action, one is deprived of choice.
6. Any treatment of persons which ignores, denies, or
inhibits their power of choice from outside (an outsider
decision) is dehumanizing. That is, the ESSENCE of
being human is related to choice.
7. Dehumanization may occur through an attack on a
person's
a) power of reflection: by silencing, mythologizing,
denying education, voice, or action.
b) power of action: by coercion, manipulation,
violence.
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8. Human beings are incomplete, perfectible, "ever able
to become more.
"
The World Situation: Domination Dehumanizes
Freire is not concerned in his writings with the biological or
evolutionary aspects of the world but with the sociological context of men
and women.
With respect to both the Third World, and the "Third World contained
in the First World": the world is characterized by
1. unequal distribution of goods, power, education.
2. structures which institutionalize and perpetuate inequities.
3. persons conditioned by their past experience to believe
that the world they know is the only world possible, and
that the way they have historically been treated is the
way they ought to have been treated.
4. persons who have identified progress with technology
and modernization;
persons who are sincerely, and sometimes naively,
engaged in efforts for human betterment;
persons who are critically aware of inequities, economic,
social and political causality, and of alternatives.
The "Man-Wo rid" Entity: A Dialectic Unity
The dialectic unity of human beings and their world is a causal aspect
of homeostasis in biological sciences and brings light to Piaget's theories of
\
the development of knowledge in children. But Freire makes unity more
integral still and strikes a decisive blow at dualism for those who can accept
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his insight as valid. He states:
"Man-world are not two entities but one entity.
"
"There is no consciousness without a world and no world
without human consciousness.
"
Elsewhere he expands on this.
1. Human beings are in-the-world, integral with it.
2. Human beings exist, stand out from the world,
objectify it.
3. Human beings relate to the world by knowledge and
action.
4. Human beings know their world only by praxis: reflection-
in-action and reflection-on-action.
5. Human beings reflect effectively on their world only by
dialogue.
6. Action to transform the world is possible.
7. Any significant change in the possibility of choice must
be preceded by structural change in the environment.
Interpersonal Relationships
The starting point for revolution is universal dialogical relationships.
1. Human beings exist, and grow, only in and by relationships.
2. Relationships with other persons may be:
(a) antidialogical: between "unequals", based on a
perception that some persons are intrinsically
better than others. This perception seems to
justify "banking education", manipulation,
invasion, conquest, control, propaganda.
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b) dialogical: between "equals", based on a perception
that all persons are intrinsically capable, self-
determining, and worthy of respect. This perception
leads to communication, cooperation, commitment,
and love.
3.
Only dialogical relationships are humanizing relationships.
Knowledge and Reality: Where is Truth?
Freire has a great deal to say about knowledge. The way reality is
perceived will condition not only what one is, but the way one acts; and hence
the reality to be perceived. The whole of Freire’s educational program
called consciousness-raising is based on his theories of the nature of
consciousness and knowledge. The postulates which follow express as
concisely as may be his epistemology. As will be seen, it is not possible to
divorce notions about knowledge from action.
1. Consciousness is not a mechanical mirroring of the world.
2. Consciousness is creative, but it does not create the
world it knows.
3. There is a dialectic tension between subjective and
objective; between consciousness and reality. Each
continuously modifies the other. Reality is the object
of consciousness, and also the determiner of consciousness.
4. Knowledge occurs in the interaction between persons; it
is a process whereby two persons, mediated by reality,
create a new reality: their perception of it. Their
ultimate transformation of the reality is dependent upon
this perception.
5. The cognizable object may be reality external to both
persons, or it may be one or both person’s perception of
that reality.
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One role of the teacher is to present his/her perception
for the mutual reflection of student and teacher.
6. Past cognitions of reality (the "content curriculum") are
not static. They also become the cognizable object for a
process of knowledge. UNTIL THEY DO, THERE IS NO
KNOWLEDGE. That is: "contents" are not knowledge.
7. DOXA is knowledge of reality at the surface level: "prise
de conscience", opinion, "knowledge about x."
8. LOGOS is knowledge of reality from within: understanding
of the infrastructure (inner relationships) and super-
structure (relationships to outside elements and structures).
Without logos, one cannot be said to "know x. "
9. LOGOS is critical consciousness.
10. LOGOS is achieved by praxis : conscientization: perceiving
contradictions, naming, problem-posing, dialoguing,
acting, and reflecting.
11. The WORD plays a key role in the development of
consciousness. Words may clarify, lead, or mythify
thought.
(Note: Words are necessary because there is distance.
Lacking immediate contact, we need words to carry
thought. Given body contact, eye contact, intellectual
contact, the need for articulation diminishes but does
not disappear. Only when each is "thinking with" the
other does communication become communion.)
12. Reality consists of the unity of the objective datum and
one's perception of it. Both constitute the object of
reflection.
13. It is a normal functioning of human intelligence to see
the whole in the part, hence from an examination of a
fragment (codification) to reconstruct both the surface
situation and the deep structure of reality.
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14. Conscientization effects real-world confrontation, and
cultural confrontation. In cultural confrontation, people
discover the reasons for their perceptions.
15. People who wish to "control" the future "domesticate"
it; i.e.
,
make it an extrapolation of the present.
However, if that happens there is no future, only more
of the present.
The Role of Education: Enabling Dialogue and New Consciousness
In various places Freire tells us that education is consciousness-
raising; education is liberation; education is communication. Most pregnant
is the tiny phrase: "Education is Revelation. " His only educational method
is praxis. His philosophy of method seems to be that persons become aware,
conscious of reality not from hearing but from doing. Consistent action to
change reality leads to awareness of its nature and causes.
1. Human freedom to act in the world is inhibited first from
within. Hence education plays a key role in liberation.
2. The role of education is to enable persons to liberate
themselves.
a) It must make them aware of their human powers
and rights.
b) It must make them aware of what is dehumanizing
in the situation.
c) It must enable them to see the inner structures of
reality, the contradictions.
d) It must enable them to envision a different situation.
e) It must enable them to develop alternative routes to
that vision, and to plan steps to achieve it.
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f) It must maintain hope in the possibility of internal
and external change.
g) It must provide opportunities for people to achieve
the technological skills necessary to effect change:
literacy, agrarian methods.
. . .
3. Education is not neutral: it operates to promote mechani-
zation or liberation.
4. Education is communication.
5. The only educational mode that recognizes the subjectivity
and dignity of the learner is co-learning dialogue. "There
are no teachers and students, but co-learners. "
6. By dialogical knowing, a new thing is created for both
knowers. In antidialogical or "banking" education there
is a transfer of the "knowledge already possessed" by
one, to the other.
This mode of teaching implies that knowledge is a thing,
static and spatialized, that can be packaged and given.
It confuses the process of knowledge with the content of
knowledge, and determinate (past) content with dynamic
and indeterminate (present and future) content.
7. Dialogue, respect, and intersubjectivity demand faith,
hope and love:
a) faith (non-naive) in the potential of others and of
self to grow;
b) hope, that with growth men and women will take
control of their lives and work together to change
unjust structures;
c) love, that places the interests of others, individuals
and the collectivity, ahead of one’s own; and places
commitment to achieve those interests ahead of
self, family, or class interests.
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This commitment is the demand which the great religions call sanctity,
and recognize as a life project. Where it is unenlightened, disillusioned,
or distorted, it leads to fanaticism, sectarianism, and inquisitorial
repression.
But in small groupings, where it has historically been able to approach
the ideal, very beautiful examples of communal growth and living have evolved,
enduring for short periods of time. No one has yet succeeded in getting enough
simultaneous sparking of this commitment to "full humanization" to establish
a "classless society.
"
Summary
In skeletal form these are the important concepts in Freire's
philosophical stance. There are a number of them with which educators,
philosophers, and sociologists in the United States may take exception. When
this occurs, accompanied by an attempt to use his methods nonetheless, the
result seems to reduce them to gimmickry and ineffectualness. For there
is a remarkable coherence and consistency among the basic postulates listed
above, which seems to require adhesion to the whole system or to none of
it. Whether or not this is a requirement can only be determined by examining
the remaining system while systematically denying each postulate. For
those "essential" postulates which survive such a process, there still remains
the need to probe their meaning and implications so as to arrive at one's
own acceptance or rejection of his position. This analysis will be part of the
task of Part III of this study.
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Conclusion: Part I
I<reire's sociology, politics, philosophy of education and methodology
rest on his philosophy of the human person.
The human person, essentially different from animals, is a being
capable of reflection, intention, and self-determination. This nature implies
the right to exercise these powers. However, he/she is not omniscient nor
totally free in his/her choices. Conditioned by a past, including life and
thought-patterns, worldview, and education, he/she screens reality through
the expectations generated by that past and chooses and acts accordingly.
The matrix of person-person and person-world relationships into
which human beings are bom is everywhere one of unequal distribution of
goods, exploitation, and domination. Some persons are prescribed to, and
decided for, by others without any conscious consent on the part of the
dominated. Education is a tool, at present, for prescription and conditioning,
for socializing an individual into the world of domination. /
The solution, as Freire sees it, is to change people's consciousness,
making them aware of the dimensions and effects of what they assent to,
and of alternatives; and to organize (or teach them how to organize) their
activities so that they may have power to carry their new awareness into
act. To do so will further increase their awareness.
All knowledge and all education are subordinated to political ends in
Freire's thought; and the political needs are subordinated to the changing of
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socio-economic realities. The ultimate goal is a society in which there will
be no institutionalized oppression; i.e.
,
no dominant class, although there
will always, presumably, be selfish individuals.
The weakness of the whole Freirean structure is evident when the
goal is so expressed. Except for brief comments such as: the cause of
alienation of the poor is "that their work does not belong to them, " there is
no systematic plan for a different economic model. Yet economics is the
handmaid of domination.
There is likewise no explicit plan for a societal structure such that
inevitable individual selfishness can be restrained from re-establishing a
dominant class (assuming that the revolutionary leadership has not already
become a dominant class).
There is no instrument for education save conscientization—with the
implication that to know what is wrong is to change it, or put differently, to
know the right thing will lead to doing the right thing. History, both before
and after Paul of Tarsus, belies this.
These lacks indicate a certain naivete. However these lacks relate
primarily to an ultimate goal. There is also historical evidence that striving
for the moon catalyzes a great deal of profitable scientific progress even if
one never expects to get there. And lo, the day the moon is suddenly within
reach; more immediate logistics can be determined.
76
Among the things catalyzed by Freire, I would hope to find: a re-
examination of our view of the human person: child and adult.
Macmurray calls the problem of the personal "the emerging problem
of our time. "
A re-examination of the process of knowing;
A re-examination of the nature and role of relationships;
A re-examination of education, in the light of the above.
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Epilogue to Part I
John Macmurray, the contemporary Scottish social philosopher,
touches on many of the issues Freire raises, building them into a system
which centers around the agency of the human person. Much that Freire
tacitly assumes, Macmurray makes explicit and criticizes.
Freire assumes a particular definition of the human person and the
universal theme of domination and defines domination (oppression) as a
denial of the fundamental nature, and hence rights, of men and women.
Macmurray states that the problem of the personal is the emergent problem
of our time, that the Cartesian definition of human nature as ’res cogitans'
is deficient and leads inevitably to dualism, but that the romantic correctives
for this dualism involved misplaced application of aesthetic norms and led
necessarily to the totalitarian state. Therefore it seems worth our while to
look a little more critically at the philosophical definition of the person which is
basic to Freirean argument, and which is expressed in fairly traditional,
neo-scholastic terms, with its Cartesian premises vaguely assumed.
Freire also assumes the dialectic logic of Hegel, and refers to
dialectic tension and synthesis, but without any clear precision as to what
the poles of the contradictions are in the realm of knowledge, nor what the
%
syntheses are. The discussion of knowing as process is vague and inprecise.
Macmurray shows the historic difficulties with the universal application of
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the organic (synthetic) model to human activity and emphasizes the role of
choice rather than synthesis. A re-examination of illustrations of Freire's
theory in this light seems called for, since the whole of the conscientizing
model is oriented to action choices*
Freire seems to require a totalistic, quasi- religious assent to the
need and mode for revolutionary action. The. model as he describes it in the
Pedagogy cannot be successful without such commitment. However, the
concept of total commitment in a certain mode of action makes one uncomfortable
smce it implies a substitution of means for ends, and an ultimate valuation
of one particular mode over others, which, dangerously, could lead to the
imposition of that mode on others.
A comparison of the modes of knowing and valuing as given in Macmurray
may put this aspect in perspective.
Freire postulates the possibility and desirability of dialogical, love-
motivated, interpersonal relationships as the basis of cultural revolution. On
a non-competitive societal level these are in opposition to the widespread,
competitive, invasive, and prescriptive modes of operation which characterize
schools, businesses, and governments. Macmurray concurs, arriving at the
same point from a philosophical analysis of human relationships and their
motivation.
Finally, Freire implies throughout his writings a moral stance. His
judgments are made from an implicit (not necessarily denominational)
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moral code. The question of the moral in education has been avoided too
long, confused with denominational and establishment issues, and decided
against by not deciding. Macmurray contrasts science, art, and religion as
modes of knowing, and shows the moral realm as the expression of person-to-
person relationships. This articulation is particularly apposite to our present
day humanistic emphases, and to what Freire pleads for.
In the following chapters we shall examine in their context the
Macmurray theses of agency and relatedness for the light they can shed on
Freire's philosophical position and the position of educational theorists with
whom we will compare him.
PART II: Philosophical Framework: John Macmurray
The central idea in Freire’s approach to knowledge—-and his only
methodology, is praxis. Praxis is more than the familiar concept of 'learning
by doing. " It is an example of the Marxist dialectic, the unity of reflection
and action: action informed by a reflection which accompanies, follows, and
precedes action. According to Freire's system, even though it is a learned
activity, this action- reflection is the proper action, i.e.
,
the distinguishing
property of human beings. The power to objectify and name the world is the
dividing line between the world of animals and that of men and women.
However, Freire does not build his concepts of person, action, and
knowledge into a systematic philosophical schema. I believe that there are
two reasons for this:
1. his primary purpose is political and educational,
rather than philosophical; and
2. he assumes that the correlations have already been
made.
He is acutely sensitive to the destructiveness of rupturing the dialectic:
reflection-action, by a too-prolonged attention to either reflection or action
alone. But he is not averse to intensive reflective activity using the tools
of analysis available to him. Both the Pedagogy of the Oppressed and
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Cultural Action for Freedom are examples of such reflection but they are not
equivalent to a systematic critique of knowledge.
The contemporary Scottish philosopher, John Macmurray, helps to
provide for this lack. He identifies the emergent problem for philosophy in
our time as the "crisis of the personal. " There is a remarkable closeness
between some of his conclusions and the unstated, but implicit and necessary
assumptions of Paulo Freire. This and the next chapters will examine these
conclusions in an effort to provide a systematic philosophical grounding for
Freire, and a matrix for comparison of some of the American educational
philosophies into which we would like to insert Freire's contribution. Although
some of Macmurray's material will seem irrelevant to the direct questions
raised by Freire, it is necessary for cohesiveness and for its bearing on an
evolving theory of pedagogy.
In this brief overview of Macmurray’s system, I shall present
-Macmurray’s identification of the emergent problem
for philosophy today "The Crisis of the Personal"
-A brief history of the inadequacy of old solutions and
their resultant dualism;
-A statement of Macmurray's postulates: Agency
and Relatedness;
-A summary, in the form of a list of statements, or brief
expositions, of the theory of knowledge,
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the theory of action, and the modes of relating which
flow from these postulates.
Throughout this section illustrations from Freire's work will be used
to show the similarity and dissimilarities in the tought of the two men.
Thus, I believe that the emerging implications will point in two directions:
backward to critique Freirean concepts already discussed, and forward to
show the direction of new thinking.
CHAPTER I: The Problem of the Personal:
Origin of Incomplete Metaphors
The thesis of Macmurray's analysis presented in the Self As Agent and
in Persons in Relation (1961) is this
:
If we are to have an adequate, coherent philosophical
system, we must reject the definition of the human
person as thinker: "cogito, ergo sum, " which has
come down to us from Descartes, and take as our
starting point instead, a definition of the self as
agent: an agent who is defined and becomes, only
in relation to other human beings.
To substantiate this statement, we must look at the kinds of problems
philosophers deal with. We are now at a critical point in history, he maintains,
forced by rapid social change to break with the past. In such an era, the
philosophers' first task is to discover the new problem for philosophy that
emerges in their own time.
In revolutionary periods philosophy responds to the
practical transformation of the way of life by a
radical transformation of its central problem. . . .
So long as the way of life remains viable, the
philosopher works within a framework of thought
which, in its general structure and its general
concepts, remains stable. His problems are
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problems of relevant detail and he finds them set
for him by difficulties in the theoretical field
itself. Their relation to the practical problems
of his society is indirect and need not be noticed.
But with a break in tradition.
. . his criticism
no longer touches this or that inadequacy or
inconsistency in a continuing tradition but the basis
of the tradition itself. He must find a new starting
point and his success depends on the discovery of the
emergent problem for philosophy in his own time.
(Macmurray 1957)
The problem in Cartesian times was that presented by the new physics
and chemistry, notions of substance and physical laws, and how the logic
of mathematics applied to the world of men. The problem in the 19th century,
which saw the rise of the life sciences, was how to think the organic. As we
will see, Romantic philosophers evolved a new logic: Hegelian dialectics,
and an almost universally applicable evolutionary model. Macmurray indicates
that the emergent problem for philosophy in our time is to discover the form of
the personal: how we are to think the human person.
Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness
of feeling, that the problem of the present lies in
the crisis of the personal; logical empiricism
recognizes it as a crisis of form and method. Both
are correct, and both are one-sided. The cultural
problem of the present is indeed the crisis of the
personal but the problem it presents to philosophy
is a formal one. It is to discover, or to construct,
the intellectual form of the personal. (Macmurray,
1957, p. 27)
Freire speaks in similar terms of periods of dramatic social change.
In a society in transition, he says, the problem is to identify the themes of
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the new epoch, (Freire 1973) which are superseding those of the old: to find
a way to think the structures of society. This is the analytical part of praxis.
For a time, old and new themes exist together, so long as old themes still have
viability. Freire's focus is on societal structures and historical process, but
he has made assumptions about the nature and functioning of men and women.
And these assumptions are wholly or partially incompatible with the mechanistic
and organic models which will be explained in the following paragraphs. For
his part, Freire assumes, rather than states, a somewhat scholastic definition
of the person. * But the uncritical acceptance of this definition may itself be
the source of the dualism, the subject/object dichotomies, which he denounces.
An attempt must be made at the very beginning to be precise about the form of
the personal. And whatever form is postulated, it must be adequate to all
that we now know about the person.
Macmurray tells us that philosophy is a reflective activity, concerned
with the
formal characters of the processes, activities,
or constructions in and through which the object
is theoretically determined, and since the Self
is an element of the world presented for knowing,
it (too) must be determined through the same
forms. (Macmurray, 1957, Chap. I)
Before, and especially since, the time of Descartes, philosophers have
grappled with the problem of the person. Descartes defined the Self as
thinker— res cogitans. By so doing, he created a system built around
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1. Self as the starting point
2. Self in isolation from other selves, a Subject for
whom all others are objects of its knowing
3. Self as primarily a thinker in search of knowledge.
But the division of the Self from the world it occupied and the reduction to
object of everything else, including other selves, raised questions for later
thinkers. How does the outer world get into the Mind? i.e.
,
How can the
Self, the knowing subject, make contact with the world? Can the Self know
that other selves exist? What is knowledge? Can we know the world as it
is, or do we invent our knowledge? How are ideas in the mind translated into
action? What is the relation between man and world, body and spirit?
Cartesians "knew" that knowledge was possible. They assumed existence
of a real world and a correspondence between that world and what was in the
mind. They were not distracted by the necessity to establish that correspondence
rigorously, except insofar as they verified their 'laws. " They saw the mind
more as a mirror of reality than a creative faculty. Their logic was the logic
of mathematics based on aggregates of identical units and arrived at laws
which are, within their field, as applicable to human beings as to stones: laws
of gravity, motion, heat, and light. But these formulations only partially
described the human. In fact, living organisms obey them absolutely only
when they are operating as things (e.g.
,
a person or a stone in free fall).
The Cartesian premises, Macmurray shows, led inevitably to a dualism that
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has not yet been completely overcome: a dichotomy between thought and
action, mind and body, subject-knower and world-known. (1957, Ch. I, II)
The problem of knowledge and the fact that living organisms reversed
entropic laws and followed their own dynamic in evolution, energy use, and
development, set the philosophers of the romantic era searching for new
models. Ultimately they arrived at conclusions that either denied the reality
of the outer world, postulating only mind as the norm of reality (Hegelian
idealism) or denied the importance of the idea in favor of the reality of the
world of action alone (Marxist materialism). (Macmurray, 1957, p. 31) Kant
demonstrated conclusively that there was no way, if one began from the
Cartesian premiss, that the mind could know the world-as-it-is. Having
argued Cartesianism to its logical absurdity, he, personally, found a way out
of the dilemma thus presented, in a thesis which he himself never developed:
REASON IS PRIMARILY PRACTICAL.
This is Macmurray's starting point. The argument goes like this: If
the premisses of Descartes, that the Self is primarily thinker, and isolated,
lead to an impossible divorce of knowledge in the mind from the world-out-
there, and if the logic of the various romantic philosophers who argued these
premisses to their logical conclusion is not at fault, then the premisses them-
selves must be wrong. The opposite, then is true. (Reductio ad absurdam)
The Self is not primarily a thinker who can be adequately understood in
isolation from other selves. Rather, the Self is primarily Agent: a do-er
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whose action is wholly informed by reflection. Further the Self is Agent in
relation with other agents and with a non-agent (non- rational) world.
Origin of Incomplete Metaphors
It is beyond the purpose of this work to review in detail all of the arguments
by which Macmurray shows the inadequacy of Cartesian and Romantic systems.
For the philosopher it is not necessary and for the layman it is uninteresting.
But these philosophies live on in educational practice in the form of metaphors
and attitudes, and influence our ways of conceiving the person. In addition,
much of Freire's writing is concerned with the nature of knowledge, dualism,
and mechanism. For this reason, let us look at them a little more closely.
The development of philosophy since Descartes has paralleled that of
science. The 17th and 18th centuries saw the rise of small particle physics
and chemistry, sciences concerned with the definition of substances and their
properties, and with discovering general laws, mathematically formulated and
universally applicable. At the same time Cartesian philosophy developed
around the concept of the human as a "substance who thinks," one who could
somehow also be reduced to common denominators and expressed by mathe-
matical laws.
Substance is that which is determined by thought as
a mathematical system. (Macmurray, 1957, p. 32)
The assumption was that
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pure mathematics provides the ideal form of all
valid knowledge and whatever cannot be determined
in this form is unknowable.
(1957 , p. 32)
But such "unknowables" exist, Macmurray reminds us, and since they
could not be validly referred to objects, given the above assumption, they came
to be referred to the subject, and to the creative spontaneity of the mind.
From this practice evolved metaphors which identify the subjective with the
illusory, unreal, and imaginary, as opposed to "cold, factual, objective"
truth. These metaphors and attitudes are with us today.
The mathematical "laws" which were developed and which described
patterns of activity of the material world, were based, precisely, on the fact
that material substances are continuants: i.e.
,
they continue to move in the
direction that they are going, or to act according to the observed pattern,
unless, and until, some outside force (agent) intervenes. Although called
laws, these "laws" are not normative but descriptive of existing patterns.
They can be applied to human beings, but only insofar as human beings and
continuants, that is, insofar as they are not, at the moment, operating
intentionally, (humanly) but simply as substances. For example: according
to the laws of falling bodies.
Cartesian logic is adequate for the scientific determination of the
material world, for discovering common patterns, cause and effect relation-
ships, in a world of non-living substances and energy. But it is inadequate
to express the personal for several reasons. It assumes that reality is made
90
of aggregates of identical units, moved merely as objects are moved. The
Self and its activities, especially its activities as thinker, are beyond this
domain. Cartesian logic can give no account of the spontaneous activity of
the mind or its power to create the very constructs which science calls laws.
To illustrate: it is the thought-activity of the Self which provides the
categories for viewing the material world. 2 The concept: "Self is a
substance" is an example of such a construct. But no substance, as defined
by the Cartesians, is capable of these spontaneous constructions.
The precise point in history where the Cartesian system began to fail
was in expressing the spontaneous, self-determining, and self-directed
development characteristics of living things. However before leaving the
Cartesian model for that of the romantics let us note that the treatment of
individuals as objects
,
the prediction of their future activity by extrapolation
from their past, based on a perception of them as non-agents or as continuants,
and the oppressiveness of an economic and political system constructed on
this perception: to keep the people non-agents, are important objects of
Freire’s attack. Although philosophers long ago saw the inadequacy of a
purely Cartesian approach to the personal, educators are still operating on
principles crystallized into methodology from Cartesianism. This point
will be developed in Part III.
The inadequacy of the Cartesian system became evident in the 19th
century when the biological sciences began to gain the ascendancy. Philosophy
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was faced with a new problem: the form of the organic.
It is in the phenomena of life, and particularly in
the processes of growth that this spontaneity of
inner self-determination and directed development
seem to be characteristically manifest. (Macmurray,
1957, p. 33)
The form of the living organism is not one of growth by aggregation, as with
a crystal, nor is its activity explainable by chemical laws alone. It subsumes
physical and chemical properties into a higher kind of activity. It reverses
entropic laws, builds structures of higher energy from those of lower, and
develops by synthesizing unlike components at each succeeding stage of
embryonic and later development. Its form is that of a tension of opposites,
harmoniously balanced, and achieved over time: "a differentiation of elements
within the whole. " (p. 35) Its logic is not mathematical but dialectical.
The organic form and logic are adequate to embryology, maturation,
evolution. The question we must consider is : Can they be extended to the
whole of reality, and particularly to include the concept of the Self and its
activities?^ Is the process of learning some kind of "self-determining
development" similar to that of the embryo, in which "an original undifferentiated
unity differentiates itself progressively, while maintaining a functional coherence
of its elements?” (p. 35) Embryonic maturation follows this pattern. What
about the development of knowledge in the child, or adult? Is it a progressive
synthesis of unlike components?, an alternation of thesis and antithesis,
leading to synthesis?
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If such synthesis occurs, and there is evidence that in many cases it
does ,4 it is the imagination which, for the romantic philosophers, plays the
y role. For the Cartesians, the imagination was primarily reproductive,
holdmg in memory the data for scientific reflection. For the romantic
philosophers it was productive: creating the synthesis which is knowledge.
But accepting this role for the imagination creates a new problem
without solving the old one. If we invent our knowledge, all knowledge becomes
problematical. And the dualist questions remain: how does knowledge in the
mind correspond to and affect the world out there? How do we know truth?
Among the romantic philosophers there were varied answers: that the
real world is that of the mind; (Hegel), that truth is what satisfies the mind
(aesthetic criterion); that faith, or innate categories, or laws provide the
criteria for determining truth; (Hamann, Kant) that the real world is that of
action (Marx). 5
To Macmurray, the most critical issue emerging from the ascendance of
organic philosophy, is the dominance of the biological metaphor in philosophy:
the analogy of growth which so profoundly influenced Dewey (Berry, 1972)
covering "all organic and evolutionary types of philosophy down to Alexander
v
and Whitehead, " (Macmurray, 1957, p. 34) as well as dialectical materialism.
Macmurray regards this dominance as critical because it assumes that the
human being, or at least the child, is essentially an organism, which only
becomes "human" over time, and it negates the specific difference of the
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human: intentionality.
The creative role assigned to the imagination creates an additional
problem. It reduces all knowledge to the realm of the aesthetic
for it is the function of the artistic imagination to
recombine elements of experience in a way that
is not itself experience.
What satisfies the mind" is the criterion for art. This reduction eliminates
both science and morality as criteria of truth. In Macmurray’s view, such a
reduction, which flowed naturally from the romantic world-view, led to the
totalitarian state, i.e.
,
If the only criterion for the good and the true is the
aesthetically fitting and beautiful—"what satisfies the mind" of those in power
logically can be imposed upon others, even upon a whole nation. Again, it is
beyond the purposes of this work to go into the entire argument. However, the
roots of totalitarianism embedded in the romantic philosophies require critical
review, particularly as these philosophies begin to emerge today in new forms.
Further, the personification and glorification of Nature, the use of
concepts of teleology rather than intentionality in speaking of human beings,
uses which prevailed in the romantic era, led naturally to a type of mysticism
which totally subordinates the goals of the individual to those of the collectivity.
This trend also furthered the dominance of the facist state.
There are some indications of this type of mysticism in Freire’s approach
to cultural revolution. (Pedagogy , Ch. 4) Although Freire is much more
personalist than many educators of our time, it seems as though he too may
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not have completely analyzed nor adequately addressed the "crisis of the
personal. " At least, his writings repeat old definitions rather than clarifying
them
.
6
Macmurray comments that when science moved from an established
physics to a scientific biology, philosophy moved from a mathematics to an
organic form. It seems logical that the emergence of modem scientific
psychology should be accompanied by the emergence of a new form: that of
the personal.
However, the transition from an organic to a personal
conception of unity cannot be so simple as that from a
physical to an organic conception. The transformation
is much more fundamental. The difficulties are of the
same type as those which beset the effort to establish
psychology on a sure scientific basis. There are two
major difficulties. Firstly, so long as psychology is
conceived as a science of the mind, consciousness,
or the subjective, it fails. To establish itself it must
think of itself as a science of human behaviour.
Similarly, in the philosophical transition we can no
longer conceive the Self as the subject in experience, and
so as the knower. The Self must be conceived, not
theoretically as subject, but practically, as agent.
Secondly, human behaviour is comprehensible only in
terms of a dynamic social reference; the isolated,
purely individual self is a fiction. In philosophy this
means that the unity of the personal cannot be thought
as the form of an individual self, but only through the
mutuality of personal relationship. In face of both
difficulties a radical modification of our philosophical
tradition is demanded. The first requires us to
substitute for the Self as subject, the Self as agent;
and to make this substitution is to reject the traditional
distinction between subjective and objective . The second
compels us to abandon the traditional individualism or
egocentricity of our philosophy. We must introduce the
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second person as the necessary correlative of the first
and do our thinking not from the standpoint of the "I"
alone but of the "you and I. " (p. 38) (Emphasis not in
original.
)
Conclusion
There are elements of truth in the view of the human person as organism
but it is incomplete and results in inconsistencies. According to Macmurray it
leads to Hegelian idealism or to Marxist materialism, 7 It exacerbates rather
than solves the problem of dualism, and confronts us with the problematic nature
of all knowledge. Further, as Kierkegaard also noted, if Hegelian logic is
applied without qualification to the data of personal experience one produces a
"dialectic without a synthesis" for the
process of the personal life generates a tension of
opposites which can be resolved, not by reconciliation
but only by a choice between them, and for this
choice no rational ground can be found. (Macmurray,
1957, p. 36) 8
The question of choice, intentionality
,
human freedom, is precisely the question
that provides the key to Freire's arguments about humanizing and dehumanizing
structures. And it is the defining concept of the human person for Macmurray.
Macmurray identifies the problem of the personal as the critical problem
for philosophers today. He shows that Cartesian definitions of the person led
to mechanistic metaphors and perspectives that are still with us. More
significantly, he critiques the organic metaphor as inadequate and misleading.
Both lead to dualism, and stimulate the development of false views about how
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human beings learn, grow, and choose. Instead Macmurray defines the
human person as agent, and agency as reflective activity. From this new
standpoint he rethinks related philosophical problems about sensation, learning,
knowledge, and action. In the following pages I will present an overview of
this thought.
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PART II: Chapter 1 - NOTES
,,
PerS°n 18 a ratlonal animal
; he/she is able to be aware of self and
S
*?rCeptl°ns aS WeU aS aWare °f the external world
> ^ essentially
ee (free by nature") to make choices, i.e.
,
to act intentionally. The scholasticposition is that of moderate realism with respect to knowledge, and for the
most part, ignore in its educational systems the deliberate development of the
affective side of the human person.
2What we see depends on the "glasses" through which we look, and these
categories are the glasses. Freire's concern with extrojecting the oppressor
(see analysis of the Pedagogy) is a concern with being aware of "glasses,"
categories, ways of seeing. Once the oppressed perceive that these ways of
seeing are man-made, and that they themselves are equally human, it becomes
thinkable to extroject the "internal oppressor. " We must also note that the
tools of analysis Freire recommends, by which one may come to see the
deep structures of society" (see second stage of literacy training) are, for
the most part, Marxist tools, developed out of the Romantic era, and providing
another way of "seeing. "
Self here is used to mean the Subject of experience, the one who is and
who knows that he is.
4In this context, see the work of Festinger, Kelly, Hampden-Tumer.
asked Freire (7/10/74) whether the idealist issue was not, at our
moment in time, of merely historical interest, and why he spent to much time
re-arguing it. (cf "Extension or Communication, " 1968, and "Demystification
of Conscientization, " 1973, as well as many talks and seminars). His reply
was that it is very much alive in the dualism that turns up everywhere in
education: subject/object divisions; mind/will, body/soul.
. . .
g
For example, scholastic definitions of the person, distinctions of
human from animal, development of consciousness.
7Marx once commented that he had not destroyed the Hegelian dialectic, but
merely inverted it. He substituted the self-as-worker for the self-as-thinker,
without changing the organic unity patterns.
Q
By no rational ground" is meant no base provided by rationalist systems
whether Cartesian or Hegelian.
CHAPTER 2: Agency and Relatedness
We have seen in the preceding section that there are two basic criticisms
Macmurray makes of traditional philosophy:
1. It sets up a dualism when it gives primacy to the
theoretical over the practical.
2. It is egocentric. It provides for a number of "I's"
all essentially alike in relation to an object-wo rid,
but for no "you": that is, it makes no provision for
a person essentially different from the "I" and
correlated with it.
Because it proceeds from these bases, it ends in absurdity or inconsistency.
It seems logical then, that the corrective start from another base, give
primacy to the practical, and relate a person’s agency to his/her relationships
with other persons. To feel the full force of this imperative it is necessary to
study Macmurray’ s arguments in detail. However, this would take us too far
afield in this work. The purpose of this chapter is to look at a philosophical
system built around concepts of agency and relatedness as defining attributes
of persons. The degree to which this position can be substantiated may be
the degree to which we will be able to evaluate the objections of utopianism
leveled against Freire and against his requirements for dialogic community.
(Part I II)
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As we have already seen, the first question for philosophy today in
Macmurray’s view is the form of the personal, a way of thinking the human
person that will not do violence to the unity of reflective and active functions
nor destroy the integrity of the Self, yet will be applicable to all that is
essentially human whether the Self is considered alone or in society.
Macmurray has defined the person to be essentially in act: an agent, (Freire
speaks of praxis in the same sense) and states that men and women grow,
develop, and act only dialogically: in relation to other persons. Agency is
further defined as intentional action, action which includes reflection and is
constituted by it. Thinking then must inform all action if it is to be properly
human action and not mere activity. "Pure" thinking, which implies a with-
drawal from overt activity, is at the negative end of the action continuum
insofar as it is possible at all. Even ideally conceived, it is only possible
because it is based on prior actions and in its turn, affects future action. Out
of numerous examples of actions unique to person (Macmurray 1967, Ch. I)
Macmurray distills what he believes to be the essential characteristic of all
personal action and offers it to us as the form of the personal. Everything,
that is properly personal, he says, will have this form: that it can be
expressed as a positive which includes and is constituted by its own negative.
(For a discussion of the use of the negative in Macmurray, see Appendix III.)
What might this mean ?
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Example: Action is defined as a positive which must
necessarily include its negative: reflection—
withdrawal from external action. Without
reflection we have not ’'action" but "activity":
autonomic activity, habitual activity, chemical
activity, stimulus-response activity, but not
human action. Freire makes similar distinctions
between praxis and activism.
Example: Intention: purpose, value position, from which
one selects among actions, in view of an end to be
attained by one of them, includes necessarily
(and is constituted by) its negative—attention
:
by
which one adverts to the qualities of various
activities, is conscious of what one is doing or
studying, but without choosing, at this time, the
end to which this study or activity may ultimately
be directed. (For example: the selective attention
of nuclear scientists in the ’20’s:some of these
scientists disowned violently the ends to which
their research was put in 1945.
)
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Example: Community
:
a grouping of persons based on love,
trust, and communication, for heterocentric ends,
includes its negative
—
society : a grouping of
persons constituted by something other than love,
usually fear, and bound together for egocentric
ends such as mutual protection or aggrandizement.
We can express more succinctly all that has been said above in Macmurray's
four postulates
:
1. The Self is Agent and exists as Agent.
2. The Self is also Subject (thinker) but cannot exist as
Subject.
3. The Self is Subject in, and for, the Self as Agent.
4. The Self can be Agent only by being Subject.
What then are the important philosphical questions to be reconsidered from
the standpoint of agency? The following form the framework for a philosophy
jX
of the person, and indirectly, of education:
V-
1. What is the relationship of thinking to agency, or of
the Self-as-Subject to the Self-as-Agent?
2. What is the nature and role of reflection, of theory?
3. How do we achieve knowledge? How does the role of
sense perception, consciousness, motivation, and
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valuation change when viewed from the position of
agency ?
4. How are the modes of reflection related from this
position?
5. What has all this to do with society and human freedom?
Macmurray's answers to these questions will be the substance of this and the
next chapter.
The Relationship of Thinking to Agency
As with everything that is personal the relationship of the Self-as-Agent
to the Self-as-Subject is that of a positive and its included negative. The
Agent must include the thinker, must sometimes stand over against the world
as spectator, to reflect on it, but is also and always in dynamic tension with
that world. Freire speaks of the man-world dialectic, where each pole is
causally effective upon the other. Macmurray develops a further interesting
extension of the fact that the Self cannot exist as Subject (alone). In reflection,
he says, the Self is at least theoretically outside the world it contemplates:
t
over against it, a Spectator. But this is, in fact, impossible. To exist is to
be in the world. Therefore the more the Self approaches the pole of perfect
Subject—the more it is "outside the world, looking on"—the more it does not
exist. The Self exists only as Agent.
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As Agent the Self is Body (material): able to affect bodies which offer
resistance to action, and able to offer resistance in turn. By resisting, it
makes possible the acts of others. 1 As subject, the self is non-agent, non-
body—nobody. This same negative connotation is carried by many of our
metaphors. For example, "a 'mental note’ is, in fact, a note which is not
made. ” As Agent then, I am body, operative, material, and existent. As
Subject I am mind, causally ineffective, immaterial, and non-existent.
But this whole play with the body/mind duality disappears if the Self is
posited as Agent, and Action as including its negative, thought. The unity of
the Self, Self-as-Subject and Self-as
-Agent, requires a unity of self-affirmation
and self-negation. (I am agent, i. e.
,
acting. But for the moment, I am non-
agent insofar as I am thinking and abstaining from acting. And the nature
of human action is such that at all times it is some combination of acting and
non-acting, action + reflection, Self-affirming and simultaneously Self-
negating.) This is what Macmurray calls the form of the personal, when he
postulates that the Self is constituted by its capacity for Self-negation: i.e.
,
the agent is constituted by its capacity to be also and simultaneously thinker.
Action, then, is defined as
a full, concrete (causal) activity of the self in
which all its capacities, (sense perception,
judgment, movement.
.
.) are employed;
while
thought is constituted by the exclusion of some
of these powers and a withdrawal into an activity
which is less concrete and less complete.
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If it is assumed that the aim of thought is the discrimination between truth
and falsity, then thought must necessarily be a determinant of action and
modify the form of action. The question that a theoretical activity seeks to
answer can only arise in practical experience, and the truth or falsity of the
conclusion can only be verified in practice. This statement is the underlying
assumption of praxis as Freire has developed it in the conscientizing process.
The nature of reflection
In reflection the Self withdraws from action, to stand as a spectator over
agamst the world, but it still attends selectively to one or another aspect of
action, and derives meaning. Attention is the negative of intention. Intention
or purpose looks forward in order to modify the world; attention looks backward
to learn its structure, to determine in idea what has already been determined
in fact, and is not to be modified by future action. Attention examines the
world of past actions, a continuant world. Such a world is already determined;
its determinateness governs all the activities of reflection. One's conclusions
then flow necessarily from the data, not from one’s intent.
The purpose of reflection is to achieve a theoretically more adequate
perception by attending to a re-presentation of events, and to do so it makes
use of methods such as abstraction, generalization, and particularization.
Freire states that this reflection on past events, and on one’s previous
perceptions of reality is the only means of growing to higher levels of
105
consciousness, of de-conditioning a naive consciousness, or perceiving the
"deep structures" of reality.
Macmurray distinguishes two principal modes of reflective activity,
appropriate to science and to art respectively: generalization, and particulariza-
tion.
1. Generalization of the representation, in order to
include as wide a group as possible in its extension.
In this mode, the thinker abstracts from all that is
unique, and attempts to see the object (event) as
constituted by external relations. The end product
of this process is ideal, a (pure) concept, a scientific
law.
2. Particularization of the representation in order to fill
in detail and render the object complete in all its
uniqueness, a "self-contained unity holding all the
attention within itself. " The end result of this process
is an image, an object of artistic activity.
Note that in both cases we are engaging in theoretical activity. Both the
mathematical formulation and the artistic intuition are representational,
ideal, and more or less conceptual; less or more intuitional. Both are the
result of reflective or theoretical activity, for it is the intent that constitutes
an activity theoretical or practical. The difference between theory and
practice lies in this:
A theoretical intention intends a determination of
the idea of the world without going beyond this to
a determination of the world itself.
For this reason the results of a theoretical activity
hhve a reference beyond themselves. For any
development of knowledge makes possible a
modification of action which was not possible
without it, whether such a modification is intended
or not. The extension of knowledge always extends
the range of possibility for action.
. . . Practical
activity includes theoretical activity, of necessity,
in its constitution. Theoretical activity excludes
practical activity from its intention, though not
necessarily from the means for the realization of
its intention. (Means such as a laboratory experi-
ment may be used for the furtherance of a theoretical
intention. ) Consequently, its results are meaningless
in themselves, and require a reference to action to
give them meaning. They can be valid or invalid
through a reference to the validity or invalidity of
the practical activity which they suggest.
Macmurray states that in personal action there is a continual rhythm of
"withdrawal and return, " or action-contemplation-action; reflection is often
forced upon us when we meet unforeseen difficulties in action. For Freire,
reflection is an essential part of praxis which "names" the contradictions
that emerge in the action. In such a case reflection is clearly subordinate
to, and for the sake of action. But Macmurray warns it need not be so:
the moment of withdrawal into reflection may be
prolonged indefinitely.
The operative intention may become the theoretical one, without specific
reference to any practical intention to which it is a means. Then knowledge
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becomes an end in itself, albeit irrational and meaningless.
for in the absence of all reference to the practical,
reflection becomes phantastic, incapable of either
truth or falsity.
However, Macmurray adds that even though there may be no particular
reference to practical application,
any modification of knowledge, since it is in the
Agent's knowledge, necessarily involves a
modification of his practical activity, whether
this is intended or not. We clearly cannot change
our ideas of the world in which we act without
in some way modifying our way of acting.
For example, suppose a group conceives of itself as inadequate, stupid,
impotent, or incapable of changing an oppressive environment. Probably that
group will take no action, or participate half-heartedly and even self-
destructively in action. Now suppose the group's ideas of themselves, for
some reason, change to an image of persons capable, intelligent and effective.
Their strategizing, their energy, and possibly the nature of their acting will
change, even though they may still be unable to achieve their goal.
Freire's focus on consciousness-raising and the highly theoretical nature
of his writings make sense in the light of this position. If indeed, a person's
ways of seeing reality change drastically, and it is hoped, in the directim of
a truer perception, one more reality-based, action will follow without one's
having to detail it.
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It is also in this sense that the Pedagogy which will be examined in
Part III can be seen as a handbook for revolution.
Knowledge and the Proofs of Knowinf,,
Sense perception, Consciousness, Motivation, Valuation
When we begin to consider sense perception from the stand-point of the
Agent-Self, it becotnes evident that the theories of sense percepdon we now
have are built printarily on a visual metaphor. They assume the primacy of
make vision the model for all sense perception. (Thought itself
is equated with ’Inner vision" and
-light,
" e. g. , "insight. „ This metaphor
reinforces the subject-as-observer concept, and flows naturally from the
Cartesian definition of the person. Macmurray offers instead the concept that
the self is aware of the Other primarily by touch. The Other is that which
resists my movement, my action. Tactual perception is necessarily per-
ception m action; it is the experience of resistance. The experience of
resistance is the experience of being blocked in something I am trying to do,
by some Other, prevented from achieving my will, frustrated. If the Self is
Agent, his moment-to-moment existence is identified with what he is doing
at the moment, and the "tactual experience of resistance is the experience of
the Other-than-myse If which prevents my doing whatever it is that I am doing
the moment. jt is a direct, immediate experience of the Other,
which however, gives only minimal knowledge about that Other: simply that
it exists and limits (negates) my Self.
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Space, time, shape, size, and texture are all concepts derived from
tactual perception. Tremendously increased discrimination of the Other is
made possible with the evolution of special organs of vision, and the fact that
the immediate stimulus for vision is light reflected from the Other, rather
than body contact. Thus contact can be anticipated. Discrimination of actual,
visual perception from imagination, illusion, hallucination, fantasy, or
dream, is based on correct reference of the image to the existent, and/or
present Other, and the verification of presence by contact.
Knowledge of Existence of the personal Other: How do we know that
other Selves exist?
Here the argumentation becomes much more obscure and we are thrown
back on common sense experience to bolster our logic. Macmurray draws on
the analogy of Newtonian physics to claim that the Self cannot, in fact, act
(move) unless there is resistance, and thus the existence of the Other, at
least as resistant, is necessary to any action: it supports action as well as
resisting it. Now assuming that the Self can exist only as Agent, then if there
were no possibility of agency: of action (and this would be the case if there
were no Other in the field) there could be no personal Self.
Macmurray extends the argument further to show that the Other is the
necessary correlate of the Self, and further that the Other must be like the
Self: not merely existent, or organism, but Agent. The weakness of the
argument’s impact stems from the organizational fact that Macmurray has not
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yet developed, and so cannot draw upon, concepts of personal relationship
which round out his definition of the person. If his insistence in making the
existence of the Agent-Self depend on the existence of Other Selves in the field
seems to belabor the obvious, perhaps we need to consider again the implications
for the humanness of the Self—when he/she operates in ways that allow only
that Self to be an Agent in a given field of action, attempting to reduce all
others to things.
Freire has a similar concept in passages where he speaks of "dehumanizing 1'
structures. Structures, in education, welfare systems, or government which
prevent personal action, intentional and self-determined, change persons into
things. The Self as person is not allowed to exist and eventually does not
exist. Persons cannot exist as persons except in a world of personal others.
In contrast when individuals begin to act upon these structures, working with
other persons, their own humanity is restored.
There are also ethical reasons why it is necessary for Macmurray to
establish the (necessary) existence of other Persons. It is only in a field of
other agents that an action can be judged to be right or wrong, since rightness
or wrongness derives from intention. And intentionality is a defining
characteristic only of agents. Action which cannot be wrong, also cannot be
right. If I am surrounded by a world of things, any act that suits me is right
for me. But when other persons who also have needs and desires and "rights"
come into conflict with me, the concept of right and wrong action comes into
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being. If we deny right and wrong as criteria for discriminating intentional
actions, we must seek some other criterion: perhaps what is useful to me
(pragmatism) or what is aesthetically satisfying or fitting. These standards
Macmurray discussed at the outset in his treatment of aesthetic norms and the
fascist state. As a concept, the rightness or wrongness of an action depends
on the existence of agents whose rights and needs are in conflict. Thus,
Macmurray situates religion and morality in the mutual relationships between
persons, and moral issues in a clash of wills.
Consciousness, sensory awareness, and feeling in relation to Knowledge:
Rationality has traditionally been seen as the differentia for the human
species. But in the past rationality meant ability to think and judge.
Macmurray retains the term to define the human, but appropriates it to his
new defining characteristic: agency. So Rational Consciousness is the
consciousness of self and the world of the Agent-Self. It implies the ability for
reflective, intentional action. Consciousness is reserved to subrational or
non-intentional awareness.
Consciousness then is that form of awareness of environment present
in non- rational or non-intentional beings, or human beings operating non-
intentionally. Macmurray argues at length that there is a break in the
continuity between all levels of moving-feeling consciousness below the human
level, and the level of the uniquely human, reflective, intentional or purposeful
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response. The former serve survival purposes (e.g.
,
the moving-feeling-
awareness of an animal’s sudden leap away from fire) and so have goals in
the teleological sens* The latter, rational awareness, may serve, or subvert,
survival purposes at the choice of the agent and have goals or purposes in the
uniquely intentional sense. Knowledge presupposes agency: the "I do," and
action implies intention. On the other hand, conscious activity implies
response to stimulus, an automatic, non-intentional activity, whether attended
to or not.
If by cognition we mean knowledge, then consciousness
is never cognitive, since knowledge depends on aware-
ness of the distinction between the Self and the Other,
and this is the basis of rational (or irrational)
behavior.
Thus Macmurray’s account of consciousness is behavioristic. Accepting
his definitions, there is no way to construct a continuum from the organic,
feeling-motive level to the personal level: action-cum
-knowledge, because,
by definition, consciousness excludes the rational element exclusive to persons.
This is not the common use of the term today and may therefore create some
confusion. But this is the concept Freire is also attempting to specify when
he distinguishes animal from human awareness (1968). Further, at the
negative pole of the consciousness-knowledge scale, sensory experience and
feeling are equally non-cognitive. At the opposite, or personal pole, knowledge
can include its negative: feeling, as easily as it includes sensory experience.
This has implications for non-humanists who would accept sensory data as
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valid source of knowledge but exclude feeling data as being non-objective and
non-scientific.
For it is the person who knows in acting, not his
mind or his thought, and feeling, like sense is a
necessary element in any personal consciousness.
The psychological analysis of consciousness into
cognitive, affective and conative is misleading.
. .
Consciousness as such has no cognitive element.
Only persons know in any proper sense of the term
and act with knowledge. And they know and develop
their knowledge as much through their capacity for
feeling as by using their senses, perhaps even more
so, since sense depends upon feeling in a manner
in which feeling does not depend on sense.
Theory./ Practice: and the Modes of Reflection
The heart of the human dialectic, and the source of its tension is the
relationship of theory and practice, of reflection to action. Establishing the
primacy of action and the role of reflection as an included negative seems to
down-play an important, satisfying and necessary human activity. In fact
this is not the intent. Instead we seek a coherent system and a different
perspective on the modes of reflective activity. The three modes of reflection
distinguished by Macmurray are religion, art and science. All derive from
action, refer in some symbolic way to action, and are distinguished by their
modes of operation, by what they suppress and by their levels of valuation.
Before considering this concept in greater detail, let me summarize some of
the notes by which Macmurray distinguishes action, as opposed to both activity
and reflection:
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1. IN ACTION there is choice and discrimination: I am doing
this and not that, and the choice inherent in the fact that
I am intentionally acting requires some ground of dis-
crimination, independent of the agent itself: i.e.
,
it
requires the existence of alternative possibles of which
the agent is aware, and a process of valuation.
2. IN ACTIVITY (such as a response to stimulus), the nature
of the activity depends on the nature of the organism
.
For example: an amoeba responds to the presence of a
foreign object by engulfing it (regardless of whether it
is food or a grain of sand). A person responds according
to the nature of the object presented; even a starving
person does not attempt to eat a flagpole; or if he does
we say he is no longer functioning "rationally" (no longer
a "person" in this respect).
Therefore, in action, the nature of the response is de-
pendent on the nature of the other, and on the conscious
awareness that the agent has of the Object. The ground
of choice is the agent’s knowledge of the Other.
3. Our knowledge of the past (memory) is the history of the
interrelations of the Self and Others up to now.
IN REFLECTION there is abstraction from action. At this point
1. The self becomes pure subject, over against the object
world.
2. The self is in the pure present.
3. The past, held in memory, is an object of knowledge: with
time as one of its dimensions—sometimes called the
"fourth dimension. " It can be considered a dimension,
i.e.
,
spatialized, because it is fixed. (This is an aspect
stressed by Freire as essential for any conscientization.
)
4. This past is a continuant: i.e.
,
completely determinate,
not to be modified further by action. Any predictions based
on it are based on its extrapolation, unchanging into the
future. (Freire refers to the same point, though less
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systematically, when he speaks of the necessity to
preserve the status quo, causing the need to reify history
and so dehumanize education and social structures.
History is robbed of its dynamism, and there is no future,
but only a continuation of the past.) (cf Role of the Churches
in L. A.)
5. It is the effort of reflection which extends and completes
our framentary memories.
Reflection
is characterized by attention,
is based on memory, and is
oriented to the past and the
determined. It attends to a
mode of the other, as focus
of reflection, in order to
ascertain its structure.
Action
is characterized by intention,
is based on anticipation, is
oriented to the future and the
undetermined. It intends a
modification of the other,
(by agency) in order to
determine its structure.
Modes of Reflection
Reflection, Macmurray states, can approach truth by one of two routes:
the particular or the general (p. 84). Let us accept, for the moment, that
truth is a completely adequate determination or representation of an object.
Both the particular and the general modes are ideal. To particularize is to
express the uniqueness of what is represented. This is the mode of the artist
and results in an intuition or an image. We ask: what about this object is
totally its own? To generalize is to suppress particularities, so that what
is represented is constituted, not as unique, but as having external relations
common to it and others. This is the mode of the scientist and results in a
concept, idea, or law. We ask: what about this object is like other objects?
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Freire's process of conscientization exemplifies both modes. The theme
is particularized in the artistic codification. The reliance on the gestalt-
making powers of the human mind contemplating the codification is the approach
of the artist to the search for truth. The second level search for patterns,
"the deep structures, " their contradictions, and generalization is the approach
of the scientist. When it lacks this second step, education may be failing
students because it fails to be scientific
!
According to Macmurray, the real difference between the practical and
the theoretical is in the intention of the agent. Both the work of the artist
and that of the scientist are theoretical activities because they intend a
modification of the representation of the Other, rather than practical activities
which intend the modification of the Other.
The distinctions it makes between sub-human and human knowing rest
precisely on the ability to think about and modify representations of the other
rather than modify the concrete, present other. The critical point of
consciousness-raising is the passage from what Piaget calls concrete
operational to formal operational reasoning.
But the most important basis for the distinction of practical from
theoretical activities is that of valuation. For action to begin at all valuation
must be present and valuation is always a question of feeling.
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1. Any action begins in a feeling of dissatisfaction with the
situation as it is (the motive) and terminates when that
feeling has been changed to one of satisfaction. This
statement presumes a completed action, not one
terminated prematurely. It applies to all action:
theoretical or practical. Without the motive feeling,
there is no action.
2. If we consider the world as a system of possibilities
of action, feeling, referred to a situation in this way,
_is valuation. It moves us to accept or to reject a
possibility of action. When we abstract from a
positive valuation, i.e.
,
when we reject the possibility
of action, then the world is considered as matter of
fact, system of events, an object of study. But the
negative valuation is still retained: i.e., selective
attention. We may choose to consider one aspect of
the world (to value it) rather than another. Accordingly
,
we have whole range of sciences: physics, chemistry,
history, sociology.
. . In the reflection phase of praxis,
selective attention focuses on economics and practical
aspects of reality.
3. The above discussion is based on a division of valuation
into positive and negative, a choice for action or a choice
against action, for reflection.
4. Valuation may also be based on the discrimination of
actions into means and ends. An act is a means, if it
is valued for the sake of some end. The intention passes
over to something else. This act is chosen, from
alternatives, for the sake of that end. An act is an end,
if it is valued for its own sake, a terminus of intention,
and a source of satisfaction.
The pursuit of science, (any science, natural, sociological, behavioral,
historical.
.
. ) insofar as it is without positive valuation, necessarily
become a means to some other end, determined not by itself, but by someone
outside: an agent. The agent may be the scientist himself, or another:
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government, university, business.
. . Freire considers both action in
general, and the particular action of learning, only as means to another end.
For this reason it is particularly important to critique the question of his
values, and choice of ends.
The first reflective mode is intellectual. It abstracts from positive
valuation but includes negative valuation: selective attention. One sees the
world as a system of possibilities of action; focusing on one or another
possibility results in the Sciences. As we have seen the method of the
sciences is that of generalization, the formulation of general laws or patterns
by the suppression of particular details. It yields a determination of the
World-as
-Means, to some further End.
The second reflective mode is the emotional. It sees the World-as-End
in itself, to be rested in, contemplated, enjoyed. The valuation is positive
and the method one of particularization. The object of this reflective activity
is the production of an adequate image to symbolize that to which it refers, and
the result is the external expression of a work of art.
Both of these modes result in ideal personal constructs. The production
of Boyle’s Law is no more a reproduction of the World-as-it-is than are the
unique interpretations of the artist. The difference lies in the fact that artist
and scientist proceed by different methods because they value the world
differently: the one, as a means to something else; (the scientist) the other,
as a good in itself; (the artist) and they focus on different aspects (particularities,
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or generalizable patterns) in their creative activity of expressing the world.
For some reason, perhaps the enduring presence of Greek philosophical
tradition, we consider the mode that suppresses particularities to be more
’’objectively true, ” but Macmurray insists that there is no ground for this. To
reiterate: both modes involve valuation, or feeling, which provides the motive
for the activity; and in both, we invent our knowledge. This knowledge then
requires reference to the world by some action, in order to verify it.
Freire is, in some sense, primarily a scientist. He uses artistic
expressions (codification) for what they are able to evoke in the minds of the
learners but his concern is an analysis of the world-as-means to the fuller
human relationships of persons in society. Human development and personal
self-determination are the focus of his values. The end, if expressed in
Macmurray’s terms, is a religious one; the means are scientific: analysis
and generalization. The reference to the real world in praxis verifies and
modifies the insights, and new theory leads to new action.
Summary: Up to this point we have established the form of the personal,
as a positive which includes a self-negation; the definition of the Self as
Agent, and the philosophical primacy of action over reflection; action, or
praxis, which includes and is informed by its negative- reflection. From this
viewpoint we have looked at the problem of dualism and seen how the new
central position of agency eliminates the mind/world dichotomy. It also
paves the way for resolution of the subject/object dichotomy which, however,
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is dealt with more effectively when Macmurray speaks of personal relationships.
We have also examined the genesis of knowledge, the perception of the Other,
the relation between practical and reflective activities (theory and practice)
and some of the distinctions between artistic and scientific forms of reflection.
Persons in Relation
The Self does not exist as an isolated Agent any more than it exists as
an isolated thinker, and this is the second major thesis of Macmurray’s
critique.
Persons are constituted by their mutual relations to each
other. I only exist as one element in the complex 'I and
You* (p. 24).
The form of the personal takes shape and is refined by the quality and motivation
of the relationships in which the person is involved. These relationships can
be looked at from several points of view and will be seen as personal or
impersonal, direct or indirect, fear-oriented or love-oriented. Within the
I-You relation which constitutes my existence and yours, I can isolate myself
from you in intention, and so my relationship to you becomes impersonal. In
this event, I am treating you as an object, refusing personal relations. A
personal relationship is one defined by mutual intentionality and agency; an
impersonal relationship is one in which, for purposes of science, economics,
or self-interest, one person treats the other, not as another agent, but as an
object for study or use (pp. 28-33).
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In the next section we will examine Macmurray's theory on types o£
relationships that evolve out of basic life positions, and their connection with
forms of society and modes of knowing.
Before doing so I would like to insert at this point an interlude to
distinguish personal and impersonal, direct and indirect relationships, because
these categories are valid and need not, necessarily, imply dehuminization.
In impersonal relationships the Other is seen as determinate, and hence
predictable, one whose patterns can be studied and behavioral laws derived.
Impersonality is the negative aspect of the personal;
since only a person can behave impersonally, just as
only a subject can think objectively.
Impersonal relations are valid when included in and for the sake of the
personal. For example in psychology one may undertake the study of persons
whose behavior is "abnormal" with the intention to promote their return to
health. However, because this requires abstracting for the moment from the
personal relationship, which is taken as normal, such treatment of persons
(as things) has to be justified.
A purely objective attitude toward another person can
only be justified if it falls within and is subordinate
to a personal norm. The other person may be treated,
rightly, as a means to the realization of our intentions,
and so conceived, rightly, as an object, only insofar as
this objective conception is recognized as a negative
and subordinate aspect of his existence as a person and
so far as our treatment of him is regulated by this
recognition.
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For example, for a scientist to "cause" illness in a patient merely to
serve the scientist's purposes of study would be to make the impersonal
relation exist for its own sake. By commonly accepted societal norms, this
cannot be justified.
Our relationships, then, with other persons are always personal, viewed
from the position of the Subject. From the position of the Other, they may be
personal or impersonal. They may also be direct or indirect, according as
we relate to the others as persons known to us, or relate to them as functionaries
grocer, salesman, farmers. It is necessary that someone fulfill these functions
for us; it is not necessaiy that he/she be personally known to us.
The scientific treatment of the other is governed by a different intention
from that of personal relationship. Personal relationship issues in a knowledge
proper to philosophy, a knowledge of persons as free and indeterminate agents,
in relation to ourselves. Scientific study issues in a science of anthropology,
wherein the Other is studied as an object, a continuant, one who is determinate
and predictible, conditioned and therefore (for the moment of study) denied
the property of free choice.
The relation of our personal to our impersonal knowledge
is the relation of two different emotional attitudes toward
the Other, which provide the motives for two different
ways of behaving toward the Other and therefore, in their
reflective aspect, of conceiving the Other.
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Although the impersonal concept of the other is in opposition to the
concept of person, it falls within the schema of the personal as a negative
included in and constituting the positive. This objective aspect of the Other
for me is always a component of the most personal relationships. (Even in
talking to a friend, we almost unconsciously observe him "objectively.’')
However, if we take the scientific account of the person as the complete account,
such that it entails the rejection of the personal conception, with the freedom
it implies, Macmurray reminds us that we are in error, and the error lies
not in the scientific account but in the philosophy of the human person which
of its nature includes the scientific and goes beyond it. We are in error because
we failed to understand the special character of scientific knowledge.
If science is exalted today it is in fact the result of a
false valuation of the objective attitude, a valuation
which makes it normative for all attitudes.
The distinction.
. . between a personal and an objective
knowledge rests upon this: that all objective knowledge
is knowledge of matter of fact only and necessarily
excludes any knowledge of what is matter of intention.
But persons, as person, are constituted by their power of choice,
i.e., of intention.
Since an objective knowledge of other persons cannot treat them as
agents, but must treat them as determinate objects or continuants,
determinism, in this sense, is a necessary component of scientific methodology.
The method consists in searching for patterns of behavior which recur without
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change and in formulating these into laws of general applicability. The
procedure is based on the assumption of continuance: that the patterns are
constants and will be found in the behavior of all members of a class.
In conclusion:
The field of the personal, with which we are concerned, is
defined by a personal attitude to other persons; the field
of the anthropological sciences by an impersonal attitude.
These two attitudes are primarily practical, though each
has its negative or reflective aspect. The personal
attitude is the attitude we adopt when we enter into
personal relation with others and treat them as persons.
Its reflective aspect, systematically pursued, is a
philosophical knowledge of the personal. The impersonal
attitude is the one in which we do not treat other people
as persons in personal relation with ourselves, but as
men, that is as members of a determinate class of
objects in our environment whose presence and behavior
limits, and so helps or hinders, the realization of our
own personal ends, and of whom we must take account,
since their presence conditions our own actions. This
too, has its reflective aspect in a knowledge which, when
methodically developed, provides a science, or set of
sciences of human behavior.
The philosophical knowledge of persons as persons, and therefore as
agents, is a full and inclusive knowledge of the personal other and includes its
negative, the fact that he/she is a continuant object in the world. The scientific
knowledge excludes consideration of his/her agency; it is objective, partial,
and for the sake of the personal, considering the other as a determinate object,
as he/she appears to the mere observer. Thus there is no necessary contra-
diction between personal freedom and scientific determinism in the
anthropological field.
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However, the concept of determinism refers to something else as well.
Not to whether I, a person, am continuant enough to be known and predicted,
but whether I, a person, can in fact make
-free choices- or whether I am so
determined by genes, environment, and subconscious programming that my
choices do not emanate from me. This aspect of determinism is not discussed
by Macmurray, for one of his assumptions is that agency, implying intentionality,
is possible. It is also an assumption made by Freire.
It is necessary to have scientific or impersonal knowledge of the other
not only for anthropological and psychological studies, but also for economic
and social considerations. I must assume that others, whom I do not know
personally, will continue to behave according to patterns that I have known in
the past—i.e.
,
that they will continue to make clothes, produce food, etc.
I count on this determinateness of "People as a whole" even though I know that
any individual "Other" could break with the pattern.
The organization of personal activities depends on an
objective and impersonal knowledge of the other.
We are, in fact, concerned with the distinction between direct and
indirect personal relationships.
Direct relations within the field of the personal involve
a personal acquaintance with one another. They may
or may not be personal at the level of those relations.
Indirect relations are relations between persons who
are not personally known to one another. (My relations
to the people who grow my food. ) All indirect relations
are necessarily impersonal.
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In these chapters we have established that human beings are, by essence,
agents, and that agency or action implies reflection or intentionality. Macmurray
at this point states that agency has meaning only with respect to other agents. He
postulates
1. that persons exist, act, and grow only in interaction with
other persons and
2. that there are two basic kinds of feeling-motivation which
characterize persons; love and fear.
These motivational patterns begin in infancy and set the scene not only for
individual life positions, but through them for the organization of societies,
modes of reflection, and politics. Given this bipolarity of motivation, the
problem of human existence, he states, is always the problem of reconciliation;
the return to positive motivation toward the other (in infancy, the mother)
after a period when the negative, fear, was dominant. The development of this
concept and its relation to modes of reflection and models for organization of
societies will be the subject of the next chapter.
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1. See the Analogy with physics,
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Chapter 3: Persons in Relation
The "newness" of Macmurray's philosophy is the importance he gives
to two premisses: (1) The person is above all Agent; and (2) The Person is
essentially shaped—qualified in his essence, in whatever it is which makes
him/her human—by the ways he/she is in relationship. So strong is this
second conviction that Macmurray relates modes of reflection, ways of
valuing life, forms of society and devices of politics to the types of relation-
ships that evolve from basic love and fear motivations.
This chapter will attempt only to present the essential notions of his
treatment of Persons in Relation although much of his interest and clarity
will necessarily be sacrificed in condensation. However, his insights bring
into new perspective Freire’s comments on dialogic and anti-dialogic
community and warn of points where inconsistencies may be hidden.
We will first look at Macmurray’s schema which derives the quality
and style of all relationships from the early-established attitudes of love and
fear. Although the developmental psychology is a product of his era, the
conclusions retain their validity. We shall then consider how these
motivations affect modes of action which he characterizes as communal,
contemplative and pragmatic, and modes of reflection which he expands
from the scientific, artistic, and religious bases already presented. These
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same motivations are then carried over into models of society, law, and
politics.
tte 0rganizinS the™ for the discussion of Persons in RelsHon
motivation. The bipolar motivation: love versus fear, runs through the
entire analysis, and is related to modes of reflection, organization of
societies, religion, art and science. Macmurray traces basic motivation
patterns from infancy in a development similar to that of Erickson (1950).
Like Erickson, he sees the fundamental problem of human life as reconciliation:
the return to positive motivation toward the other (in this case, the mother)
after a period when the negative was dominant. This becomes the primary
problem of human growth; its failure or avoidance an important factor in
explaining modes of morality, reflection, societal organization, and politics.
Without going into details of the argument, the main points of his thought on
persons and their relationships are summarized below.
1. The primary motivation in the child is positive or negative,
love or fear.
2. This primary motivation, love-fear, partakes of the form
of the personal: a positive which includes its negative.
Love includes the negative pole, fear, and dominates it.
3. Ordinarily in adult life the negative motivation, fear, is
masked by intentional choices. In fact, since motive is
the negative of intention it ordinarily only comes to the
surface of consciousness when intention is frustrated in
some way.
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4.
The origin for the child of the distinction between good and
evil is the problem of coping with its first experience of
evil; the Mother* s rejection of it by weaning.
Quality of Relationships
Macmurray relates the quality of relationships with the initial love/
fear polarity.
5. Patterns are established in personalities according to
whether love or fear is habitually dominant. Love leads
to a reaching out to others; fear to withdrawal in
self
-protection, or to aggressiveness. If fear, the
negative motivation, dominates, the child sees the
mother, and later on, others, as unpredictable, enemies
to be coped with, controlled, or defended against.
6. In cases where fear of the Other is the dominant feeling,
the problem of protecting the self is solved in opposite
ways* withdrawal or aggression, according to the
personality. Passive personalities tend to solve (or bypass)
the problem of reconciliation by trying to placate the
enemy, to conform, to become a "good boy" so as to win
caring and approval. This is an egocentric, defensive
position. Egocentric here implies no value judgement
but indicates that the concern is for self, not the Other.
The child is motivated by fear for self, fear_of the other.
More aggressive personalities fight the enemy, struggle
for power, become hostile, rebellious, "bad boy." This is
also an egocentric, defensive and isolated position. There
is no real return to unity with the Other, but an effort to
compel the Other's will to follow mine. It is also self-
defeating, since the hostility of the child begets further
rejection and hostility in return.
7. Both the conforming and the aggressive behavior have their
basic attitude determined by fear of a hostile world, a world
not to be trusted.
1318.
In persons in whom the positive motivation consistently
wins out over the negative, love dominates. Relation-
ships are heterocentric; there is a tendency to reach out,
to trust, to place the Other's interests first. The world
(and the Other) is seen as good.
Reconciliation and Growth
9.
In childhood, and at every point of growth, there must be
periods of disruption, of apparent rejection and disequilibrium.
For example, the child must learn to do for itself what the
Mother has heretofore done. But her refusal of the child
makes her appear to it "bad. " Then fear or rage dominates.
To effect the dominance of the positive again, the child must
see the illusions in the negative phase, and so dissolve the
conflict of wills.
This implies not so much a change of judgment as a change of valuation.
It means that the child must recognize as unreal what has been taken for
real (Mother is not really bad but only appears to be; she really loves me)
and reverse the valuation of the situation. Value is primarily a question of
feeling.
10.
The ability to do this depends on the recognition of the
distinction between appearance and reality.
The recognition of this distinction and ways of coping with it are important
throughout life. In the imperfect reconciliations referred to above, (good
boy, or bad boy approaches) where fear continues to be dominant, the child
either accedes to the mother's demands because it must, or tries to force
the mother's will to its own, but interiorly the valuation of the situation has
remained the same: mother is bad. Thus the child remains egocentric,
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conforms as policy, without finding any real satisfaction for its own desires
m conforming, because the solution imagined and desired is something other
than the reality. Macmurray believes that the source of our dualism as a
habit of thinking is found in the repetition of this mode of resolution, and its
crystallization into habit: i. e.
,
the habit of dividing the real world from the
world of the mind.
11. But Persons cannot exist except in relationship.
The reality of relationship is the full mutuality of fellowship
in a common life in which alone the individual can realize
self as a person.
The objective of all personal life is the achievement and
maintenance of a fully positive relation to the Other.
Both negative modes of relationship, conforming and aggressive, are
ambivalent because the very notion of relationship posits a bond with the
Other while these ways of behaving deny it and tend to destroy it. By seeking
to force the Other to care for me, they force the Other to defend himself
against me. And so they destroy mutuality. In its stead, the best that can
be hoped for is cooperation, but cooperation between persons or groups who
continue to fear and mistrust each other.
Therefore the quality of relationships relates directly to the habitual
ways an individual has come to perceive his world as hostile or friendly,
hence, to whether he/she is moved by fear or love. In a later discussion
Macmurray extends this motivational pattern to its effects on the organization
of life styles:
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The three modes are communal, contemplative, andpragmatic. They are related to the positive: love, and
e two negative: fear-conforming, and fear-aggressive
patterns respectively. ’
Persons who are fear dominated, with a tendency to withdraw from
life in order to protect self, tend to seek the contemplative.
Persons who are fear-dominated, with a tendency to control others
and/or political life in order to protect self, tend to seek the pragmatic.
Persons who are love-dominated, with a tendency to reach out and
trust life, tend to seek communal modes of living and acting.
These life styles will be discussed later in this study.
Morality and the World of ApHa»
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Morality is the science of relationships, their study, their building
and rebuilding. It is concerned with questions of right and wrong, such
questions are meaningless, according to Macmurray, unless they are seen
e context of relationships between agents who have mutual and conflicting
rights.
Modes of Perceiving: Predispositions of Morality
1* 1116 distinction between right and wrong choice is inherent
in the nature of action. An action is right or wrong
according to how it is ordered by intention and the claims
of others. "To ACT is to realize intention, with the
help of the Other. "
2. If the Other is considered a non-agent, we have an amoral
situation, according to Macmurray. In this case "to act
rightly, I must know, so far as it is relevant to my
intention, (my purposes) both what the properties and
characteristics of the Other (for example, an instrument)
are, and how to use the Other as means to my end. M
Wrong action in this case can occur through misapprehension of the
nature of the tool or through lack of skill in manipulating it. It is a question
of knowledge, style, or efficiency. Even using a tool "wrongly" I may, by
accident achieve my goal, but awkwardly, inefficiently, and with unnecessary
expenditure of effort. Right action, seen from this perspective, becomes
a matter merely of efficiency or style:
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a. of efficiency: if the primary intention of the agent
is the end to be achieved by the action (example:
completing a task)
b. of style: if the primary intention of the agent is the
means, a display of skill (example: a game of golf)
If efficiency is to be the criterion for right action, its norms are
provided by technology; if style, by aesthetics. The technological standards
are essentially pragmatic. A mechanistic view sees action only as means
to an end and discriminates right from wrong in terms of efficiency.
Aesthetic standards are essentially contemplative; they see action as an
organic whole, an end in itself, and discriminate good from bad action in
terms of stylistic quality. But it is important to remember that both the
technological and the aesthetic standards were derived from a consideration
of a solitary agent (that is, the Other was considered a non-Agent, not a
person). Neither the norm of Aesthetics nor of efficiency considers the
intention of the agent, nor allows the Other to be a person.
However, in the real world, this is a fictitious situation. There is
no action of a solitary agent, for agents exist only in relation to other agents.
Action is defined by intention; and rightness of intention cannot be discriminated
with respect to a single agent, nor can it be found in the use of one agent
as a means to another's ends. The grounds for discriminating rightness
from wrongness in intention are found not in the Self, but in the Other, who
is also intentional.
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The moral rightness of action has its ground in the
relation of persons.
The World of Action
Seen from the standpoint of Agency, the world in which we live is in
fact a unity of action. There are many agents. Therefore, if action is to
be a means to determine the future, there must be unity of intention, for
the world cannot be determined in incompatible ways.1 If two agents have
incompatible intentions, one or both necessarily must lose freedom:
Either one must yield to the other, of his own free
will, or they must seek to prevent one another from
acting.
In the first case, one of the agents loses his freedom
and cannot realize his nature as agent; in the second,
both lose their freedom until one has mastered the
other and forced him to abandon his intention.
. .
The intention of each party is dictated by the other
(hence there is no freedom) and neither determines
the common future. The struggle.
. . may have
quite catastrophic effects on the situation, but the
consequences are not intended by the agents in the
struggle.
Macmurray here is describing a situation of violence, however
peaceable be the means by which one or both lose freedom. For example,
when oppressor and oppressed have incompatible intentions for the use of
resources, one or both lose their freedom. The situation is, by its nature,
one of violence. The following postulates make explicit Macmurray's views on
action, freedom and interdependence.
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1* The interrelation of agents makes the freedom of all
depend on the intentions of each.
2. This interrelation of agents is the grounl of morality.
3. Thus, "the freedom of any agent is conditioned by the
action of all other agents. " My freedom depends on how
you behave.
4. If we call the harmonious interrelation of agents their
community, then a morally right action is an action which
intends community.
2
5. Since any act of any agent, within its limits determines the
future for all agents, every agent is responsible to all
other agents for his actions.
6. Freedom and responsibility name two aspects of the same
phenomenon. However, responsibility to the other is
limited by intention, and must be related to knowledge.
(And as Freire has shown, the quality of knowledge is
related to historic and social factors.)
7. Therefore, whatever an agent does is morally right if its
intention is to maintain the community of agents; morally
wrong if its intention is to the contrary.
Or, put succinctly: the moral rightness or wrongness of an action depends
on intention and attention. It depends on the intention directing it, and the
agent’s attention or apperception of the situation. Given this fact, education
is necessarily concerned with apperception and whether it is demonstrational
or not, necessarily education is concerned with the moral.
8. The moral orthodoxy of a community is established
by the mode of apperception common to its members.
For example, what Freire perceives as prophetic in the role of the Churches
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in Latin America, may be seen as merely political, or even taboo by some
groups of Churchmen.
What is expected of me by the Other must always play
a part, though not necessarily a decisive part, in
determining the morality of my actions.
9. A "category of apperception" (communal, contemplative,
pragmatic see below) determines the form in which the
community of agents is conceived and the form of the
demands on me to which my moral action is a response. 3
Modes of Morality
If there are three typical modes of apperception, one positive and two
negative, logically there are also three typical modes of morality which, in
general, will tend to characterize a group: the communal, contemplative, and
pragmatic modes. If the modes in any group are mixed, natural pressures
created by conflicts will tend to restore equilibrium and dominance to one.
Moral orthodoxy in a group is the degree to which the members conform to
what is the accepted mode of the group as a whole; orthodoxy is distinguishable
from the traditional concept of a moral code. The code may state one thing
but the practice of the community demonstrates the true norm of orthodoxy.
The moral problem to be resolved by all three modes:
communal, contemplative or pragmatic, is the problem
of hostility resting on fear.
1. The communal mode is based on positive motivation, (love)
is heterocentric, and has for its objective the maintaining
of positive personal relationships.
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In the face of a moral problem it demands transformation
of motives by the overcoming of fear. It is summed up in
the norms: "Love thy neighbor.
. .’’and "Love thy
enemies.
.
.
"
2. The two negative modes (contemplative and pragmatic) are
egocentric, and tend to be dualistic. They seek to maintain
a relationship while negating or withdrawing from it in
fear, and creating a division between the actual and the
ideal worlds, or the material and the spiritual self.
3. lor a person operating in the contemplative mode: the real
world is the spiritual world. Dependence on others is a
matter of fact, but one can, so far as possible, cease to
intend the practical life. The practical life then becomes
secondary and is reduced to automatic activities and
relationships, requiring a minimum of one's attention.
The real life is not in the practical. By conformity to
rules and patterns of behavior practical functions become
routinized and primarily a means -only to the life of the
mind (soul) which is the life intended.
At a societal level, this is best achieved by making relationships automatic
and regimes unchanging in an organic structure where each member is
functionally related to the other, is trained to fulfill his function, knows
what his role is, and conforms to it almost as second nature. Morality
becomes a question of good form, possibly stipulated by rules but more
likely perceived by intuition. The standard is aesthetic. Moral judgment,
depends upon a vision oLthe good which is the
same for all who are united in personal activity
by means of it.
Examples of this mode can be found in contemplative monasteries,
government bureaucracies and multinational corporations, wherever the
norm depends on each one knowing his/her functions, routinizing actions, and
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stylizing roles. Moral judgment tends naturally to levels described by
Kohlberg as Stage 3.
4. Where the orientation of the group is pragmatic, and the
basic, relational attitude still is one of fear or mistrust
of others, the real life is found in action in and on the
world to change the world. Again there is a dualistic
divorce between the life of the mind and the life of action
but now ideas, and all that is spiritual become a means
subordinate to practice. Conflicts of wills result in
struggles for power.
The problematic of action becomes the effort to achieve
my own purpose in the face of the resistance of the Other.
However, the problem of how to achieve unity of action for the greatest
number remains. The world cannot be determined in incompatible ways.
In this mode, the technique for achieving unity is not union, but rather
cooperation, and the technology for achieving maximum cooperation and
harmony is Law. Morality in a society so structured, becomes a morality
of obedience to law: to external law, but above all
to a moral law which the individual imposes upon
himself and through which he secures the universal
intention to maintain the community of action.
From this emerges the glorification of self-control— 'limiting one’s own
freedom for the sake of the community" and of terms like "will, " "obligation,"
and "duty. " In Kohlberg terms this is a Stage 4 orientation, which Macmurray
identifies with the Stoic philosophers, Roman Law, and Immanuel Kant.
When these contemplative and pragmatic orientations are institutionalized
Macmurray holds that they result in two kinds of society to be discussed below.
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He reserves the term "community" for the communal, heterocentric
orientation.
Society and Community
In every case a human society is a moral entity: a unity of persons,
and is maintained by the intention of the members to continue together in a
certain structure.
Its basis is the universal and necessary intention to
maintain the personal relation which makes the human
individual a person and his life a common life.
The pragmatic orientation of persons leads them to form societies
maintained by power, structured by law, somewhat mechanical in operation
and in attitude toward persons. Such societies consist of dynamic units of
energy held together by some outside force (law or power). Of themselves
the units tend to repel (fear) each other, but they need each other and so
they establish means to cooperate. We see an extreme example of such
unity in that of nations which are allied during war, but enemies at other
times.
The contemplative orientation, on the other hand, leads to a society
in the style of Rousseau, maintained by "natural goodness, " unstructured,
organic, growing toward an ideal maturity. It can be maintained if, and
only if, members identify their individual good with the general good and
find their personal satisfaction in promoting the general good. Ideally, in
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such a society, each believes that his/her real interest is the general interest
and that private self-interest is an illusion. Actually such a society would be
anarchy in the technical sense, but since anarchy has not proved practical,
Rousseau acknowledges:
The problem is to find a form of association which
will defend the person and goods of all the associates
and in which each, while uniting himself with all,
will remain as free as before and obey only himself.
Macmurray adds that
It is possible to have such a society by a mystical
self-identification with the whole of which I form a
part.
and this, he claims, is the clue to the mystery of self-government.
Mysticism is an essential element in all reflective
experience, though it is not usually recognized as such
because its role is normally subordinate. It is,
however, essentially contemplative, and in form at
least aesthetic. Self-identification with the whole, with
the Other that includes oneself, is mysticism. The
dramatist identifies himself with characters in his
drama; so do the actors on the stage as they play their
parts in the drama, and the spectators as they watch
the spectacle, each remaining himself the while. But
this is only theoretically possible—only in a play. If it
is made the basis of society, and so of life as a whole,
it creates illusion. For then there is no other life
than the life of the stage. We cannot leave the theatre
and resume the serious business of real life where we
must bear our own identities. The drama. . . may be
meaningful. . . as a commentary on life. It can hardly
be, for the members of the troupe, at least, a
commentary upon itself. It becomes inherently
meaningless and pointless. Unlike the pragmatic society,
the contemplative society is not a State. It is not grounded
in power, but in the voluntary submission of its members
to the general will. Its inherent ideal is anarchism—an
143
automatic harmony of wills produced by the
suppression of self-interest in favor of the
moral will for the general good.
Such a society has distinct limitations: it must remain small enough
for all members to know one another and to meet together for decision-
making. Its size may be extended, at least in appearances, through
representative government. In this form, the elected representative
identifies himself with his constituency and speaks with their voice so
disinterestedly that what Macmurray calls "the fiction of self-government"
is maintained, when the "Will of the People" emerges from the debate
and is enacted into law. it is loyally accepted by all the people who then
identify with it. Government, or the State, is necessary but it is "not
really a State" but only a function of society, needed to execute the Common
Will. Tensions naturally develop but they are "not over questions of power,
but the necessary tensions between peoples whose interests are basically
one, and who are equally satisfied with government, whichever party wins
out. " The competition although real is not serious; the whole game of
politics is popularly viewed as a game, not serious business, with the out-
come not really important.
. . "May the best man win" and life goes on
much as before.
I* or example, in the United States a new government is elected at
least every eight years, but socially and economically, there is little
disruption in every day life, to distinguish one incumbency from the other.
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In spite of the tongue-in-cheek irony with which Macmurray under-
scores the romanticism inherent in democracy, he locates the weakness.
This kind of society depends on the majority
of the members not taking the practical life
seriously, but treating it as a means to the
private life.
Since in fact, action is primary for human beings, Macmurray says
that the only way the illusion that it is not primary can be maintained is by
divorcing theory and practice.
The illusion is only possible by keeping theory
and practice apart. It involves the belief that
what is true in theory would not work in practice
. . . The practice of such a society may be worse
or better than its theory but it cannot be the
expression of it. . . for the theory is really a
compensation for the unsatisfactory situation
which exists in the practice.
The contemplative mode of apperception produces an ideal which it
hopes for but which it does not intend in practice!
It asserts that the ideal is the necessary outcome of
the conflict in the actual world. To try to improve
it by planning would be dangerous interference with
natural laws which in their own good time will
necessarily bring the improvement about.
Further, when the organic society described above is compelled (by
war or other crisis) to take its practical life seriously, then the struggle
becomes real, and its outcome is no longer indifferent. The game-playing is
over. It quickly transforms itself into the pragmatic mode. For example,
in the crisis of war, the United States gives its president powers amounting
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to dictatorship. Then
the unity of society can only be maintained by the
power of the State;.
. . idealism gives way to
realism; modem democracy to the totalitarian
state.
It is evident that the discussion of morality forms the bridge in
Macmurray’s theory from the individual to the social aspect of the personal.
Any human society is a unity of persons, a matter not of fact but of intention.
It can therefore be destroyed only by destroying the intention of the persons
who constitute it to maintain it in being. It is a moral entity. Its basis is
the universal and necessary intention of the members to maintain the personal
relation which makes the individual a human person and his life a common
life.
That human life is essentially social was articulated by Plato. But
that "man is a social animal" (Aristotle) does not translate into "Man is one
of the herd animals. " This statement would define the personal on the
analogy of the organic and to do so must treat human nature as matter of
fact to be defined from outside, from the standpoint of a spectator.
Although this seems quite possible: to define the human on the
analogy of the organic, it is in fact impossible for the person doing the
defining to be outside the human race, to be a spectator; he/she must also
be part of the species, observed and interacting with other members. As a
reflecting member of society, I cannot divorce any activity, including my
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reflective activity, from its modifying influence on society. To be able to
do so would be to define the person as a thinker outside society, who happens
to act, not as an agent who must reflect.
We can produce the illusion of pure contemplation by suppressing
the referent to action as the motive of reflection. But pure thought would
be pure phantasy. A thinking which could not be false could also not be
true. Since thinking like all our activities has a motive, it may be that the
motive of thinking dualistically (attempting to divorce thought from act),
is the desire to know the truth without having to Uve by the truth.
As we have seen, a Society is a grouping of persons in which the
motivation is negative and the bonds between the members impersonal. The
association is an aggregate for the better promotion of the ends of each
individual Self.
A community is a grouping of persons in which the motivation is
positive, the members are in communion with one another and their association
1
t
is a fellowship. Community contains within it its negative, society.
A community, then, is a personal unity of persons, which rests upon
a positive apperception by its members of the relation which unites them as
a group. Both societies and communities are groups of agents, each
characterized by intentionality
. The modes in which agents apperceive one
another determines the relations existing between them:
The mode of apperception which is normal to any
society determines the mode of the society’s existence.
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This conception, however, may be true or false. Its truth or falsity
is verified by action.
Community, Communion, and Religion
1. Community is a form of society based upon a positive perception
by the members of the relations which united them as members.
I need you to be myself: a fully positive personal relation
in which, because we trust one another, we can think feel and
act together.
"
2. The mode of conception that a people has of itself influences the
mode of society and is influenced by it—because any relation of
agents is a matter of intention. That is to say: the mode in which
we conceive our relations, determines the relations themselves.
3. If the conception is false, the actions based on it will be self-
frustrating. For example, if we conceive others as friendly and
cooperative when in fact they are egocentric and hostile to us,
our efforts to work with them will result in frustration.
4. If there is a categorical error in the conception: that is an error
in the perception of one’s own nature, then every action, regardless
of efforts (like changing objectives), will be self-frustrating, and
ultimately lead to despair. (A trivial example: If I consider myself
a musician when in fact I am tone-deaf.
)
5. There are basically three reflective modes: religion, art, and
science.
6. Religion is the reflective activity specifically concerned with
relation of persons. Religion is about Community. ^
To repeat: Community is a personal association among individuals
who are equals but not copies of one another, who are free, and aware of
their freedom, and who are open to receive anyone into their fellowship.
These are the characteristics of Freire’s dialogical community (Pedagogy,
Chapter 4) and they are the characteristics which have traditionally been
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associated with the great religions: "A universal community of persons in
which each cares for all and none for self. » Religion is about community.
A society acts together for a common purpose. A community acts
together in fellowship, in a unity of persons as persons, a unity constituted
and maintained by affection. It is heterocentric: i.e.
,
the Other is the
center of value.
Any community of persons, as distinct from a mere
society
,
is a group of individuals united in a common
life, the motivation of which is positive.
7. A community is not organic in form: i. e.
,
not based on
a relation of functions. It is a unity of persons constituted
and maintained by the motives which sustain the personal
relations of its members, by mutual affection and the will
to community of the members. "It is a nexus of the active
relations of friendship between all possible pairs of
members.
"
In community each acts, thinks and feels for the others and not for
self. Each remains an individual who realizes himself in and through the
other.
Human Societies
Idealist philosophies place the essential difference between human and
animal groups in self-consciousness. Freire concurs: the power to objectify
and name the world, to perceive oneself and one’s own perceptions are
elements of his definition of the human, whereas he maintains that the
animal does not exist (1970)—stand out from the world, and perceive its
relationships to it. However, Macmurray notes that self-consciousness
does not discriminate human societies from communities. Consciousness
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alone does not commit a person to anything. In this case it does not commit
one to remain in the group. Further, self-consciousness normally occurs
spontaneously only when there is some breakdown in relationships. As long
as I relate to another in full trust and affection, the center of my interest and
attention is in the other. It only centers in myself when something happens
to disrupt or constrain the relationship—to introduce a negative element.
The problem of community then is the problem of maintaining or re-establishing
positive relations in the face of possible outbreaks of hostility and fear.
And it is of the nature of community that such reconciliation cannot be
mandated, but must result from mutual agreement and love. Among the
modes of reflection we have been considering the primary mode is that which
reflects on the primary problem: how to maintain positive personal
relationships in the human community. This mode is religion, which includes
and subsumes both particularization and generalization, both art and science,
and is about the business of relationships. We shall see later on in this study
that Freire’s critique of some of the churches in Latin America is the
accusation that instead of building dialogical, other-centered, community
they are following aesthetic lines of action more appropriate to self-serving
and self-saving societies. (Part III, Ch. 1)
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In Summary
1. All reflective activities of the personal are concerned
with the development of knowledge, i.e.
,
are primarily
concerned with others but include the negative, knowledge
of self.
2. Reflective activities are the negative of action, for the
sake of action, and are symbolic actions. As such they
determine the future symbolically.
3. Reflective activities fall into three principal types:
those that reflect on and symbolically determine personal
relationships and aim at improvement: this is the realm
of religion, according to Macmurray.
those that reflect on and determine values, satisfactoriness,
the good as an end, and function for the refinement of
sensibilities: this is the realm of art.
those that reflect on and determine means to desired ends
and function to develop efficient technology: this is the
realm of science.
4. Pergonal relationships and personal activities include both
values and means. In this sense, religion includes and
provides the matrix for art and science. But each mode of
reflection has its own type of universality and its own unique
problem.
5. The problematic for religion is that of maintaining or re-
establishing fully positive interpersonal relationships, of
overcoming hostility and fear by love.
The problematic for art is the development of a fully adequate
image as an expression of reality.
The problematic for science is the development of efficient
means for achieving the ends we have in mind.
151
Conclusion
I have developed at length Macmurray’ s analysis of the contemplative-
organic society for two reasons: (1) it is of interest to the Americas in the
light of our recent history and two World Wars, and of our tendency to believe
that a democratic society is right for the whole world; and (2) it is of particular
mterest in the light of the growing mystical tendencies of Freire's later work
and the accusations of utopianism made by some of his critics. Some of Freire’s
concepts fall into the mystical idealist categories described above, and, I believe,
if immaturely understood, could lead to the dangers of totalitarianism which
Macmurray traced to other romantic thinkers. However, the intent of Freire's
critique and language and his explanation of the relationships necessary for
cultural revolution, are closer to those of the third, positively-motivated society
which Macmurray describes as Community.
In explaining the religious mode of reflection Macmurray makes three
observations which supplement insights of Freire. Freire is concerned with
scientific knowledge only and the question "What is knowledge" leads him to
process answers. But the basis of the process is interpersonal relations. Since
religious reflection is defined by Macmurray as that which seeks symbolically to
solve problems of personal relationships he is concerned also with process
knowledge: How do we know other persons?
Not "objectively", he says, as we know things, for the primary character
of the personal relationship is mutuality. It is "I" and "You" that constitute the
unit of action, of observation, and of reflection. Freire insists that the unit of
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action, of observation, and of reflection. Freire insists that knowledge is
social, is neither acquired, developed nor verified alone. Against "objective”
knowledge, he places the norm: "If I do not know you, you do not know me. »
And so it follows that the only mode by which persons know each other
is revelation, a communication not of facts but of self "giving oneself away"—
"All knowledge between persons and all education is revelation. "
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PART II: Chapter 3: Notes
. ,
l ’ Fo1" example a Piece of territory cannot be determined as belongingto country X and to country Y simultaneously. If they fight over it, one wins,and the other loses the possibility of determining that bit of world-and inthat measure loses freedom of choice.
2. By community we mean the heterogeneous, mutually sharing
trusting group that supports, challenges and loves.
3. This issue relates to orthodoxy. Within a community a given action
may be unorthodox, hence taboo or "immoral" although in fact, it may still
mtend and even promote relationships and other, deeper, or avowed communal
ends
.
During the post-Vatican II transitional period in the Roman Catholic
Church, there was much variation from diocese to diocese on the issue of
abstinence from meat during Lent. A standard quip had it that one could be
liable to Heaven, Hell or Purgatory depending on how far down the New York
Thru-way one stopped for a hamburger. The question is one of orthodoxy over
morality.
4.
Rule of St. Benedict.
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PART III—PAULO FREIRE, THE LIFE PROJECT
Chapter I: Exegesis of Three Works
INTRODUCTION
In Part I of this study we examined the historical and sociological
background of Freire's writings and attempted to outline the philosophy
which guided him. In Part 1 1 we placed that philosophy into the perspective
provided by another Christian Marxist and social philosopher, John Macmurray.
Doing so provided us with a more rigorous language and a context against
which Freire’s ideas could be evaluated and perhaps supplemented. In a
sense both these sections have been preliminary to the real work of this
study, hr this section we shall examine critically three of Freire's published
works in an attempt to develop his educational theses and relate them to the
educational metaphors which have currency in the United States in our present
day. Freire's writings seem to fall into three phases: the transition writings,
sociological in nature; the revolutionary and philosophical writings; and most
recently, a small group of theological, almost mystical writings.
In the transitional period, which included his imprisonment in Brazil
and the years immediately following in Chile, Freire described the general
characteristics of a "Society in Transition" and the passage of a people from
semi-intransitive to naive consciousness. Much of this material is found in
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the Portuguese edition of Educacao Como Practica Libertade (translated
into English and incorporated as the first part of Education for Critical
Consciousness)
. Transitional also were the further trial and politicization
of the literacy method during the years in Chile, and a number of essays:
"Cultural Action and Conscientization, " "Cultural Freedom in Latin
America, " "Education as Cultural Action, " "Cultural Action: A
Dialectical Analysis. "
While still imprisoned in Brazil, Freire began the articulation of
some of the ideas which mark the second, or revolutionary set of writings.
Chief among these, most revolutionary and clearly more philosophical than
pedagogical, is The Pedagogy of the Oppressed
. Other philosophical
writings include Extension or Communication and "Education as Consciousness-
Raising. " In this group of writings his thought is concerned with the nature
of the person, the world, the "man-world entity, " knowledge and learning,
and the role of pedagogy in cultural revolution. The Pedagogy appears, on
careful study, to be not a manual but a philosophical rationale for revolution,
although, in general, a revolution of a Gandhian type. However, Freire
does not altogether exclude violent options, nor examples like Che Guevara
and Camilo Torres. By his definition a situation of violence already exists
in oppression and the question of violence in the popular sense is somewhat
beside the point. The issue seems to be revolution or non- revolution, rather
than violence or non-violence.
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1 inally, Freire’s thought now seems to be evolving into a theological
or mystical phase. In the present phase two characteristics are emerging:
the growing significance of the dialectic in his analysis and proposals, and
the theological or mystical direction which becomes increasingly prominent
in language and value positions. (Mystical is here being used as developed by
Macmurray in the preceding section. ) I am not sure that he would accept
the term mystical, nor do I use it in any evangelical or traditionally religious
sense. Mysticism involves the dedication of one’s whole being in something
larger than self: the Party, the State, Religious Service, Union with God. . .
and the willingness to submerge personal good, even to the sacrifice of life,
for the sake of this greater good. In these later writings there is a growing
clarity about the stance of dedication, an almost religious commitment to the
work of liberation of men and women, a liberation that is internal, ideological,
and transcendental while remaining praxis: (see also Weffort on this point)
action in the world for the here-and-now liberation of all human beings,
beginning with the most oppressed.
That praxis of this nature involves structural change in society
becomes more and more clear, but what is still ambiguous, is whether Freire
has opted for the necessity of revolution in the classical sense. Weffort
believes that he has. On the other hand, it is possible that Freire believes
that cultural revolution is not only the essential component of classical
revolution, but is sufficient without a political take-over. In the Pedagogy
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(Chapter 4) he indicates that cultural revolution precedes, accompanies,
and follows political revolution. The latter should only take place at that
moment when the new order is well-established in the people's consciousness
and therd is no further danger of role reversal—that is, no further danger
that the oppressed, having achieved power, merely become oppressors in
their turn.
Education has been the form that action has taken in all three phases,
and I believe, the stimulus for Freire's own movement from one to another.
However, it would be a serious oversimplification to try to separate socio-
logical from philosophical and theological considerations. It is, rather, a
question of focus. Out of Freire's early apprenticeship in the movement of
conscientizacao
,
he carried the conviction that consciousness, in the sense
of awareness of underlying relationships in a situation, does not just happen.
It must be catalyzed by an event, or a person who has moved a little deeper
into the analysis of a contradictory situation. Catalytic communication is a
role for education. Out of his Marxist readings came the concept of the
dialectical unity of theory and action which he has named praxis, and which
is his single pedagogical method. Marxism is also a source of his
conviction that unless structures change, human consciousness will not
change. Out of an existentialist and phenomenological background came a
deeply personalist view of human beings and human potential. He sees
the person as incomplete, becoming, "ever able to become more, " and for
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this to understand more than he/she now does. The instrument for this
becoming is pedagogy: a Pedagogy of the Oppressed, by the oppressed.
Education for Critical Consciousness (Freire, 1972) is an English
translation of two earlier essays and exemplifies the transition in Freire's
writing from preoccupation with the past to preoccupation with larger issues
of the future, and his personal transition from doxa to logos: understanding
the surface phenomena, to "analysis of the deep structures, true understanding. "
We already have seen (Part I, Ch. 3-4) the sociological data out of the past,
first presented in Education as a Practice of Freedom
. But we still seek
answers to questions it raises. What happened in Brazil? How could one
prepare a people to achieve a different outcome ? Why are so many of the
people, who were "conscientized^ so easily and totally silenced now? These
answers are not provided. Some indications however, appear in the second
essay: "Extension of Communication. " This essay reflects on data amassed
through Freire's involvement with education under the agrarian reform move-
ment in Chile, a valuable source of information, for Chile was experiencing
a non-violent revolution which was to last over a decade. (1962-1973) But
it was a cultural revolution effected by the leadership for the people rather
than with them, and Chile now faces the same task Freire had earlier identified
for Brazil to bring the people to understand and participate in national
democratic life. The revolution did not begin with the conscious action of the
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masses. This in itself was its weakness
.
2
The second essay presents Freire's epistemology and ontology which
are expanded and completed in the Pedagogy. What is knowledge ? What does
it mean to be human? What is human education ? The writing in the second
essay is more difficult: more abstract and philosophical, less obviously
relevant to the business of teaching. But the questions it raises are those
which make education relevant at all to the humanization of persons. It is
necessary abstraction.
Freire is repetitious and somewhat cyclic in his writing. His thinking
evolves from essay to essay by reflecting on itself. He is primarily a philo-
sopher of education but does not systematize his philosophy. Instead the
pieces of a system are scattered throughout his work. To introduce some
linearity I shall use as outline the following system which Macmurray gives
us, because it has many points of contact with Freire's thinking. The main
categories are:
The Personal : definition, nature, persons in relation
Action, Agency: nature, priority, intentionality, praxis
Knowledge
:
nature, acquisition, social dimensions
Reflection : metaphor, valuation, modes: science, art, religion
Relations
:
oriented by love or fear: contemplative, pragmatic, and
communal societies
If we add oppressive relationships and
160
Education : mechanistic literacy and neutrality and conscientising,
metaphor, word, dialectic, we have a frame for Freire's system. With the
exception of references to metaphor, Macmurray does not treat education or
praxis in the Gifford lectures, nor is he committed to the concept of the
dialectic which is central to Freire.
The Personal
Macmurray defines the critical problem for philosophy today to be
the discovery of the form of the personal. The form he offers us is that of a
positive which includes and is defined by its negative. In this definition he
echoes Hegel, yet denies him, for he does not speak of the oppositions present
in every historical concept and their synthesis, and he rejects dialectic logic
as adequate to human choice. Yet when we look more closely at his form of
the personal, it seems to be dialectic in nature. Freire does not define the
personal as such, but the way in which he uses "human," ' 'humanization,
"
"dehumanizing structures, " implies a neo-Scholastic definition that could be
formulated somewhat as follows:
The human person is a rational animal, differing from other
animals in ability to be aware of self and of the self's per-
ceptions of the environment, and ability to make purposeful
choices (to act intentionally).
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The definition, so expressed, is equally compatible with a Cartesian or an
agent-oriented system. Freire has not clarified this issue at the level of
definition. The definition gives no clear right of place to agency nor does it
incorporate choice within action, per se. In fact it generates images of a
spectator self over against the world, a concept that Freire has had explicitly
to reject. As Macmurray has shown us, any Cartesian definition of person
creates insurmountable dualism, and Freire has devoted pages to repudiating
dualism of the subject/object, mind/world variety. If, however, we incorporate
into this definition something of his treatment of the dialectics : human-
dehumanizing, oppressive-liberated, prescriptive-dialogic, we arrive at a
definition of the person much closer to Macmurray's agent-in-relationship.
It is my belief from conversations with Freire that the two postulates of
Macmurray, agency and relatedness, are not only compatible with his thought
but bring a needed clarity. Let us accept, then, as a starting point that persons
are agents, that agency includes reflection and intentionality, and that persons
exist and grow only in relationship with other agents.
Knowledge and Education
The content of "Extension or Communication" is Freire' s understanding
of knowledge, the contrast between this understanding and the views of Extension
Agents, the sociological data for Freire's rejection of extension as ineffectual
and immoral, and a counterproposal for education. We cannot maintain strict
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linearity in this review since each of these notions is interwoven with the
others. *
Knowledge is a dynamic representing of reality, created when persons
together confront and analyze that reality and act to change it. As such it is
inseparable from praxis.
Knowledge is not extended from those who consider
that they know to those who consider that they do
not know. Knowledge is built up in the relations
between human beings and the world, relations of
transformation, and perfects itself in the critical
problematization of these relations.
This is quite different from the concept of knowledge ascribed by Freire to
extension agents. If knowledge could be "extended" at all (reached out to
someone else), it would have to be conceived of as reified and static; this is
a view Freire opposes. Against it, he places his own epistemology.
Knowing, whatever its level, is not the act by which a
,
Subject transformed into an object docily and passively
accepts the contents others give or impose on him or her.
Knowledge, on the contrary, necessitates the curious
presence of Subjects confronted with the world. It
requires their transforming action on reality. It
demands a constant searching. It implies invention
and re-invention. It claims from each person a
critical reflection on the very act of knowing. It must
be a reflection which recognizes the knowing process,
*The following extensive digest is intended to assist those who have
little knowledge of Freire. For those already familiar with Freire* s writings,
pp. 161-209 may be omitted.
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and in this recognition becomes aware of the
raison d etre behind the knowing and the conditioning
to which that process is subject. ... In the learning
process the only person who really learns is s/he who
appropriates what is learned, who apprehends and
thereby re-invents that learning: s/he who is able to
aPPty the appropriated learning to concrete existential
situations. On the other hand, the person who is
filled by another with "contents" whose meaning s/he
is not aware of, which contradict his or her way of
being in the world, cannot learn because s/he is not
challenged. Thus, in a situation of knowing, teacher
and student must take on the role of conscious Subjects,
mediated by the knowable object that they seek to
know. The concept of extension does not allow for
this possibility, (p. 101)
The key in this passage occurs in the phrase "becomes aware of the 'raison
d'etre' behind the knowing and the conditioning to which that process is subject."
At some length, Freire clarifies the perceptions of the peasants:
There are various levels of knowing: magical, naive, and critical—all
conditioned by the structures with, and within which, persons live. Magical
thinking involves a misconstruing of apparent causal relations for true ones.
It occurs because persons are too close to their reality, or to nature, to
objectify it, and to perceive its true causality, and because they already have
a world-view, with belief and ritual, into which new knowledge must fit.
Freire suggests (p. 107) that all men are subject to magical thinking—even
men highly educated and technologically developed. Knowledge is "conditioned
by the concrete cultural reality in which human beings find themselves. " (p. 102)
1G4
Further, when those operating in a magical context are presented with new
knowledge (an intrusive or foreign element) they relate it to the matrix of
’’facts” as they already perceive them. Hence they interpret and assimilate
them to their existing myth.
Magic is neither prelogical nor illogical. It
possesses its own internal logical structure
and opposes as much as possible any new
forms mechanically superimposed on it.
(p. 104)
For this reason, presentation of contents of knowledge, without due respect
for the total cultural context of the recipient is ineffectual even for agronomist
ends of increased production. 4
The rest of the essay is an extended discussion of right and wrong
ways of educating, given this interpretation of what knowledge is. Important
ideas are extension, the social nature of understanding, and the non-neutrality
of educational means.
Freire sees extension as a merely technicist, supposedly neutral,
form of training based on the general philosophy that the agricultural skills
which peasants need to increase production can be taught them independently
of any consideration for their world view, self-image, or existing technology.
This concept, Freire says, reifies the learner and knowledge, implies that
the one who "extends” is superior, and that the receiver is ignorant and
passive. It constitutes cultural invasion because
the aim of any invader is to penetrate another cultural
historical situation and impose his system and values
on its members, (p. 117 )
This, in fact (although perhaps without malice) the extension agent does. As
a result a relationship of authority is established which must be supported by
conquest and manipulation.
Authoritarianism need not necessarily be associated
with physical repression. It can also be seen in
actions based on the "arguments of authority. "
"This is the right way—it's technically correct--
don't raise questions, just do it. " (p. 117 )
Technicism is based on the belief that technical skills can be divorced from
values as well as from social reality. It is mechanistic, messianic, and
paternalistic. Mechanistic, in that extension agents assume that knowledge
is a thing which can be mechanically transferred from themselves to the
peasants, given the right techniques, and that once the peasants learn the
agricultural technology, production will automatically increase. Messianic,
because in technical education ("technical capacitation") alone will be found
salvation and the extension agents bring the gospel of technical know-how to
the poor. Paternalistic in that the peasant is assumed to have no culture and
no knowledge, to be a waiting emptiness for the good father/govemment agent
to fill.
But such is not the case. The peasant receivers have a culture of
their own, a technology, albeit empirical and primitive, of their own, and a
world-view that integrates work, belief, ritual and life. Education, not
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extension, is what the peasant needs.
Faith in the transmission of facts on the part of the agronomist
betrays an ignorance of the cultural nature of these facts. Applied science
grows out of science which grows out of a culture. The factual layer cannot
be simply translated so as to be the icing on the cake of a different science
(understanding) and culture (the peasants') out of which it did not come.
Techniques do not just happen, but like the science
of which they are a practical application are socio-
historically conditioned.
. . . Because the answers peasants give to natural
challenges are cultural, they cannot be replaced
by superimposing the equally cultural responses
(ours) that we "extend" to them. (pp. 108-109)
By reflecting on his own reality and on the peasants' interpretation of their
reality, as well as on the interlocking and self-healing nature of the peasants'
total cultural context, the agronomist will come to know that all knowing and
ignoring are culturally conditioned.
Education versus Extension
True education incarnates the permanent search of
people together . . . for their becoming more fully
human in the world in which they exist, (p. 96)
Its object is
to make it possible for human beings, through the
problematizing of the unity being-world, to penetrate
more deeply the prise de conscience (understanding)
of the reality in which they exist, (p. 107)
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The object of extension, on the other hand, is "to change the peasants'
knowledge to one more like to that of the extension agent.
" (p. 99) The
transformation of perception brought about by education requires praxis; the
role of the educator is to catalyze the reflection on action, and to catalyze the
action itself out of which knowledge grows. The teacher "poses the reality as
a problem" to be analyzed and solved, draws attention to points naive or
unclear, questions causality, and in so doing, learns, along with the students,
of the underlying realities and of their (the people's) power to act effectively.
(pp. 125-127) The result is the learners' discovering
their own presence within a structure and not as
"imprisoned" or "stuck to" the structure or its
parts, (p. 107)
Without this there is a valid criticism of the "technical aid" approach to
education in that it 'leaves them (the educatees) acritical and naive in the face
of their world: (p. 152), possessing some information, badly assimilated,
but not possessing the power to conquer that world, intellectually or actually
without ongoing aid.
If education is the relation between Subjects in the
knowing process mediated by the knowable object,
in which the educator permanently reconstructs the
act of knowing, it must then be problem-posing.
The task of the educator is to present to the educatees
as a problem the content which mediates them, and
not to discourse on it, give it, extend it, or hand it
over, as if it were a matter of something already
done, constituted, completed, and finished. In the
act of problematizing the educatees, the educator is
problematized too. Problematization is so much
a dialectic process that it would be impossible for
anyone to begin it without becoming involved in it.
No one can present something to someone else as
a problem and at the same time remain a mere
spectator of the process. S/he will be problematized
even if methodologically speaking s/he prefers
to remain silent after posing the problem, while the
educatees capture, analyze, and comprehend it. . . .
Educators.
. . "re-enter into" the object of the
problem through the "entering into" of the educatees.
This is why educators continue to learn, (pp. 152-153)
The term "problematizing" here means more than asking questions, although
it carries that meaning also. "The educator is problematized".
. . He or she
is concerned not only with questions like: "What is there about this situation
that is a problem for us ? Where precisely is the contradiction?" but also
with the problematic nature of all knowledge. Presumably people begin to
develop a habit of mind that questions the given in every situation, analyzing
it according to structures that are not immediately self-evident. Asking the
right questions is a way of structuring understanding and imposes upon reality
a set of values which have demonstrated cogency and consistency in prior
scrutiny.
However, it is necessary to beware of the mechanistic gimmick of
adopting a "problem-posing" or dialogical method without any radical change
of sociological substructures. A technicist solution is ineffectual for long-
term education. Further, their sociohistorical situation renders the peasants
apathetic to dialogue and the situation impervious to "problem-solving techniques.
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Their existential experience is constituted with the
limits of anti-dialogue (essential, not accidental),
of a latifundiary vertical structure wherein distance, sometimes physical
distance, and always social distance, renders dialogue impossible. Within
similar rigid, vertical structures the consciousness of the peasant has evolved
over historical time. This is the "consciousness of the oppressed" which the
work of education must address. Conscientisation, change in consciousness,
is effected through change in both the internal and the external conditioning
environment, (pp. 120-121)
There is a further problem: dialogue and problem-posing are time
consuming. To see that the time loss is worth the price we might look at
education from the perspective of goals. If the object of a unit of study is that
the student acquire, comprehend, and be able to apply a given set of facts,
(note: this goal is an outsider decision and implies a mechanist view of
training) then if the method is effective, the simple direct inculcation of the
facts, with practice in their use, is the shortest route. However, if the
object of a unit of study is that the student be empowered, able to deal with
unforeseeable pieces of the environment by creating or choosing his own tools,
and to grow in skill, analysis, decision-making and intersubjectivity, then
dialogical, "slow" methods are both the goal and the only route. The differences
between extension and education are less differences in method or assumptions
than differences in the end desired.
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Leaving aside for the moment the development of "banking education"
which Freire discusses extensively in the Pedagogy, let us turn to the important
concept of neutrality of educational means. It is the assumption of technological
education that the skills and information "given" are necessary to development
and are neutral, that values, moral positions, the uses that the information
will serve, are not the business of the educator. We are reminded of the
moral question raised by Macmurray with respect to the neutrality of Science.
As we have just seen, to evaluate the efficiency of educational method we
must look to the goal. So here education itself is a means which must direct
to some end. It is not neutral since it relates to culture and inculcates a value
set. If this is denied in attempts to maintain a false neutrality, the values
which guide education simply go unscrutinized. Agrarian reform cannot be
unaware of all the political, technical, social, religious and educational
overtones of its work. (p. 134) A more fruitful conception of agrarian reform
would put its maximum effort into the transformation of perceptions rather
than into a mechanistic transmission of techniques.
A critical attitude toward agrarian reform with an
emphasis on cultural change which recognizes the
need for perceptual change (see Paulo Freire:
"The Role of the Social Worker in the Process of
Transformation") opens up a new and fertile field
of work for the agronomist-educator. . . As
agents of change together with the peasants (who
themselves are agents) it is incumbent on them to
enter into the process of transformation, conscientizing
both the peasants and themselves at the same time. The
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conscientization I shall discuss in the latter part
of this work is an inter-conscientization. (p. 135)
Relations
Education then, is communication and interconscientization.
Without a relation between subjects that know with
reference to the knowable object the act of knowing
would disappear.
. . There is no such thing as
isolated thinking, (p. 136)
. . . The thinking subject cannot think alone (without
the co-participation of another subject). This co-
participation of thinking Subjects in the act of thinking
is communication. Thus, the object is not the end of
the act of thinking but the mediator of communication.
(P. 137)
Communication is manifested by linguistic signs and requires agreement on
their meaning. Real agreement on meaning requires a common language and
common emotional conviction which can only be achieved through dialogue.
The final portion of the essay develops the characteristics of a humanizing
education by criticising its opposite, Extension, once more. Humanizing
education is dialogical, dynamic, relationship-building, co-creative of
knowledge in teacher and learner. It becomes critical consciousness when it
goes beyond the mere apprehension of the presence
of a fact and places it critically in the system of
relations within the totality in which it exists.
(p. 148)
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The Pedagogy of the Oppressed
In the evolution of Freire's thought the Pedagogy of the Oppressed
provides the reflection on action that is integral to praxis. The philosophical
postulates emerging from this reflection have been extracted and presented in
summary form in the first section of this paper. The question that confronts
Freire is how to achieve liberation, the conscientizing implicitly required by
the sociological and philosophical perspectives he has espoused. The question
that confronts us is how well did he succeed in his literacy methods, and what
are the dimensions of literacy as he understood it. Praxis is the mode of
everything that Freire does and writes, reflection in and on action to reconstruct
one’s world. Philosophical reflections, then, developed out of action and
terminated in new action.
In the Pedagogy, the new education Freire outlines emerges as
revolutionary. It is important to realize that he is not talking about cosmetics:
substitutions of discussion for lecture, or greater attention to language and
cultural relevance. He is talking about political and economic literacy. The
Pedagogy of the Oppressed explores the critical divergence of its basic principles
from those implied in existing pedagogical practice. These are deeper issues
than how to implement his literacy methods. In fact, these methods could be
prescriptive, and not really consonont with Freire’s philosophy of dialogue.
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To demonstrate the critical divergence of the Pedagogy will demand
considerable time. At this point, let me give only three generic examples.
Existing practice in education is based on this society as we know it, as a
given, and socializes the student to it. Existing practice is based on the
assumed superiority of teachers to students, at least with respect to the
teacher’s discipline. Existing practice is based on ultimate decision-making
tied to power
—
the power of authority with respect to adults over youth;
the power of ownership of the institution with respect to
institutions over young and older adults;
the power of government with respect to adults over
adults.
Freire claims that the first practice leads to domestication, the second to
manipulation, and the third to repression. All three have high potential for
oppression.
174
The Pedagogy is revolutionary both in its assumptions and in the
potential for violent revolution of its implications. 8 However the book is
obscure, in the original and still more in translation, and it is possible to
read it without recognizing its departure from both classical Marxism and
American humanism. American humanism says that human persons have
the inner power to become uniquely great and self-determined individuals.
But the concern of the humanist not to interfere with that uniqueness or to
impose values leads to a liberalism which relegates values and attitudes to
the strictly private domain. It guards no man's rights because it fears to set
limits in the name of the common good.^
Classical Marxism assumes that the socialist revolution, when it
comes, takes place in a mature bourgeois society, amidst an abundance of
goods, an abundance of means of production, of human skills, tools,
consumption, and human culture, in a society where political freedom is
taken for granted. (Deutscher, 1971) The revolution in underdeveloped
countries is a revolution of scarcity, scarcity of almost everything. Scarcity
engenders fear, inequality, political and intellectual constraint, and the
revolution is strongly shaped by the need to win political freedom. This is
the world out of which and to which Freire speaks. However, Freire is
Marxist in his understanding of the essential contradiction of Western
Society: the increasingly social character of the processes of production
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and the antisocial character of private property. He does not dwell on this
point but on the exploitation that enables some to accumulate private property
at the expense of others.
Much of the Pedagogy of the Oppressed is repetition or amplification
of principles already discussed by Freire in other writings. In fact, the
book might be called "Reflections on a Critical Pedagogy, " but it takes a
far more radical turn than other publications (radical = going to the roots).
Three important concepts stand out:
-that oppression is first and foremost in the mind and
liberation must begin there. This is why there needs
to be a pedagogy.
-that conscientizacao cannot be complete until there are
structural (political and economic) changes which make
possible a human, self-determining mode of existence
for all men. This is why revolution is implied.
-and that the work of liberation exacts a price that is
nothing less than total committment.
Freire is not merely philosophizing or playing idea games (Pedagogy , pp.
34, 47, 52, 54). The price of "helping" the oppressed is sharing their lot
with a commitment to whatever cost is necessary. Notions of commitment
and its cost appear more and more dominantly in what I have called Freire
s
"mystical" writings.
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The Pedagogy is divided into four sections. In the first Freire
introduces most of the concepts to be discussed throughout the essay,
explains the nature and existence of oppression, his own philosophical stance
with respect to human beings, dehumanization, and the "man-world" entity.
The role of the oppressed in their own liberation, and the difficulties
presented by the "internalization of the oppressor" make evident the need
for a pedagogy. Other concepts treated are false consciousness and the
subject/object duality, the role of education in liberation and transformation,
violence, the centrality of dialogue and the nature of revolutionary leadership.
The role of education in both oppression (domestication) and liberation
is the content of Chapter 2. This section presents an extensive development
of teacher-student relationships, dehumanizing education, which Freire calls
depository or "banking" education, and its opposite: "problem-posing"
education.
The philosophy and method of problem-posing education is the content
of the third, and perhaps most provocative section of the Pedagogy. Praxis
and the power of the word: "naming, " are explored and a methodology for
literacy and consciousness-raising developed. The entire essay closes with
a fourth chapter which is an extensive discussion of dialogue, dialogical and
antidialogical action, and cultural revolution.
In the Pedagogy Freire defines dehumanization as prescription: the
deprivation of the right and/or opportunity for persons to make their own
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decisions, and situates the causes of dehumanization: fear of freedom (p. 31),
fear of the loss of privilege (p. 29), need to have, and to have power, in
order to be (pp. 30, 45) and lack of confidence in the common people (p. 46).
He describes the "screening effect" created by vested interests which cause
persons to misperceive reality: not to see the oppressive structures.
(Neurotic perception, p. 37) In the course of the first chapter of the
Pedagogy
,
he changes abruptly from a cooler language to oppressor/oppressed
terminology, which in spite of his own explanations seems to give an
excessively voluntaristic tone to the actions of the "oppressors." Freire
recognizes (p. 44) that "the oppressors" may in fact be caught in an oppressive
structure which also oppresses them, and of which they may be unaware. In
his use of the term he is speaking about an oppressor class, even while he
recognizes the good will of individual oppressors who "convert" and fight
beside the oppressed for their liberation (pp. 46-47). Still the terminology
creates a "good guysA)ad guys" mentality that can be unfortunately
simplistic. For the sake of clear reference I have continued to use the
oppressor/oppressed terminology in analyzing Freire's thought, aware
however of the gratuitous rhetoric it introduces. I will have occasion to
return to this point in discussing the "leading power" of the word.
Oppression
As we have seen "Any situation in which A objectively exploits B
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or hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person is one of
oppression. " (p. 40) Freire identifies prescription as a basic element in
the oppressive relationship.
One of the basic elements of the relationship between
oppressor and oppressed is prescription
. Every
prescription represents the imposition of one man's
choice upon another, transforming the consciousness
of the man prescribed to into one that conforms with
the prescriber's consciousness, (p, 31)
This false consciousness destroys the effectiveness of any stimulus for
action. (Freire, 1970) False consciousness results whenever there is
internalization of the oppressor's mentality within the oppressed. For
example, generations of sitting in the back of busses and living only in
certain sections can be so internalized by members of certain races that
they come to consider it wrong to do otherwise. Again, many women in
America consider their proper role that of housekeeping and mothering,
without realizing that they have internalized a cultural stereotype ascribed
to them from outside.
The oppressed suffer from the duality. . . within.
They are at one and the same time, themselves and
the oppressor whose consciousness (values and goals?
or prescriptions? Ed. note) they have internalized.
The conflict lies in the choice between being wholly
themselves or being divided; between ejecting the
oppressor within or not ejecting him; between human
solidarity or alienation, between following prescriptions
or having choices, between being spectators or actors;
between acting or having the illusion of acting through
the action of the oppressors; between speaking out or
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being silent, castrated in their power to create and
re-create, in their power to transform the world.
This is the tragic dilemma of the oppressed which
their education must take into account, (p. 33 )
The mentality of oppression affects the oppressed in other ways. As indicated
in the schema on page 45, it provides the only model the oppressed have for
being human. Hence, initially at least, the oppressed as they become more
aware of an unjust system, do not desire to change the system but to reverse
roles within it.
It is not to become free men that they want agrarian
reform, but in order to acquire land and thus
become landowners—or more precisely bosses over
other workers, (p. 30) 11
The internalized oppressor also causes people to internalize that
they are inadequate. They fear freedom which implies personal choice,
because they fear the risks (p. 32) and responsibility of autonomy.
The oppressed, having internalized the image of the
oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful
of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject
this image and replace it with autonomy and
responsibility. Freedom is acquired by conquest,
not by gift. It must be pursued constantly and
responsibly.
.
.
(and) is the indispensable condition
of the quest for human completion, (p. 31)
To overcome the mentality of oppression and the external reality of a
dehumanizing situation, oppressed people need "critically to recognize the
causes" of the oppressive situation and to find a group with the same
commitment as themselves to work for change, (p. 32) Initially their
struggle will be a threat both to oppressor and to their own companions
who can fear still greater repression because of it.
The first purpose of the pedagogy is the liberation of human
consciousness, of botti oppressor and oppressed, from the myths created by
living m an oppressive structure. 12 Some of these myths are:
-that men, in principle equal, are in fact unequal in
ability and right to determine their world.
-that it is better to keep people "happily unaware"
of the injustices of which they are victims and
about which they can do nothing, (p. 20)
-that the models of an educated man, a capitalist
system, and a developed or modernized nation
imported from oppressor groups or nations are the
only right models, and are good for all men.
So the battle against oppression must be joined on two levels: the level of
the mind and this is the work of education; and the level of economic and
socio-political change—and this is the level of revolution. That there can
and must be a non-violent cultural revolution, in Freire T s argument (see
Pedagogy
,
Chapter 4) does not preclude the possibility, in some cases the
necessity, to "take away from the oppressor his power to oppress. " (pp.
40-41) Freire does not, as we have seen, explicitly advocate violence, or
rather, he takes refuge in the fact that violence is already present, though
unacknowledged.
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Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who
exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons—
not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and
unrecognized, (p. 41)
It is the educator who must assist at the growth in awareness of existing
violence and injustice for all those caught in an oppressive system:
The pedagogy of the oppressed is an instrument for
their critical discovery that both they and their
oppressors are manifestations of dehumanization.
Liberation is thus a childbirth, and a painful one.
The man who emerges is a new man, viable only as
the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is superseded
by the humanization of all men. (p. 33)
Here, it appears that Freire is speaking of a classical revolution and a
classless society, not merely of a process of internal liberation. True
revolution presupposes liberation. 13 If it does not deal with the presence of
the internalized oppressor, it will fail as a revolution.
Resolution of the oppressor-oppressed contradiction
indeed implies the disappearance of the oppressors
as a dominant class, (p. 42)
Marx’ thesis: that change in economic structures precedes change in con-
sciousness, is evident here. Until the oppressiveness of an oppressive
system is destroyed, there can be no liberation. Since it is the attitudes
of human beings which perpetuate oppressive structures, it might seem
182
conceivable
.at cducalion, without ^^^
But it is Freire's premise that there is no valid reflection without preceding
"d aCC°m“g aCti0DS!
> Without praxis. In this light the Pedagogy
seems to be a clear call to revolutionary action.
The pattern for (he educational work is laid out by the necessity for
those involved to see "the reality of oppression not as a closed world from
which there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. "
(P. 34) But this perception alone will not effect liberation.
This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for liberation; it must become the
motivating force for liberating action. Nor does
the discovery by the oppressed that they exist in
dialectical relationship to the oppressor, as his
antithesis--that without them the oppressor could
not exist in itself constitute liberation. The
oppressed can overcome the contradiction in which
they are caught only when this perception enlists
them in the struggle to free themselves, (p. 34)
This demands a radicalization of the oppressed and of those others,
formerly members of oppressor groups, in sympathy with them. Radicalization
involves commitment to the position one has chosen
and ever greater engagement to transform concrete,
objective reality, (p. 21)
The radicalization required of the individual from another class, who would
join the struggle, is solidarity with the oppressed.
Solidarity requires that one enter into the situation
of those with whom one is solidary; it is a radical
posture, (p. 34)
1H3
Since the oppressor-oppressed contradiction is established in concrete
reality, the "resolution of this contradiction must be objectively verifiable"
(p. 35) in the transformation of that concrete reality. This maintains the
reflection/action dialectic called praxis and combats the
subjective immobility which would divert the
recognition of oppression (in)to patient waiting
for oppression to disappear of itself.
Without "making real oppression more oppressive still by adding to it the
realization of oppression" there can be no authentic praxis, (p. 37)
The Pedagogy
One of the means for the internalization of the existing myths of a
society is our present mode of education. A large portion of Chapter 2 of
the Pedagogy is devoted to depository or "banking" education. This name for
educational methods is used to show that the student is considered a spatialized,
empty vessel, into which the teacher makes deposits of "knowledge" which can
be withdrawn at certain times (examinations). Freire first points out the
subject/object dichotomy implied: the teacher is a person, a subject, who
knows, decides, and teaches. The student is an object, a passive empty
container who receives and stores. We have already seen that in Freire’s
analysis the result is not 'loiowledge"—since knowing requires a dynamic
co-creating of what is known. Yet the context (not the contents) is internalized.
I, the student, am inferior, a thing, to be decided for, taught and led.
In opposition to this method, Freire advocates problem-posing
education: problematization which we have already discussed. In the culture
circles, the content of the curriculum is drawn from the daily life of the
people. But Freire implies that within so-called "school" disciplines and
situations, problem-posing education can elicit the relevant core from the
irrelevant information. Further, it respects the human dignity of the student
and involves him/her in the dynamics of inquiry, teaching and learning. Freire
employs barbarisms such as educator-educatee, and educatee-educator to
indicate that there are in this system no "teachers" and "students" but
co-learners in dialogue. There is, however, a role for the teacher: to
catalyze the questioning, to present his/her own reflections as one of the
objects for consideration, to prepare materials to assist students to penetrate
more deeply the challenge of the reality under consideration. But not to decide
exclusively what is to be considered, nor why, nor what the "right" outcomes
are. Teachers are also learners in an open-ended exploration.
This chapter seems to be a diversion in the forward flow of Freire's
writings. It presents, in fact, additional data on the dehumanizing potential
of existing educational practice, but its "school" applications of problem-
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posing distract from the political and directional consciousness-raising of
the rest of the Pedagogy.
This direction is established again in the discussion of the Word,
naming, praxis and dialogue found in the remaining chapters. The somewhat
simplistic presentation of problem-posing given above might lead one to
believe that it is equivalent to the familiar "inquiry" methods in education.
However, a consultation of the text shows that in adult education at least, it
is far more complex, critical and committed. One of the still unanswered
questions about Freire's intent is how far down into the earlier years of a
child’s education do/should political and economic organizers for educational
methods reach. The reader is referred again to Part I, Chapter 4, for a
detailed summary of the methodology not repeated here.
There are several assumptions implicit in Freire's discussion of
existing and ideal pedagogy. These are basic to his theory of knowledge and,
necssarily, to his theory of action.
1. Man's mode of knowing reality is by interaction with
it, not contemplation of it.
2. Knowledge is not an absolute because reality is not
fixed; it is a process.
3. Knowledge is a resolution of opposites in dialectic
interaction.
4. What, and only what a person acts on, that she/he
knows.
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verified by action.
6. Thus knowledge (a theory) is continually modified
y the validation or absence of validation of thehypotheses it points to.
7. Knowledge necessarily leads to action, (pp. 33, 37)
Present day pedagogy, insofar as it is narrative implies that knowledge also
is reified, a thing which can be packaged and transmitted. The narrative is
untruthful (p. 61) because the "deposits" contain contradictions and because
reality is described. The possibility of clear description indicates that
reality itself is fixed, static, and predictable.
The result of a banking attitude toward the student and knowledge,
is increased nonhumanness and passivity for the student, conformity to the
reified world which he/she absorbs, and dehumanization for the teacher as
well who never comes to know truth: i.e.
,
reality as it is (in process).
Hence, out of touch with truth, the teacher cannot be intentional or trans-
forming of that reality.
Even the words used to transfer knowledge become denatured, no
longer instruments of power, or creative of change (at least of change in con-
sciousness, which is liberation) but instead are tokens of pre-digested,
non-active symbolizations called "facts." The teacher is
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acting, but not humanly, because human action is knowledge-based,
intentional and predictive of change.
This type of education is in the moral, not amoral, order: with its
morality ranging from
-evil: if frustrating the creativity and transforming the
natural inquiry of the student mind is deliberate; or if
adaption is promoted, the better to dominate;
to
-criminal neglect: if the educator has failed to reflect
critically on his/her practice, since both training and
position posit reflection;
to
-blind tool-ship of the institution: there where institutionali-
zation operates the work of oppression, in spite of the
good will of some individuals
to
-total ignorance of the effects of his/her action. This last
makes the teacher equivalent to the most "submerged"
peasant.
The assumption under this aspect of Freire’s critique of educational
practice is that education as such is a process of inquiry, (p. 58) His
criticism of the standard methodology underscores the obvious reifications,
the lack of inquiry and the substitution of a teacher-student polarity for a
true dialectic. It assumes that knowledge is only of the past and, like the
past, is wholly determinate. *4
188
On the other hand, Freire assumes that the goal of education is the
development of critical consciousness, (p. 60) Oppression is first of all a
state of consciousness; the essence of the humanization of education is related
to
-a changed concept of the nature of reality (as process),
of knowledge (process) and of the human person (process
with power, "ever becoming more than he is").
-a changed concept of the dynamic tension between self
and other, as creative of the person.
-a changed concept of the function of time in the
determinate (past) versus indeterminate (future)
world, and its relation to freedom and power to
determine the future.
The content of a liberating pedagogy is the historical situation in which people
find themselves and their perception of that situation. To arrive at assessments
of the people's initial perception, and to bring them to perceive their own
perceptions, Freire uses projective materials.
In all the stages of decoding, men exteriorize
their view of the world; in the way they think
about the world their generative themes may
be found, (p. 97)
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is enormous if the educator
The possibility for manipulation by the leaders
begins to shift his view from the themes to the people or tries to insert themes
he/she thinks they should discover. Freire holds that there are no pre-
determined themes apart from the concrete
"men-world" relationships.
Hence, in theory at least, there can be no mapping of the itinerary of thematic
investigation in advance, beyond that of the sparse procedural steps given in
fte gates: and in Education for Critical Conscinnsn^
The development of thematic investigation described in Chapter 3 of
the Pedagogy although involving the people in dialogue, places the planning
and direction of the entire project in the hands of outsiders, the "experts. "
This seems to be prescriptive and in contradiction to Freire's position that
the oppressed must undertake the work of their own liberation (Ch. I, 4). This
is the crux and challenge of the Pedagogy.
The task which the Pedagogy sets itself is to evolve a mode of education
capable of dealing with the need on the part of the people so recently, or still,
submerged in a semi-intransitive consciousness, so that they may become
aware of their oppression, and of the necessity to achieve internal and external
freedom. Yet this pedagogy must be respectful and dialogical, not manipulative,
depository or prescriptive. To develop it several questions can no longer be
avoided.
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1. Who will be the agents of the new order to be achieved by the
Struggle against oppression? Those who enjoy the goods of an oppressive
structure have too much to lose to undertake its overthrow (pp. 42-44) and
are often unaware of its oppressiveness. The oppressed, who have the
sensitizing and motivating action of misery, also have the freedom to work
for change, once they have extrojected the values and point of view of their
oppressors.
Those who recognize, or begin to recognize
themselves as oppressed must be among the
developers of this pedagogy, (p. 39 )
Extrojecting the oppressor housed within is a necessary first step. As long
as the oppressed are seen or think of themselves as objects, a thing or a
category, or a class (the poor), they are dehumanized. Freedom and
responsibility require that they be subjects and that they act.
The oppressed, submerged in the situation must get a new perception
on the situation, see it as an entity apart from themselves, but without action
on that situation perception alone "will not lead to transformation of reality
because it is not a true perception. " (p. 37 )
2. If the implementation of the pedagogy requires political and
economic power, can the oppressed bring it about? By formal education, no;
for systematic education "can be changed only by political power. " (p. 40)
Formal education conducted by those in power can only be expected to maintain
the same patterns of power, and to adapt the uneducated to their oppression.
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However, educational projects "can be carried out with the oppressed in the
process of organizing them. " Freire's culture circle method is one such
project. (See Part I, Ch. 4) To achieve a new perception of their state the
"oppressed must see examples of the vulnerability of the oppressor" and the
transformability of the situation. Thus they can overcome magical beliefs
about the oppressor's power, invulnerability, and the inevitable rightness of
their victimization, (p. 51) This implies that they must engage in action
demonstrates that the oppressor is vulnerable and that the situation can
be changed, however slightly.
In the first stage (of the pedagogy) the oppressed
unveil the world of oppression and commit them-
selves to its transformation.
In the second, after the
reality of oppression has been transformed, the
pedagogy.
. . becomes a pedagogy of all men in
the process of permanent liberation, (p. 40)
Freire softens the revolutionary implications of the above by adding that the
confrontation occurs in the first stage through a
change in the way the oppressed perceive the world
of oppression; in the second through the expulsion
of the myths created and developed in the old order.
(p. 40)
and which tend to endure into the new. "In both stages, it is always the culture
of domination that is culturally confronted.” (p. 40)
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3. Can myths be expelled without action changing the old order? If
not, these statements imply revolution. Freite notes that violence is a given
of the existing order, because any coercion of the free person such that he/
she cannot make significant life decisions is a situation of violence.
Any situation in which "A" objectively exploits
B or hinders his pursuit of self-affirmation
as a responsible person is one of oppression.
Such a situation in itself constitutes violence
(p. 40)
Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who
exploit, who fail to recognize others as person.
(P- 41)
This Violence, by an action- reaction mechanism, causes and apparently justifies
a violent response
!
Yet is is.
.
. precisely in the response of the
oppressed to violence of their oppressors that
a gesture of love may be found. Consciously or
unconsciously the act of rebellion by the oppressed
(an act which is always, or nearly always, as
violent as the initial violence of the oppressors) can
initiate love.
. . . As the oppressed, fighting to
be human, take away the oppressors power to
dominate and suppress, they restore to the
oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise
of oppression. 15
Given Freire s dialectical approach, one might expect here some attempt at
synthesis of the polar opposites into a new kind of system. There is no
indication in the Pedagogy of such a step.
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False consciousness is not limited to the oppressed mentality. It
permates every level of an oppressive society.
Once a situation of violence and oppression hasbeen established it engenders an entire way of
life. (p. 44)
y
conditioning oppressors and oppressed alike, creating in the oppressor "a
strongly oppressive consciousness” which without
-concrete material possession
of the world and of men.
. . could not understand itself-could not even exist.
"
(p . 41) The ever greater
-having” of the possessing class generates myth-
making words: their own
-competence, ”
-ability, -
-courage, -
-initiative, -
"willingness to risk, - which imply that the cause of the poverty and ignorance
of others is due to their incompetence and laziness, (p. 45) These myths,
conditioning the mind of the oppressor, together with a desire to control, can
be unsuspected and particularly dangerous, in those who leave the ranks of
privilege to work for the liberation of the oppressed. (Ch. 4) They betray
themselves in attitudes: fear to trust the peasants to do their own thinking,
avoidance of honest dialogue with them in favor of planning for them— "later
after we have educated them, they will be able to do it for themselves!" It is
difficult for conditioned minds to believe in the humanness and ability of the
underprivileged. (p. 46) These attitudes are the source of anti-dialogical
action in those committed to change an oppressive system, and they defeat any
real systemic change.
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Trusting the people is an indispensable
precondition for revolutionary change.
converts become populist leader types
—truly wanting to ,Thelp" the
oppressed but acting for not with.them-and so perpetuating the essence of
oppression: decision by another.
The man who claims devotion to the cause of
liberation yet is unable to enter into communion
with the people, whom he continues to regard
as totally ignorant, is grievously self-deceived.
(P. 47)
As with the people, so with the leadership, the instrument for a change of
consciousness is praxis:
Conversion to the people requires a profound
rebirth. Those who undergo it must take on a
new form of existence; they can no longer remain
as they were. Only through comradeship with
the oppressed can the converts understand their
.
characteristic ways of living and behaving which
in diverse moments reflect the structure of
domination, (p. 47)
Freire, opposed to any form of messianism, is committed to faith
in the inner competence of oppressed peoples. He is aware that the oppressed
mentality is characterized by a fatalistic docility and duality of the oppressors
and that these are manifested in horizontal violence, self-deprectation and
emotional dependency. His dilemma is constructing a pedagogy to change this
situation yet avoid prescriptive, outsider decisions as to content, method,
and values.
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Praxis, Naming and Literacy
As we have seen, Freire’s work began with literacy training, a
literacy whose objective was that men and women should name, and so control
their world. By naming, Freire means both reflection and action for change.
There is an ambiguity in the concept of naming as Freire uses it. Sometimes
the term is equivalent to praxis; sometimes it is restricted to analyses, or
even to labeling. In treating of the "culture of silence" he implies that naming
is constructive of intelligence and "being robbed of the power to say their own
word" is to be deprived of understanding.
To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to
change it. Once named, the world in its turn
reappears to the namers as a problem and
requires of them a new naming. Men are not
built in silence, but in word, in work, in
action reflection
.
But while to say the true word—which is work,
which is praxis—is to transform the world,
saying that word is not the privilege of some
few men, but the right of every man. ...
Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated
by the world, in order to name the world, (p. 76)
The concept of naming as power has many echoes for linguists,
educators, philosophers and psychiatrists. However, naming also could
become a tool for the more effective control of one person by another.
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Dialogue is an encounter among men who name the
world; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for
the domination of one man by another, (p. 77)
The domination implicit in dialogue, is that of the
world by the dialoguers; (together, not one domi-
nating the other). It is a conquest of the world for
the liberation of men. (p. 78)
By its focus on honest collaboration and dialogue, Freire’s methodology and
philosophy enhance the dignity of the oppressed. By the process of naming,
acting and reflecting, people become aware of the inherent defects of an
oppressive system and of their power over it. They are conscientized.
The need for conscientizing to enable the people for participatory
democracy was first discussed in Education as the Practice of Liberation and
is reinforced here. Education is the instrument for the people to discover
that oppression is a systemic flaw, solved only by changing the system itself,
if the existence of liberated persons is to be viable.
The difficulty with this whole section of the Pedagogy is the rhetoric
and lack of precision. Much is suggested about the creative role of the Word,
dialogue, the injustice of depriving people of their own word, the nature of
praxis as naming-action, but if we ask Freire what and how to do it, there
are no further details beyond the codifications and discussions of the first
twenty "words" of the literacy training. Stanley has developed the implications
of political literacy (1972c); Freire himself admits (1974) that his fuller
development was cut off in Brazil by the coup of 1964. But the fact is that
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neither here nor in later writings to we find the detail on me second level oi
conscientisation that his works promise.
Dialogue and Cultural Revolution
Whether cultural or violent, revolution requires a commitment.
Commitment to revolution results from conviction: that the revolution is
itself pedagogical.
The closing chapter of the Pedagogy of the Oppressed is a lengthy
development of the characteristics of cultural revolution as opposed to
cultural invasion and of the utopian view of interpersonal relationships it
requires. It is not possible to teach or lead without a relationship of love,
a relationship which places one at the "other" end of the self-other continuum.
The cultural revolution will be characterized by dialogue, commitment,
cooperation and love, as opposed to manipulation, sloganizing, "deposition,
regimentation, and prescription which Freire says are the characteristics
of cultural invasion. All of this seems rather airy and abstract until we
realize that cultural invasion is the term he applies to most of our traditional
modes of education, development and assistencialism
. He repeats that the
manipulated consciousness under such regimes has at best only a semblance
of choice: a selection among those choices allowed by the dominators. In
fact, people who have been long prescribed to, will choose according to the
will of their rulers, even when there is no coercion to do so.
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On the other hand, true revolutionary leadership requires nothing
less than an abandonment of self-interest and personal gain for the sake of
the collectivity. The level of communication is such that the people them-
selves, coordinated, stimulated, perhaps challenged and directed, but never
superseded by the praxis of leadership (p. 120) commit themselves to transform
their world.
Dialogue with the people is radically necessary for
every authentic revolution. This is what makes it
a revolution, not a coup. (p. 122)
Dialogue corresponds to a radical need of persons: "beings who cannot be
truly human apart from communication. " (p. 123) It requires a solidarity
witnessed by "humble, loving, courageous encounter with the people" which
is necessary for both leaders and led.
When men avoid encounter they become inflexible,
and treat others as mere objects, (p. 124)
Dialogical encounter can take place only between person "in communion" who
liberate each other, (p. 128)
But the Utopian vision cannot become a reality unless there has first
been an internal liberation of the dual consciousness housed in all of us. If
one comes to power, still seeting self and the situation as before (seeing
injustice as just) the same injustice will go on but with a new person in the ruling
role. This, Freire comments, is at the root of the revolutions "manquees."
They failed because there was indeed no inner revolution. Liberation is the
inner revolution by which
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a) the oppressed mentahty comes to see the situation
and the self in it;
b) to see self as able to transform it, with others; and
c) to commit itself, at whatever cost, to this work of
transformation,
which begins with transforming consciousness and with action on situations,
and is continually and simultaneously reflective on both.
To be human is to communicate, and communication is essential to
revolution. Any liberating action not sustained by, and promoting dialogue
is self-contradictory. It is for this reason that Freire discriminates cultural
invasion from cultural revolution completely on the basis of dialogue.
Communication is so essential that to lose, avoid, or frustrate it is to
dehumanize, (p. 124) However, dialogic encounter cannot take place between
antagonists (p. 124); it takes place only between equals. Hence, revolutionary
leaders cannot carry on the revolution for the people, but only with them, on
a footing of equality and mutual decision, and their own ability to think truly,
depends upon ongoing dialogue.
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If the revolutionary leaders deny this right to the
people (implicitly deny their capacity to raise their
own level of conciousness by reflecting on the
causes of their existing reality) they impair their
own capacity to think.
. . correctly, (p. 126)
But Freire goes further. To work for liberation one must identify with the
dominated; he/she must "die" as a dominator or uninvolved person (and
institutionally, an uninvolved person is a dominator) and be "reborn" as one
of the oppressed.
There have been revolutionary leaders who do not believe that dialogue
is possible prior to taking power. They intend to give the opportunity for
dialogue later. But dialogue after the taking of power is a sort of luxury,
not a means to authentic revolution. Such a leader misunderstands revolution
as education, and instead visualizes a "new education" to be established "after
the revolution. " This is a return to the view of education and knowledge, of
teacher/student, which is characteristic of the world of oppression, a world
which the revolution is supposed to change. It evidences the dualism still in
the mind of the leaders.
We have said that only the oppressed can carry out the work of
liberation. However, the entire discussion on the leadership of revolution
raises questions about this. The revolution, Freire says, begins as a social
entity within the oppressor society. It was also Marx's view that only the
fully mature bourgeois capitalist society is ready for the socialist revolution.
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(Deutscher, 1971) Here occurs the first change of consciousness and the
dramatic change in act of those who cross over to the ranks of the oppressed.
Any cultural action must correspond to the potentialities of that society. The
potentialities of any social entity are to develop (be transformed) by interplay
of its own contradictions. No external intervention is effective except in the
measure that it matches with these potentialities and accentuates these
contradictions. The newness of the revolution is generated within the old
oppressive society before the moment in time of the taking of power, (p. 132)
If not, there is a coup, but not a revolution. The oppressive structures have
to go if revolution is to be achieved. In many places (Ladoc, 1973) Freire
has claimed that the whole fabric of capitalist society is essentially competitive
and dominating and is incapable of sustaining the kind of dialogic, cooperative,
loving humanism essential to a non-oppressive society. The revolution is
both interior and exterior cultural change, through praxis, and is ongoing,
with or without the moment of a takeover of power. Only if this cultural change
is indeed ongoing can it prevent the bureaucratization of the revolution
after the political taking of power. In other words, as Freire indicates in
Chapter 4, cultural revolution is the matrix; military revolution is one point
ol intersection. One might represent the concept on a three-dimensional
graph (a two-dimensional attempt is offered below) where growing consciousness
in the oppressed increases with action to promote social and political power
for the oppressed. The increased action, in turn, causes growing oppressive-
ness (repressiveness) in the actions of the dominant group. At some critical
point the moment of revolution is reached. It is (theoretically) possible that
the critical temperature might never be reached and the axis of reactionary
efforts on the part of the dominators be reduced to zero without military
action. The ambivalence about violent versus non-violent revolution in
Freire’s writings might be clarified if we look at the unlikeliness of zero
reactionism with a mathematical model. (Figure 2)
However, the important point Freire is making here is that
unless there is growing consciousness and growing dialogical commitment to
love on the part of the revolutionaries, there will simply be a line-up
between antagonists: dominated and dominator, with the power belonging
to one or another according to the moment of the revolution, but with no
change in the oppressiveness of the situation. The history of revolutions
in modem times and of communism as it is found in Russia shows that these
revolutions resulted in systems as competitive, prescriptive and oppressive
as the ones overthrown.
On the other hand, cultural invasion, like cultural revolution, is
also cultural action. The differences lie in the view of the human person, the
Action
13
c
Repression
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Explanation of Graph
Repression has existed. At some point (A), praxis begins and when it reaches
a certain level stimulates greater repression, to such a degree that action
may be brought almost to a stand-still.
(B) However with increasing repression a critical point (C) is reached.
Increased repression and abortive actions now achieve a breakthrough of
understanding and a leap forward (C-D) into revolutionary action.
C-D represents the revolution, where external oppression is neutralized,
and action is dramatically effective.
The internalized oppressor still present in the revolutionaries probably will
prevent complete disappearance of repressive actions, although now coming
from a different source and so the curve will probably follow D-E' instead of
D-E.
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view of the relationship between persons, the view of the self, the view of
society as competitive or cooperative, and given these views, in the purposes
for the cultural action. One’s views are created and refined by one's agency
and hence are interdependent with the world in which one lives, and with its
18
malleability to change.
Cultural revolution aims at development of individuals and trans-
formation of the whole society. It becomes cultural invasion when the locus
for the pattern of the transformation is located outside the being transformed.
Then there is change, modernization, but not development, (p. 160) (See
for example, A. I. D. and other kinds of "development" of Latin American
countries by Western powers.) If invaders and revolutionary leaders act
in the same way, (act for the people instead of with them) their objectives
soon become the same, whatever their initial differences in intention. To
repeat: the constitutive elements of a true revolutionary action are dialogue,
cooperation, unity and communication. Cultural revolution, Freire claims,
integrates the values and world-view of the leaders with those of the people
to produce a new model, belonging to both and resolving the contradictions
between them. (p. 183) This still allows the leadership to go beyond the
rather limited aspirations of a partially submerged people, without setting those
aspirations aside. By accepting the desires of the people and bringing them into
the perspective of a larger problem, they conscientize both the people and
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themselves, (p. 185) For example, Frei re cites the workers
higher wages, which was brought into the larger context of the
the ownership of labor.
To achieve critical consciousness of the fact
that it is necessary to be "the owner of one's
own labor, " that labor "constitutes part of the
human person, " and that "a human being can
neither be sold nor can he sell himself" is to
go a step beyond the deception of palliative
solutions. It is to engage in authentic trans-
formation of reality in order, by humanizing
that reality, to humanize men. (p. 185)
desire for
problems of
The Pedagogy: A Summary
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The Pedagogy of the Oppressed is a process which makes the condition,
existence, and causes of oppression objects of reflection by the oppressed, and
through them, by all men. It is a conscientizing process carried on by
problematizing a situation (questioning it, ferreting out together its contra-
dictions and the tasks they imply) in dialogue. Dialogue such as this, and the
whole conscientizing process, rests on certain assumptions:
-that all human beings have the ability to understand their
situation, get distance on it, and act to change it.
-that men and women learn together with others by experimental
action, on whose results they again reflect.
-that men and women are conditioned by previous historical
experiences and usually need a catalyst to arrive at new
insights into a situation.
-that this catalyst may be another person (educator) or a
change in the concrete context (movement by a member of
oppressor class into context of the oppressed) but usually
requires both. Education is a question of praxis.
-that to be human is to be in control of one’s own life, to be
a center of decision-making.
-that dehumanizing others by preventing their decision-making
also dehumanizes the oppressor.
-that if a situation is evil, (unjust, oppressive) revolution
is justified to change it.
-that the situation of oppression, whereby some men are
treated as things or animals, is evil.
-that the first unfreedom is in the mind:
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(1) of the oppressed, who have internalized the
oppressor, fear freedom, are not convinced
that anything can be done, nor that they have
any power to do it
(2) of the oppressors, who have identified their
being with having, mythicized the nature and
condition of the oppressed, fear change and
loss, and are themselves oppressed in a variety
of ways.
-that external conditions: economic, social, and political,
historically condition thinking, so that the liberation within
men s minds cannot take place without external transformation
of the conditions which perpetuate oppressive contexts, or the
oppressive nature of the context.
-that the process of liberation is a scientific process.
Activism, excessive objectivity without reflection, is
irresponsible; verbalism, excessive subjectivity without
action, is ineffectual. Only praxis, integration of
reflection and action, leads to liberation.
-that praxis inevitably leads to liberation if there is
commitment to stay with the ideals of dialogue and communion,
and pay the price: not be bought off by the lure of power or
position.
The key ideas of the Pedagogy are dehumanization, internalization of the
oppressor, liberation by praxis, dialogue and communion. Dehumanization
appears in common educational practice as ,rbanking education. " It rests on
the subject/object dichotomy of teachers and students, the concept of knowledge
as a thing rather than a process, and the assumptions of ignorance, passivity,
spatialized emptiness with respect to students who must receive all knowledge
from the knowing Subject, the teacher. Based on the unspoken assumption
that students are things, it succeeds in making them things as well as in
providing a channel for the transmission of other myths by the dominator
group.
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^In contrast to banking education, Freire places problem-posing education
and later shows it to be part of a larger reflective process called praxis. It
restores to the individual the right to "say his own word" and be actively a
part of the co-knowing process. Praxis, or the naming-acting- reflecting
cycle, in Freire’s theory is both the source of understanding of the object-
world and the means of transforming it. The centrality of dialogue in this
process has certain implications of respect, mutual dependence
,
trust and
love, and leads him into a discussion of cultural invasion versus cultural
synthesis. These are characterized by what he calls anti-dialogical and
dialogical action respectively. Anti-dialogic, prescriptive and authoritarian
action is engaged in by those whose aim is conquest and control
,
preservation
of the status quo. Leaders whose desire is to help the people and correct an
oppressive situation, however, may also fall into this trap if they cannot
trust the people and attempt to think and plan for them, rather than with them.
In both cases these attitudes lead to manipulation, sloganizing and depositing,
an attempt on the part of the leaders to prescribe attitudes and regiment
behaviors. For those whose aim is "helping, " this is done in the belief that
the people do not understand what will be best for them. Anti-dialogic action
is characteristic also of those who enter an under-developed country to promote
"development" for their own gain: sources of raw materials and markets for
goods
.
Freire calls the action of all of these cultural invasion, for they
disregard the culture, language and technology of the people and substitute
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their own in the name of progress or modernization. (Sec also ’’Extension
or Communication. ") Dialogic action, as Freire sees it, is the only action
open to the revolutionary leadership. It must be characterized by cooperation,
dialogue, organization, and unity in the work of liberation. If it is, it will
become cultural revolution. If it is not, it will be oppressive in its turn.
Unless cultural revolution occurs, classical or military revolution will make
no real difference to the victims of oppression—and these victims are found
at every social level in the system. Cultural revolution is the objective of the
Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
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Cultural Action for Freedom (1971)
Neutrality
The monograph, Cultural Action for Freedom, includes two essays
published during Freire’s Harvard period, 1969-70. Both contain materials
which have appeared in large part in previous publications but they have been
subjected here to a re
-reflection. In the first essay: "The Adult Literacy
Process as Cultural Action for Freedom," the author establishes more firmly
the non-neutrality of education, and reiterates that materials and methodology
impiy and inculcate a value set on the unaware, a value set which evolves from
a philosophy of man.
Only someone with a mechanistic mentality, which
Marx would call "grossly materialistic" could reduce
adult literacy learning to a purely technical action
. . . Technique itself, as an instrument of men in
their orientation in the world is not neutral, (p. 6)
One of the means by which education is rendered non-neutral, is the metaphors
which are used and which imply certain assumptions: the digestive metaphor:
the learner is "undernourished; illiteracy is a "poison herb to be eradicated,"
a "disease" to be cured; words become "bread of the spirit" which illiterates
are to "eat" and "digest." (p. 8) Closely related to the nutritionist approach
is the banking metaphor described in Chapter II of the Pedagogy . Here words
and facts are "deposited" in the "empty" students.
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In both, Freire illustrates the power of words to create as well as to
lead. He is concerned with the alien content of texts, the insulting tone for
the adult learner of totally irrelevant materials, and the myths created by
the materials: myths implying that literacy will automatically lead to jobs,
prosperity and dignity.
Analysis of these texts reveals.
. . a simplistic
vision of men, of their world, of the relationship
between the two, and of the literacy process which
unfolds in that world, (p. 10)
Violence
A second clarification in Cultural Action for Freedom is that of violence
and marginality. The illiterates of Latin America are "marginados"
—
marginal men, at the periphery of society.
If then, marginality is not by choice, $md how
could it be with all it implies of hunger, disease)
marginal man has been expelled from and kept
outside the system and is therefore the object
of violence, (p. 10)
If marginality is not seen by educators as the result of structural violence,
notions of integrating the illiterate, changing him, "curing” his sickness of
illiteracy by the "medicine" of literacy are reinforced. But, if the cause of
marginality is expulsion, violence, the cure must attack the cause. As we
have seen, these beings are not "marginal"; they are within the structure of
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society but dependent:
"bemgs-for-others,
" representatives of the dominated
strata of society and in "opposition to those who treat them as things.
"
Alienated men, they cannot overcome their
dependency by incorporation into the very
structure responsible for their dependencv.
(P. U)
The task is not mechanistic adaptation to be achieved by a technical, "neutral"
education:
Teaching men to read and write is no longer a
question.
. . of memorizing an alienated word
but a difficult apprenticeship in naming the
world.
By changing the view of the illiterate from that of "marginal man" to that of
oppressed men within a system, one changes the task of the teacher and makes
the literacy training itself a step in demythologizing the world, (p. 12)
Naming
The third major concept in Cultural Action for Freedom is that of the
word: the role of language in leading thought. "Naming" is a concept used
throughout Freire’s writings, and always seems to imply more than the
simple meaning of the word in the given context.
Language is "profoundly significant"; the human word is word-in-
action, powerful to express and create. Because of this, the object of the
literacy process must include not only the man-world relationships and a
perception of them but the dialectic between the products of human activity
which transform human beings in an "inversion of praxis. " Speaking the
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word is both a process and a right: a right to express self, to express the
world, and to create the world. That is, to decide, choose, and participate
in history. De facto denial of this right has resulted for oppressed peoples
m the culture of silence already discussed in Part I. "The fact that human
beings, (even if literate) are alienated from power is responsible for their
silence. " (p. 13) They do not know that the concept of their inferiority is a
myth nor do they know that their enforced silence is due to the fact that "their
work does not belong to them. " (p. 13) Praxis is more than a linear process
of reflection-action-reflection; more than a human process of reflective
action.
Action upon an object must be critically analyzed
in order to understand both the object itself and
the understanding one has of it. (p. 13)
. . . for the learner to know what he did not know
before, he must engage in an authentic process of
abstraction by means of which he can reflect on
the action-object whole or, more generally, on
forms of orientation in the world, (p. 13)
To repeat, reality is never the objective datum alone but includes one’s
perception of it, and it is on this that man must learn to reflect.
The first context for this reflection theoretically and ideally is the
school where teachers and students dialogue together. The second context is
the real situation "the social reality in which men exist." (p. 14) In the
Metodo Paulo Freire, the instrument facilitating the process of abstraction
in the theoretical analysis is codification: visual representations of the themes
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in the existential situation. The point of the codification, which is of course
an artificial form, is to force the discussants to take distance on the object
under consideration. One of the characteristics of animal existence is the
inability of the animal to have any distance from the environment; its total
immersion as part of the natural world. One of the characteristics of human
beings who are repressed and silenced (pp. 14-15) is unawareness of the
structure of the social context that keeps them submerged. The use of
codifications to gain distance corresponds to the use of simulations in modem
educational practice.
In decoding the codification the discussants perceive the object as
a whole, then analyze it, naming its surface structure components. From this
they are led by facilitator questions to decodify the second and fundamental
level, the "deep structure" (Chomsky) consisting of themes, relationships
and contradictions. This deeper analysis gives insight into the contradictions
and the dialectic of the surface structure with the real-world context in which
the discussants live. Spontaneously they recreate the Gestalt after the
analysis, but this time it is a Gestalt that contains within the global view of
the thing-in-the-whole
,
the particulars of their own place in that whole.
(pp. 14-15)
Perceiving one's present or former perceptions is an integral part
of naming and praxis.
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If the act of knowing is a dynamic act.
. . and no
knowledge is ever complete.
. . then in order to
know, man not only "admires" the object, but
must be always "readmiring" his former
"admiration." (p. 15)
And by this focus on the act of analyzing, as well as on its product, errors
in perception are rectified.
One objective of the process "perceiving one’s previous perceptions"
is to demythologize so that the people may become aware of the values they
have internalized. Since we are concerned with the leading power of the
word, we must also note the potential for manipulation in the technique. The
choice of theme to be codified necessarily "leads" what is discovered. For
example, Freire says "Let us suppose that we were to present to groups
from among the dominated classes codifications which portray their imitation
of the dominator's cultural models, a natural tendency of the oppressed
consciousness at any given moment. " (p. 16) As a result of the decodification,
the people perceive the "myth" of the absolute value of these models, and
the subtle implication of the superiority of the dominator’s culture. However,
a different codification, it could be argued, might lead the students to
"perceive" the validity of one of the models presented.
Freire's answer to this is that the themes to be codified come from
the people themselves, in the form of metaphors and day-to-day preoccupations,
of which they are unconscious. To assume that this is so without any
projection of the listener into the themes, is to presume a facilitator
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consistently listening without a personal agenda (without values?), without
screening for what he/she wants to hear.
Does this imply, on the other hand, that to avoid manipulation the
learner ought to reconstruct the process of human knowing in absolute
terms ?" to re-invent every wheel? Freire would say no. He advocates a
synthesis, achieved in dialogue, "between the educators’ maximally
systematized knowing and the learners' minimally systematized knowing, "
(p. 17) which he conceives as possibleby the simple technique, consistently
applied, of objectifying the real-life situation and posing as problems the
contradictions evident in it. From this flows the process of Naming.
Problematizing is not the prerogative of the educator. By continuously
directing the attention of the people to the problem side of a situation, moving
away from a fatalistic attitude toward a task orientation, it is assumed that
the process and attitude of problematizing will become a habitual mode of
thought for them. Critical consciousness will be a way of life.
Cultural Action
The direction of the decodification process to cultural themes such as
the conditioning of men by the products of their action, or by the importation
of foreign models, is called "cultural action." Cultural action in this case
is the internalization of the dominator’s values, social and cultural norms.
They can only be ejected by corresponding cultural action.
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As we have already seen, even if revolution were to change the
super-structure of a dominated group, without cultural action at the level of
the infrastructure, it would be a revolution manquee, perpetuating the same
structures of domination with different occupants in the key roles. (Elias,
1974; on Soviet capitalism. Other examples can be multiplied. See also
"Extension or Communication": Chiliean agrarian reform.) The instrument
for cultural action is praxis, not verbal lessons or propaganda.
Utopia
The fourth concept important in the analysis of "Cultural Action for
Freedom" is that of utopia. As indicated before, the utopian vision is unreal
only in the sense that it is unrealized, not that it is unrealizable. The
Pedagogy has been accused of being unrealistic and unrealizable, hence utopian.
This is not the sense in which Freire uses the term. By utopian he means
to be engaged in denunciation and annunciation:
denunciation of an unjust and dehumanizing
situation, annunciation of its transformation
and what the transform will look like.
This requires a theory of transforming action, since neither denunciation
nor annunciation effects change. The effectiveness of the theory and methodology
of action is the factor that saves the utopian, hope-filled pedagogy from
being merely utopic arm-chair philosophizing. Unfortunately while there is
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considerable data available as to the technical effectiveness of the Freirean
literacy process (which is not unlike Ashton-Wamer’s and others) the end:
literacy, is only incidental to Freire's pedagogy. There is also data as to
the effectiveness of praxis and problematization to awaken awareness of
unjust structural factors in one’s environment. There is, as yet, very little
data as to the effectiveness of this awareness in the change process—without
a parallel military and social change in the power structure.
It must be recognized that the process itself, and the changes
envisioned are long range. (Note: I am not sure that there has been a clear
visioning of what the end-product will look like. Freire is exceedingly
ambiguous in describing the classless society which might replace competitive,
exploitative structures.) It has been said that the steady movement of Latin
American countries toward socialism has been heavily influenced by Freire’s
thought. (Perez, 1971) But, in point of fact, the conscientizing process has
not yet been widely implemented among the most "silenced" levels of society.
It has shown marked effectiveness among the intellectuals, middle class and
churchmen, to radicalize or promote reaction. (Medellin, 1972; "80 Priests"
LADOC 1973; MEB 1960-70)
For Freire, utopianism is one of the descriptors of education. He
does not subscribe to the thesis: the first function of education is socialization
to the existing systems.
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When education is no longer utopian, i.e.
,
when it
no longer embodies the dramatic unity of denunciation
and annunciation, it is either because the future has
no more meaning for men, or because men are
afraid to risk living the future as (a) creative over-
coming of the present which has become old. (p. 20)
For a pedagogy to be utopian, it must know the present reality, i.e.
,
have at its disposal all the necessary techniques ranging from literacy
methodology to the behavioral sciences. It must also have a view of the future
as indeterminate, for if the future is completely contained in the present
reality there is no future, but merely an extrapolation of the present; action
becomes absurd since change is impossible.
The second essay in Cultural Action for Freedom: "Cultural Action
and Conscientization" reflects on both philosophical and sociological aspects
of Freire’s thought. The chief concepts; the distinction between human and
animal existence, the human power to exist, to understand the significance
of human action, and to communicate; the power of consciousness to reflect
upon, not merely to reflect the world, and a detailed analysis of levels of
consciousness have all been discussed elsewhere. Freire claims that
mechanistic objectivism, solipcism, and behaviorism, distort the human
dialectic: the first posits only the world, with consciousness merely a copy
of it, the second posits only consciousness, which creates reality, while
behaviorism "makes men machines" (mechanistic behaviorism) or negates
them altogether (logical behaviorism) "since it affirms that men’s conscious-
ness is 'merely an abstraction.'" (p. 30)
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Conscientization is only viable because men's
consciousness, although conditioned, can
recognize that it is conditioned, (p. 30)
This recognition and the ability to imagine, in advance, the end as if already
achieved enables men and women to form goals and to plan.
In re-analyzing the relationships between dependency and the culture
of silence Freire notes the theoretical impossibility of a government adopting
an attitude of increasing independence from external, highly technological
societies, and yet continuing to maintain silence among the people within its
own borders. Alternately, it is impossible for it to allow the people to emerge
from silence, increasingly to participate in history, while attempting to
maintain dependence of the economy on foreign powers. The historic
confirmation of the incompatibility of independence and silence is found in
the governments established by Quadros (Brazil, 1961) and the Peruvian
military coup (1968); the consistent position of general dependence and
repression is seen in the Brazilian coup (1964).
The Necessity ofor Cultural Action
The latter part of the essay is concerned with moments in the
revolutionary process, and establishes the necessity of cultural action in
the process of revolution.
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The difficulty with the long contrast of cultural action for freedom
versus cultural action for domination is the use of words like myth, slogan,
manipulation, to characterize nthe enemy’s action" and dialogue, utopia,
conscientizing, to characterize "the good side." The former "uses the
communications media (and modem educational methods) to indoctrinate and
dominate"; the latter uses "scientific methods" to promote conscientization
for freedom. The distinctions between use and abuse of media and science
could easily depend on which side they are viewed from.
However, the need to challenge one’s own myths and deifications of
reality, revolution or technology, is a valuable insight, as is the tendency of
technology to depress critical thinking by "saving us the trouble" of problem
solving, (p. 50)
Technology thus ceases to be perceived by men as
one of the greatest expressions of their creative
power and becomes instead a species of new divinity
to which they create a cult of worship. Efficiency
ceases to be identified with the power men have to
think, to imagine, to risk themselves in creation,
and rather comes to mean carrying out orders from
above precisely and punctually, (p. 50)
Freire is not anti-cechnologist. He recognizes that technology and science are
means necessary to human development, essential to economic growth; means
which take their valuation from the end to which they are directed. However, they
are not by that fact neutral, for they arise from and reveal a view of man and the
world, and tend to effect what they signify: i.e. , if the technology is such that
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man is treated as if he were a machine, he tends to become mechanized,
silenced, dehumanized.
The Role of the Churches in Latin America
Much of the language occurring in Freire’s later writings, and in the
Pedagogy to describe cultural revolution is religious language. The concepts
presented, while addressed to secular ends, imply a power and form of
commitment usually associated with religiously oriented life-projects, the
dedication of martyrs and holy men of whatever persuasion. It is Elias’
opinion that the theological aspect is critical to an understanding of Freire.
(Elias, 1974) This theological dimension becomes the pervasive one in
publications since 1971 and in Freire’s growing philosophical identification
with the Theology of Liberation writings appearing in Latin America. (1973)
Two documents will serve to make these views clear: "Conscientizing
as a way of Liberating,
"
published in Contacto from a tape of a talk given in
Rome in 1970, and ’’The Educational Role of the Churches in Latin America,"
published in Pasos
,
in October 1972.
A number of things are different in the Freire of these articles:
-the frank recognition of the relationship between his utopian
vision and the Gospel message.
-the open confrontation of the Latin American Churches as
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powerful social agents: for domestication, or for liberation.
-the appeal for a new "institutionalization" of non-formal
or non-institutional education.
-the almost evangelical exhortation to commitment to the
work of liberation
-ilm ar1icul;i1ion of (;»•<• socialisi • • '•H I' *r Putin
Amo rica (or at the 1 • • ry b’ast, J ' t api* i opiion as
w 'ongj.
-the clearer articulation than herdofon o! the probable
need for violence.
It is in the light of these writings that the Pedagogy appears as a frankly
revolutionary document; a pedagogy for effecting revolution, rather than a
methodology for educating marginal people.
The talk in Rome deals again with the historical commitment to a task
implied in conscientization, the utopian nature of that task of denouncing and
announcing, and the implications for education for freedom (cultural action
for freedom). None of these ideas is new. What is new is the frank relation
of human liberation to divine salvation and the call to liberating action as a
prophetic call—indeed, as the only mode in which the commitment to a
transcendent reality can be lived out in the Latin American Churches today.
He denounces concepts such as "God" and "heaven" if used as magical
palliatives for human misery or myths to keep the oppressed patient with their
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lot; denounces any view of religion which promotes fatalism or "other-
world-ism. ” He calls upon the Churches to stop rationalizing and mythologizing,
and to join in the action, historically; to promote the human, earthly liberation
of men and women. He is calling on them to realize that any salvation hereafter
is a myth, if it bypasses the human task of liberation here and now. This is
what the incarnational presence of God in history is all about. Lastly, he
calls on the Churches to realize the meaning of communion: that no one frees
himself alone, and no one frees another, but "men together in concert, in
communion, collaborating on something wrong that they want to correct, "
achieve the liberation of men. There is a sense in which the mystical language
of Easter is the only language to represent this position, for the price of
commitment to the work of liberation is dying
—
perhaps in the literal sense
—
in the hope of being bom again. This is language Freire uses more and more
frequently: dying to anti-dialogical ways of acting (Pedagogy) , to innocent or
naive ways of seeing (Talk in Rome), to self-protecting ways of being (Role
of the Churches) in order to move forward into the life that is revolutionary.
The revolution is personal, interior, and cultural, before, and while, being
revolutionary in political action.
"The Educational Role of the Churches" adds that the transition from
innocent or naive ways of seeing to critical ways is, like dying, irreversible.
If one is not prepared to pay the price of commitment, one can attempt to go
back to an idealistic dream world—but unsuccessfully. Instead one becomes
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"astute": rationalizing and manipulating in an attempt to justify a lack of
commitment to what one has seen and cannot un-see
.
Freire speaks of the loss of "innocence" of the Church as a whole.
By the loss of innocence he refers to the loss of naivete on the part of "good
men" who were unaware of the state of oppression of others, or of the
structures which perpetuate oppression, and of the fact that their own benefits
derived therefrom. Once awareness comes, innocence is lost. People either
go forward, to commit themselves to the work of changing these structures,
or find the cost too great, withdraw, become "astute. " Then they justify
themselves by conducting "band-aid" social welfare projects, helping "the
poor, helpless, unlettered masses keep their faith." Freire’s irony is heavy;
he does nothesitate to apply it to the Church as a whole, which, having seen
the truth, must either move forward, or reject its vocation. It is no longer
possible to maintain the fiction of neutrality in the face of social issues.
This is a gauntlet flung down: for this is precisely the issue for well-
meaning as well as reactionary elements in the Churches, which are confronted
by the dilemma of choice between unfortunate alignments with one or another
political camp and the non-viable option of doing nothing because they do not
know what to do.
A Church that refuses to face its insertion into
history is not any the less inserted. . . .
Insertion does not depend on the will of those who
assert it. In fact, by affirming the Church s non-
insertion they rather corroborate that insertion. . .
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but on the side of those who deny to the dominated
classes all possibility of being. And that is
exactly how the Church, through fear of losing
itself at some uncertain future, really loses itself
now as it endeavors to avoid the risk involved in a
future that it must build and not simply receive.
(p. 17)
By neutrality, the Churches forego the possibility of denunciation and
annunciation, or of speaking at all to youth who know that the Latin American
problem
is not laziness of its people or the inferiority
of their lack of education.
. . but imperialism,
not as an abstraction or a slogan, but as a palpable
reality, an invading, destroying, present force.
(p. 17)
By avoiding the risk of "dying, " the neutral Church avoids permanently its
"resurrection" and eternal vitality. But this is not universal. There are
some among the Churches who are prophetic, utopian, hopeful, and non-neutral,
and it is to these that Freire appeals.
Their experience shows them that being a Christian
need not mean being reactionary, just as being a
revolutionary need not mean being demoniacal.
Rather, being revolutionary means opposing
oppression and exploitation, favoring the liberation
of the oppressed classes, in concrete terms and
not just conceptually. . . they perceive that it is
not enough to say that men and women are human
persons: one has to do something objectively to
make their status as human persons effective.
They learn that assistential works will never enable
the oppressed to reach their full stature as persons.
(p. 18)
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The essay analyzes in detail the positions that the Churches have taken in the
past: traditionalist, modernizing, and prophetic. The educational work of the
Churches: purposes, methods, processes and aids, whether in schools,
pulpits or seminaries, is conditioned by which of the three choices they have
made.
Freire describes the traditionalist Church, aligned with the power elites,
its continuation of the '’missionary" approach and its "obsession with sin and
death and eternal punishment. " He calls it "the refuge of the masses"
mentality because it provides a (mental) escape for the oppressed. Deprived
of the good things that others enjoy, the oppressed can at least take refuge in
notions like "the evil nature of this world and its enjoyments, " which "are
not worth having in the light of eternal life. " It is surprising to the North
American Christian that such dogma are still being preached in the latter
quarter of this century but if so, it is easy to see the alienation and the
anaesthetization of action against oppression that would be promoted.
Traditionalists delude the people into "flailing out against the demon and
sin, yet leaving intact the real cause of their oppressed state. " (p. 20)
Traditionalism is characteristic of closed societies. But many of
the Churches in Latin America, Freire says, have evolved out of the
traditionalist perspective and are modernizing. This parallels the emergence
of the masses, the advent of populism, and the craze for "development in
society at large. The sudden interest in development, spurred by foreign
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aid, United Nations programs, and national planning institutes, did not occur
by accident. Freire ascribes its cause to
Imperialism's economic interests—e.g.
,
its need
for expanding its markets and the need to "update
the outmoded structures" of its branch offices in
Latin America
—
providing that the updating did not
go too far and disturb the vertical relationship
between the metropolitan society and the dependent
ones. (pp. 21-22)
In order that development not destroy dependence
all political, economic and cultural decisions
controlling the transformation of the dependent
societies would have to be made in the metropolis
,
except for certain trivial ones. (p. 22)
It is this external control that Freire blames for the fact that the Latin
American societies are merely modernizing instead of developing, since true
development must initiate within an organism, independent of any but self-
control. (p. 22)
No class society can have an integral development,
for development presupposes liberation.
Concomitant with modernization, populism appears, and assistencialism.
The masses have been conditioned by years of dependence; while claiming
"rights" they welcome welfarism and manipulative treatment.
Modernizing trends affect the Churches also. They become efficient,
streamlined bureaucracies with professionals in charge of social programs.
(formerly called "charities") modem techniques and communication. But,
Freire charges, the Church is still aligning itself, not with the poor,
but
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with the power elites. It is for their purposes that it supports "reformisms
that only preserve the status quo.
"
It talks of humanizing capitalism but not of
throwing it out altogether, (p. 23)
. .
.
(but) there can be no humanization
without liberation.
Freire's attack upon the "modernizing" Church is virulent: it is a Church
of half measures, alienating its members who see that compromises and
reformism achieve nothing; afraid to take a stand, frozen into immobility,
dead—while its more efficient techniques give the impression of progress.
It is vicious because it stands by and wrings its hands at the alienation of
dominator and dominated alike while refusing to recognize the role of the
system in generating their contradictions; because it distorts the meaning
of liberating education to an individualistic "change of heart, not a social
and historical endeavor of men, " (p. 25) and reduces it to "liberating
children from blackboards and old-fashioned curricula. "
There is, however, a third line appearing among the Churches in
Latin America: uncompromising, lonely, full of risk, feared. Freire calls
it the prophetic Church. The prophetic Church is non-neutral, dialogical,
critically aware, utopian, and informed.
It refuses to divorce this-worldliness from
transcendence or salvation from liberation.
(p. 25)
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It sees education as a "mode of action meant to change things, a political
program for the permanent liberation of man." (p. 28) Yet it knows that no
change that is only in men's minds means anything, it is from this Church
that a new theology is emerging. Hated and feared by both traditionalists and
modernists, it speaks by action but also by words. Like the prophets of old
it cries out against injustice. It lives in men like Che Guevara, Camilo
Torres, Dorn Helder Camara and in groups like the Bishops of Medellin, the
Liberation Theologians, the "80 Priests" of Chile.
It is the function of this Church to bring its prophetic witness wherever
there is exploitation and silence in the Third World, or in the Third World
present in the First World.
A Reflection from Macmurray
Many of the targets for Freire's attack are outgrowths of the basic
dualism earlier identified in Cartesian assumptions. Whether it is people, or
knowledge, or learning, which are "reified and mechanicised" we are concerned
basically with the subjcct/object division that Freire has, in fact, invited.
This dichotomy is at the heart of the most fundamental concept: oppression.
He does us a service, however, in maing how universally it has permeated our
worlds. Yet, even his own methodology does not escape being tainted by the
threat of dualism and he is constantly correcting this by reiterating the dialectic
nature of praxis, knowledge, man-world relationships. His explanation of
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praxis is ambiguous in that it seems to imply.
. . reflection, naming,
strategizing, action.
. . in that order. In practice Freire does not do it that
way. Reflection is bom in action, but the integral dialectic of praxis is less
apparent than is the integrity of agency in Macmurray. To overcome the dualism
created by the assumed, and imprecise, definition of the person, Freire
develops concepts like "man-world entity" instead of "man versus world,"
"colleagues in the revolution" instead of "leaders and followers," "educato r-
educatee" instead of "teachers and students. " In many cases these provide a
rather lame solution for the problem of dualism. The "experts" and leaders of
the culture circles assume a leadership role that pre-decides the direction of
discussion by the choice of the questions; his revolutionary leadership take a
responsibility that others do not feel. The semantic changes are apparent, not
true, dialectic relations. There is not present in them the tension that
ultimately leads to higher syntheses, but rather a renaming which avoids the
/
appearance of opposition. However, insofar as the word leads thought and
action, this renaming may be important. Having said this, it is important to
emphasize that the concept of the dialectic in Freire goes far beyond the need
for a facile solution to dualism, and pervades every major category in the
system: knowledge, neutrality, praxis, relations, violence, cultural action.
In this, it is creative and exciting.
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Although there are many points of contact between Freire and
Macmurray, the latter is not concerned with praxis in the sense of political
construction, but only with the inseparability of action and reflection in agency.
Yet this priority shows that knowledge derives from action, the important base
in praxis. Subsuming this, Freire goes beyond it to place action/reflection
into the matrix of social conditions and social consciousness, and show that
changes of consciousness come only from actions that change situations.
One of the problems with Freire’ s epistemology is the ambiguity in
his definitions of knowledge. In Macmurray’ s thinking the Self cannot exist
as thinker but only as agent, who exists and grows only through relationships
with other agents. Freire’s position on knowledge as process emphasizes this
social dimension. Knowledge is dynamic, achieved by persons together,
"mediated" by the reality, confronting its contradictions, "problematizing"
it. The lack of clarity stems from the fact that he repeats this formula over
and over in essentially the same words, without leaving room for other modes
of knowing or for the role of "content. " Yet, in other contexts (Pedagogy,
1974 seminars) he has referred to what is really a content curriculum,
information needed by those who would effect social change; "control of Marxist
tools of analysis," the "systematized knowledge" of teams of experts
m the
literacy process (1969), all content which does not forego by
that fact its
dynamic nature. Macmurray does not go into the psychology
of learning any
more than does Freire, but he gives us three basic
modalities for reflection,
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and recognizes a valid body of knowledge that accrues from each. These are
the reflective modalities of art, science and religion. He also allows for a
’’reflection for its own sake, ” or theoretical activity to which the practical
is subordinated either temporarily, or (illogically) permanently. Freire
himself is engaged. for large portions of his time in theoretical activity:
writing, analyzing, speaking. He would be the last to deny the effectivness
of the idea in generating change. A simplistic reading of his statements on
action and knowledge, however, (I, 5) could lead one to repudiate such
theoretical activity, apparently divorced from direct action.
A further difficulty with Freire is his mysticism. In speaking of the
fear and love-orientation of persons in societies, Macmurray has given us two
useful insights to examine Freire's political position. In one, Macmurray
notes the essentially aesthetic and contemplative nature of societies where
mistrust among members is managed by routinizing and stylizing the quality
of life. Values are relegated to the private domain and one ceases to consider
the public life as the real life. This lack of seriousness about public values
and issues is illustrated by representative democracies where the outcomes
of national elections have very little effect on the routines or quality of daily
life. I have already suggested that nations such as the United States are in a
naive populist stage of consciousness with respect to national politics. But
if we take Macmurray’s remarks seriously we raise a question about a
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flaw in this mode of government, one that would prevent such a government, on
any large scale, ever being non-oppressive. We have also noted the ease with
which, in times of crisis, such democracies become dictatorships. In his
concern to prepare "silenced" people for critical participation in democracy,
Freire has been aware of naive intermediate stages, but shows no awareness
of the "fatal flaw" Macmurray refers to. On the other hand, Freire himself
seems to evidence the characteristics of mysticism: idealization of a form of
collectivity, and subordination of self-interest to it, assumptions that "the
public good is my good": qualities which make representative government
work, but also qualities which have in the past led to totalitarianism. In this
context some of Freire's remarks about violence and counter-violence give
pause. A contemplative society can easily lead to totalitarian government for
the aforesaid reason that the real life, the life intended, is not the public life.
Ethical norms and values are relegated to the private domain and the public
life is unscrutinized. This is not the form of society that Freire is recommending,
but it is an easy step away if there is that too-great submission of the Self into
the whole, a self-identification with the whole. Freire describes a dialogic
revolutionary community which concords with Macmurray’ s third societal
mode, but without adverting to the dangers in its nature. Neither mysticism
nor rugged individualism is the solution but some synthesis for the dialectic
polarity of these, at the one pole, and the Utopian community at the other.
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Quite simply, I believe Freire is ambiguous here. He has not thought through,
or at least not expressed, the implications and limitations. of democracy nor
the form of "government" most likely to promote community, but is groping
toward a Utopian vision that is in direct agreement with his theses that persons
are and grow in relationship, and act communally to construct the world. His
judgements against "dehumanizing" structures are moral judgements, based on
what these structures do to the quality and universality of human relationships,
and to the inversion of the ends and means in education.
In Persons in Relation Macmurray states that the problem of the
personal is the problem of reconciliation: of overcoming fear by love. If we
look at this as the problem of replacing fear-oriented societal structures by
love-oriented structures, we have the basis of cultural revolution. The problem
conscientisation addresses is the attitudes and the means for cultural revolution.
The society Freire criticizes is competitive, mistrustful, and dehumanizing,
because it is based on a contemplative approach, "each man for himself,
"
with a minimum of interaction. Unequal distribution of resources is only a
symptom of basic attitudes which have been structured into economics and
politics. To attack it on this level is to cure the symptom and not the cause,
if that is possible. The alternative implies that conversion, conscientisation,
must precede any action. But this is not praxis. Praxis is reflective political
action, recognizing the mutually creative effect of environment and consciousness.
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Hegel saw history as the evolution of consciousness. Marx saw consciousness
following history: i.e., economics structuring history, and history structuring
c onsciousness. The latter seems at times to be Freire’s position. But in fact
he has grasped that awareness and environment are poles of a dialectic.
Consciousness and history move forward together, in tension, first one
leading, then the other. Conscientisation gives the tools of praxis that enable
people to take a conscious role in this process, to enter history. And so the
logic of Freire’s position on cultural revolution as cultural action: If we have
accepted Macmurray’s postulate on the necessity of relationships for existence
and growth, then there is an essential flaw in the very nature of competitive
society, an essential contradiction (see p. 139 above), which will doom it to
be dehumanizing and will be its ultimate downfall. If the essential contradiction
is not understood, the new societal structures with which we replace it will be
in the same competitive, power mode. This history has shown.
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PART III: Chapter 1: Notes
1. Private communication, July 1974.
2. Private communication, July 1974.
3. P. 163 English Edition, Education for Critical Consciousness
,
Seabury Press, 1973.
4. Freire has some amusing anecdotes about elements of "foreign”
faith or techniques being "baptized" in the magic rituals of a peasant village.
5. Note use of propagation—a generative word- -rather than
transmission.
6. Notes on Pedagogy of the Oppressed .
7. Notes on Cultural Action for Freedon and Selected Essays.
8. Elias believes that initially Freire was not a revolutionary, and
in fact brokewith the Acao Popular when it began to show leftist tendencies,
but that the Pedagogy is a frankly revolutionary document. I tend, now, to
concur.
9. An example: Because limits cannot be set or crime control laws
enforced by constituted authority in Detroit without liberal outcry, citizens in
self-defense have established vigilante groups which function instead of law
enforcement agencies but whose norms and methods are not subject to public
scrutiny. The final results of this mode of protecting freedom is to destroy
it. On the other hand, Freire can come to terms with anti-humanistic concepts
like the "necessity to take from the oppressor his power to oppress" and do
so in the name of ultimate humanism. The latter plays God by action, the
liberal by inaction. Both styles pose for us moral and values questions.
10. In many places throughout the Pedagogy , as already noted, Freire
seems excessively voluntaristic in attribution of evil intent to the oppressors,
although he recognizes that they too are victims of an oppressive structure
which happens to work to their advantage. There is ample historical evidence
of people in power deliberately defending and perpetuating such structures
to
their own gain, but there are also humanitarians who further oppression
unwilingly and sometimes unwittingly. See Institutional Racism in America,
Knowles and Pruitt.
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11. Freire says, "Even revolution must confront this phenomenon.
Many of the oppressed who directly or indirectly participate in revolution
intend—conditioned by the myths of the old order—to make it their private
revolution. The shadow of their former oppressor is still cast over them.
"
(p. 31)
12. It is true that a changed consciousness will move to create economic
and socio-political change but is it possible for consciousness to be awakened
without some preceding experience of external change?
13. "Liberation" is not a question of mind alone, cf. Frankl, Man’s
Search for Meaning. I am using the term "classical" to distinguish revolution
in the ordinary political sense from "cultural revolution" discussed in detail
further on.
14. Again, we note an excessively volitional tone to remarks such
as the one that student ignorance is accepted by the teacher "to justify the
teachers’ existence." If the teacher assumes that reality is static, and that
all is worth knowing is already determined (is in the past), then the goal of
education logically becomes the adaptation of the student to the determinate
world. No malice is required to explain this stance.
15. This passage makes robbery sound like charity. "We’re not
stealing your house; we’re liberating it, and you, from the oppressive structure
in which you sleep!" This is a difficulty with Freire’s position.
16. For some reason, in this discussion of the revolutionary leadership,
Freire chooses to consider the leaders apart from the oppressed. The tone of
the section seems to contradict the communal thrust of preceding sections and
makes one wonder whether the leaders are indeed also of the oppressed, or
are persons who are "planning for others. "
17. "Experimental" is here distinguished from "experiential. " The
former is the mode of the scientist who reflects on reality, designs and carries
out a modification of that reality, and reflects on the results. New knowledge
is the result. The latter (experiential) is associated with structured (usually
structured by someone other than the subject) learning experiences whereby a
child, or adult, arrives at and internalizes a piece of information which the
teacher wants the person to acquire in the most efficient way possible. Life-
experiences, although exempt from this artificial contriving, are equally
"undergone" rather than self-designed.
?to
18. The lack of malleability caused the ’’Democratic Inexperience”
Freire discusses in Education as a Practice of Freedom.
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Chapter 2: The Freirean Challenge to American Education
In the earlier parts of this study we have examined the historical
and sociological background of Freire's work and attempted to ground it
within a philosophical system. We examined in detail the works themselves,
with their assumptions and immediate implications. In this section I would
like to show by an examination of metaphor, the inconsistency with the above
implications and philosophical positions, of common practices in American
education and offer a counter proposal to the dualism created by existing
metaphors. This work can only lay foundations, and hopefully, demonstrate
the necessity for an intensive study of present educational thinking. It
suggests, however, a new set of criteria for such a study, and offers
counterproposals which are indicative of directions. I believe that the new
departure must be dialectic and shall attempt to establish what this approach
would require of an educational system. This dialectic concept is a major
thrust of Freire's ideas, as we have already seen, but to date, "Freirean"
experiments reported have been concerned primarily with literacy methods,
or with political consciousness-raising. The level has been that of the
individual practitioner or consciousness of a local group, not that of systemic
and directional change.
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This section will close by confronting the unanswered questions in
Freire s theory, as it is articulated to date and the objections of other
commentators to it. The summary, Chapter 3, will draw these conceptualiza-
tions together in a very tentative theory of pedagogy, which it is the intent of
the author to develop in detail in further research.
Metaphor in American Education
In Part II we examined partial answers to the problem of the personal
in modem philosophy. Historically these fell into two classes: Those which
reduced the personal to substance and those which reduced the personal to
organism of the order of plant or animal. Although these reductions were
recognized as inadequate by contemporary philosophers and have been replaced
today by a confusion of other, often contradictory, hypotheses, these dated
solutions have perdured in education in the form of serious metaphors.
It is normal for human intelligence to make relationships and to
express some phenomena in terms of others more familiar, more picturesque,
and in some way analogical. The metaphors we shall explore in this chapter
fall into two classes: Mechanistic and organic, or horticultural. Some
compare the recipient of education, and/or the whole process of education,
to a system of machines, computers, programmed and predictable processes.
Others compare the learner to an organism, a tender plant to be protected,
nurtured and developed.
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These metaphors tend to lead our thought in certain directions and
to pre-form certain conclusions: i.e.
,
cause things to exist by speaking as
though they do exist. However, by the "leading power of the word" I mean
something more. It is the process that is, almost inevitably, initiated by
naming (in the Freirean sense of the term). An accurate analysis of the
structures of a situation, a "naming, " itself leads to the next thought, and
the next action step. "Ih takes you by the hand and leads you to a solution,"
a former mathematics professor of mine used to say, when defining the
"given’s" in a problem. This is what Freire suggests when he leads groups
simply to name the contradictions.
Since metaphor is a way of naming, let us first explore its leading
power.
A metaphor implies a likeness between two essentially unlike things.
It makes a leap from some set of similarities existing in them to a stated
(but not intended) identity. The mind "carries over" (metapherein) to treat
of one thing as though it were the other. (Green, 1971) It is a capsule-size
analogy with all the usefulness and dangers of an analogy. Its usefulness
inheres in what it can add of clarity to our thinking, new insights, unusual
combinations, creative breakthrough's. (Allport, 1961) But the accompanying
danger is that of reductionism and coercion, of treating individuals as if they
were in fact (merely) machines or plants.
One metaphor tor American education is that of the machine.
Problems of pedagogy are seen as problems in systems analysis. The learner
is like a computer to be programmed. Questions which are raised concern
-the quality of the input, or of the raw material
(Jenson, Hemstein)
-the nature of the processing (Rogers, Brown, Mager,
Bloom, Weinstein, Bruner)
-the component parts of the system: curricula, scheduling,
teache r-training.
The focus and direction are provided by the goal, the desired outcome or
product. The language itself is that of the machine: "inputs, " "outcomes,"
processes, " and the words further mechanize our image of students and
learning and our treatment of them. The underlying assumption, whether we
examine "behavior modification. " or "cognitive mapping" or "diagnostic-
prescriptive" teaching or "competency-based teacher education" is: if the
input, analysis, and processing are right the outcome (the graduate) will be
educated, good, and prepared for life. The frustration of many educators who
have accepted this model, stems from two sources: (1) it does not work out
this way, and (2) their predictions of desirable outcomes are based on the
determinate, that is, the past and present world. And there is disquieting reason
to believe that the shape of tomorrow's world might be so significantlydifferent that
the skills trained into students will produce early obsolescence or total inability
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to live in that world successfully. 1'he alternative u> this i« u> uy u»
second-guess the future, to render the indeterminate and unknown determinate
and predictible
,
and so "prepare" students to cope. A third alternative is
to admit that change and the unforeseen will be the given of the future and
build new sets of coping skills, including flexibility and fearlessness in the
face of change, into the educative system.
Close to the mechanistic metaphor in non-humanness, although far
from the above examples in style, is the storage metaphor, which Freire
attacks under the name of "banking education. " Here the pupil is considered
a capacity to be filled with a static, determinable quantity of knowledge which
can be produced again on demand. In this approach, content-oriented
curriculum writers and "bag-of-virtues" moralists meet.
Underlying the mechanistic approach are reified assumptions about the
nature of persons. What all the preceding have in common is the passivity
and thing-like nature of the student, whether he/she is molded, shaped,
programmed, processed, or filled. The decision about the input and the
processing is an outsider decision, the student has no opportunity for choice,
because presumably, he/she is incapable of choice. He/she is a particularly
perfect machine or computer, or a particularly imperfect, empty vessel.
He/she is what is put in from outside; Once "filled" he can produce the proper
answer for any anticipated problem—but since the material is in him but not
of him, not his, it can hardly affect what he will be. All controls for action
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are also outside—in the environment—which reinforces behavior positively
or negatively. (Skinner, 1948, 1971) External control does not change when
the student is "taught control"—when programmed in a certain way to continue
responding to stimuli according to outsider-determined patterns, long after
visible controls have been removed.
Given this view of students, it is the burden of the educator, and of
society through the educator, to determine what are the proper goals, the
best end-product, and to ferret out the best means for introducing the "pieces
of knowledge" whether cognitive or affective content or processes, that will
assure that the student will achieve these goals.
When the student fails to function as a properly programmed thing,
when he/she attempts to be self-determined, spontaneous and intentional,
in an unpredicted direction, the phenomenon is identified as a motivation or
behavior problem, or a lack of native ability (poor raw material). The
student assured of success is the one who responds at each stage as predicted.
The mechanistic approach to education has implications for the way
pedagogy is conceived and organized. I do not mean to imply that this
caricature depicts an existing school or system but rather that
our metaphors,
line of research and treatment of students become consistent and
intelligible
if we posit some such set of unspoken assumptions. It
is on this metaphor,
unanalyzed and unchallenged, that we operate. Once
educators clarify
precisely what an educated person is, technicians can
perfect the means for
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producing one: diagnostic tests to evaluate the raw materials, relevant
curricula to motivate, (oil the wheels so that the student will keep moving
through the process), teacher-training to enable teachers to perform with
mechanical replicability. Even creativity can be programmed for, by
exercises in fantasy, sensory awareness, synectics. Foremen (superintendents
and evaluators) supposedly control the process and monitor the line to see
where the system is breaking down. Consultants, Management-By-Objectives
specialists, and human relations trainers are called in to repair it.
None of this works perfectly, of course. But implications arising
from glorification of this model and wishful thinking that it could work are
the danger of the metaphor. The above caricature points up the hidden
assumptions.
Let us, for a moment, suppose that students and/or pedagogical
processes can be so mechanized, and in one sense, automated, and further
that they can be perfected to turn out the desired product. Whose desire ?
The full weight of world-making falls on the shoulders of the decision-makers.
What value system guides those who program the machines ? Is the desired
outcome a person who will conform to society’s existing norms or one who
will change those norms? Theoretically at least, either could be programmed
for. If it is to be change agent, according to what new norms shall he/she
be formed? These are moral questions and education is above all a moral
process. The questions concern ends and cannot be foresworn, for a
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mechanistic approach to education necessarily answers them in spite of
itself, and whether it posits one desired end or another. It begs the question
to say that the educator cannot decide values for another. They are being
decided by every component part of the machine and the way it is set up.
The product will bear the shape of the passage. There is no neutral education.
It is not surprising that this should be so. Macmurray has demonstrated
that the Cartesian-based "scientific" model for reality, while claiming to be
value-free, is in fact negatively guided by valuing. Values are involved
insofar as it chooses to focus attention in one direction rather than another
and insofar as science is a means which must be to some end. So too this
scientific view of education. Repudiating inner value orientations as being
an imposition and hence inappropriate, (at least in public school education)
it still educates to some chosen end, and is informed in its mode, if not in
its content, by some value set.^
A second metaphor of widespread importance for education in the
Americas is the organic metaphor. Dewey, Whitehead, Jordan, and all who
subscribe to the organic metaphor see the learner as a developing organism
bearing within it the pattern and potential for the unique individual it alone
can become. A plant is dependent for full healthy growth upon the abundance
and quality of the right environmental factors: temperature, water, cycle
of light and dark, soil nutrients and texture. If the environment is rich and
the atmosphere is close and warm the plant will flourish. Although it can be
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stunted, deformed, or killed by improper environmental conditions, it is
not controlled from outside. Rather its growth is determined according to its
own interior, unique, genetic plan.
In this case the role of the educator becomes like that of the gardener.
He/she follows the nature of the individual, studies the stages of development,
and so arranges the environment that the organism will have what it needs at
each stage to stimulate and nurture its growth. Education is seen as a
process of development affected by the genetic characteristics of the seed
and the dynamics of the interaction between the seed and its environment.
o
(Dewey, 1916, 1964) It is only partially manipulable since only the environment
is manipulable, and only negatively so, by the gardener. I say "only negatively
so" because how much of the richness of the soil a plant can use depends upon
the nature of the plant. The plant also contributes to the richness of the
soil for another. An unlimited supply of nutrients will not of itself cause a
lily to grow ten feet tall. It is also true that the gardener model leaves so
much of the control to the inner predetermined nature of the organism itself
that it is conceivable that the gardener eventually might not be needed:
i. e.
,
that, having researched the organism and determined optimal environ-
ment, the gardener might set up some incubator with timers, materials and
feed-back loops, and leave the system to function on its own. So too in the
Montessori, or Leicestershire, or other open classroom. The teacher is
there as part of the rich environment he/she has established but the controls,
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the use of nutrients and the timing are, ideally, all within the individual learner,
determined somehow by his/her needs. The type of growth, the extent, and
the time of flowering and fruiting can be altered by manipulating the environ-
ment but the nature of the resulting plant is essentially predetermined.
The implications for educational practice derived from the organic
metaphor have led to widely divergent action. (Praxis is culturally as well
as theoretically based, and theory itself derives from culture). Rousseau
believed in authoritarianism and advocated motivation by fear, or by
reinforcing the childs' sense of inadequacy. (1973) Yet he expressed an
educational theory consonant with the plant metaphor, the inner determination
and natural goodness of the seed, the destructive effects of "civilization.
"
Others blame schools which force children into predetermined modes,
hindering natural direction and growth, yet take a strong stand that "natural
growth" must not be left unguided—to grow wild. But in spite of
diversities, educators who subscribe to the organic metaphor believe that
the organism itself, perhaps below the conscious level, ’knows" what is
good for it and the educator’s task is to protect, nurture, and guide but not
to force or attempt to determine what direction it should grow.
What is wrong with this view? There seem to be two things that have
not been taken into account. Unlike the plant, the human intelligent being is
not wholly determined by genes and environment. There is, from a rather
early stage, and increasingly with age, a power of choice of intentionality.
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Although it is negatively determined by environment, (for example,
deprivation of adequate amounts of food in childhood can interfere with
normal development of intelligence) the growing human organism is much
less dependent on the environment as it matures and is able to overcome
environmental deficits. The second important factor is the dynamic
between human intelligence and environmental conditions. Freire, Marx,
Althusser, have already examined this "man-world entity" and examples have
already been cited in this study of environmental (social) conditions affecting
awareness and vice versa. It is fascinatingly true that to a limited degree
this mutual modification takes place throughout the ecosystem. But in a
case such as a climax plant species in some ecological niche, the mutual
changes are irreversible and not at all the dynamic kind of balance Piaget
notes between the intelligence and the environment, the internal and external
structures. Freire moves the dialectic out of the biological into the
intelligeable social and economic world when he speaks of the man-world
dialectic.
Exponents of both mechanistic and organic metaphor must deal with
some basic questions. If the learner is essentially predetermined (genetically)
and inner-controlled like the embryonic plant, it is inappropriate for society
to attempt to determine its final form. How direct then is the socializing role
of education? Suppose the child grows up quite other, in values and goals,
from what society is prepared to accept. Are there, built into society,
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controls to destroy him? The environment over generations promotes the
evolution of new species by selecting for or against mutants. The environment
also somehow creates mutants. See for example, the effects of radiation or
excessive heat or sound at critical biological periods. It is also true that
organisms present in a given ecosystem, over time modify the system,
perhaps to such a degree that other organisms are no longer compatible
with it. This is illustrated in the normal succession of plants in a newly
burned field until the stable climax species is reached. It would be interesting,
though beyond the bounds of this volume, to follow out this analogy for the
educational work of a Dewey or a Skinner.
Secondly, organic as well as mechanistic educators are left with a
values question. If the guidance and indirect control over some aspects at
least of the growing organism are under the control of the gardener-educator,
what values shall guide him? A dwarf Japanese maple grew that way because
of a series of intentional choices on the part of human beings, not of maple
trees. He who can control the environment can in some degree control life,
consciousness, and through consciousness, future environments. And control
implies decision-making as to ends and means. It is not necessarily true
that to be knowledgeable is to be good, nor that wide exposure to knowledge
has no effect on recipients. Undirected it can be moral education by default;
directed it may be indoctrination, manipulation, or revelation.
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Freire subscribes to neither of these metaphors. He rejects almost
violently and with every tool of rhetoric he commands, the mechanistic
dehumanization of the first. He seems unaware of, or uninterested in, the
vast amount of developmental literature based on the second, although he gives
us tools by which to critique whatever is manipulation and outsider-decision.
The danger of each lies in the fact that both always presuppose an agent who
operates the machine or tends and prunes the plant; a decision-maker outside
of the system. And because we allow ourselves to think of students as sub-
human things, machines or organisms, we begin to treat them as if they
were indeed sub-human beings. So doing, we either stir up resistance,
which must be repressed, subtly or violently; or worse, reduce them
unresistingly to things, pieces to be moved about, or conforming well-
trained plants climbing obediently up the trellis we have chosen. This is
the dehumanization built into our educational models, even those most
humanistic in content.
It seems to me that there must be a third metaphor appropriate to
human beings and their education. It also seems to me that the deficiencies
of the two just examined, stem from their non-human assumptions so the
model we seek must acknowledge the form of the personal. Persons have
in them some of the characteristics of things and some of the practices
discussed under the machine metaphor can be useful if included into a more
comprehensive model. Persons are alive, unique, and inner-determined and
much of the praxis of "organic” educators is appropriate. But the form
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of the personal, subsuming both that of substance and of organism, is that of
a positive including and constituted by its negative. (Macmurray, Part II)
The positive and uniquely personal characteristic in human beings is
intentionality
,
self-directed action (Macmurray), praxis (Freire). The
question I have raised before is: at what stage in our educational models is
the recipient to be considered a human being, capable of intentionality? I
raise it because I seem to hear that "children" need someone to think and
decide for them, and of course this programming "is only for a limited
period. " I submit that any sharp change of direction or assumptions midstream
in educational practice can be justified only by a radical change in the child
prior to that point, and the evidence from child development does, not support
sharp turning points. Rather we find continuous smooth development from
awakening consciousness in infancy to the sophisticated social consciousness
of committed adult. It is a development that follows a stage pattern, both
individually (Piaget, Kohlberg) and socially (Freire: stages of consciousness),
one that can be slowed, skewed or frozen, but apparently not reversed, by
unfavorable environmental conditions. Given favorable environmental
conditions there is no evidence of new humanness in the twelve-year old that
was not embryonically, or dormantly, present at eleven. With Freire, I
would like to submit that the human infant is essentially different in potential
for intentionality from other organisms and in this is closer in nature to the
255
human adult than to any other organism. Therefore I would like to explore
the human "metaphor" in education. Here, in fact, we leave the realm of
metaphor since our goal is a design for education that recognizes the essential
humanness of the participants.
Before doing so it seems important to repeat that Freire's methodology
for adult literacy presupposes a rather advanced developmental stage in the
student—that of formal operations. Prior to this stage some aspects of the
method are applicable but not all; nor is it reasonable to expect the political
insights of which adults are capable. If these insights are the goal of process
education rather than the increasingly potent capacity of the learner to control
the significant decisions which affect his/her life, then conscientising education
can be made as mechanistic and manipulative as any referred to under the
machine metaphor.
A humanistic design in education is based on assumptions about
human beings already exposed in Part I, and Part III. It requires attitudes of
respect, dialogue, and cooperation that stem from the equality in humanness
of teacher and learner, regardless of age or "competence." It recognizes a
dynamic nature of knowledge, the fact that all are co-learners and the fact
that all have something of value to bring to the dialogue. But it also recognizes
the need for dissonance and the recognition of contradiction if there is to be
creative advance. The form of the personal includes and is constituted by that
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of the organism. The methods of dialogue and choice of content are modified
by the level of organismal development that Piaget and others have explored.
But the control of timing, goal, and mode remains that of the student.
This does not answer the question: what shall be learned? If this
learner is to achieve unique self-determination within an environment she/he
has chosen or formed, certain analytical, social and educational skills are
indicated: communications, decision-making, relating, understanding of
structures, structuring. Genetic controls alone will not determine the timing
or necessity for these, for the person is more than organism. Enough
exposure needs to be given that intentionality can come into play. In the last
analysis each person, and each new community of persons is a mystery. I
do not know what each uniquely will become and I cannot program for it. But
the "content" of the curriculum is connected with the contradictions that
emerge whenever alive human beings confront these or other aspects of their
social situation. This is the significant content in a Freirean approach. And
it elicits a peculiarly human process: that of questioning: problem-posing and
problem-solving. The ways of doing this and the adaptations of method to age,
psychosocial development, and sociological level of consciousness will be as
varied as the target populations. Freire does not give us a method (not really)
nor a system. However, the question of content cannot be so lightly dismissed.
Freire implies in all of his discussions a political orientation that involves
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understanding of the political ramifications of literacy, science, and structures
of society. At what age and how are these understandings acquired? He gives
us a starting point, a philosophy of person, a set of attitudes. Education is any
process that promotes awareness, intentionality and communication. And at
this level education is revelation.
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The Life-Word Tension: The Fundamental nature of the Dialectic
The problem with current metaphors in education is their fundamental
incompatibility and their implications of external agency. Mechanists and
organicists seem to be in opposition. But those who think- and program for
students, whose ideal is efficiency and predictible results, are only apparently
in opposition to the philosophical position of those who believe in genetic
determiners and who control development by manipulating environments.
Neither see the learner and the environment as mutually developing each
other. Both ignore an insight of Marx, Freire, Piaget, Mao-Tse Tung (to
name only a few): that reality is not set up in polar oppositions but in
dialectic unities. Every reality contains in some measure within it, its
contradiction; and there is a balancing, a tension, a leaning now to right and
now to left, a self-correction, that is lost if one or the other pole of the
dialectic is suppressed. Freire speaks of the "man-world entity, " of the non-
dualism of subject and object, knower and known. Piaget explains equilibration,
the dialectic tension between the structuring of external reality and the
structuring of the mind. Marx underscores the dialectic nature of the
revolutionary situation, the interaction between objective factors and subjective
factors: 'the existence of a reality of oppression imposed on classes or
social groups who become the living negation of this exploitative system. . .
and the consciousness of this oppressive reality on the part of exploited
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classes and their disposition to act to overturn the established order."
(Freire, 1974)
.
Dialectic tension is different from polarity, it is possible to recognize
two opponents, clearly in opposition to one another. If one wins the other
loses. It is also possible, as we find in organic molecules, to have polar
substances where dichotomy does not, and may never, occur. In the opposition
between learner as thing-to-be-planned-and-programmed-for, and leamer-as-
organism, inner directed but immature, we have not yet reached the core of
the dialectic. In fact, both conceptualizations are at the same pole and
opposite to that of learner as intentional. The true dialectic tension is along
this continuum. Here are answered questions about how young and how much
self-direction for the learner versus how much planning by the teachers. In
the dialectic the balance swings, now too far to right, now to left. Given the
conditions of respect and dialogue, the system is self-correcting, for the
"right position" is the tension
,
the dynamic, not the absolutising of either
extreme, nor of some intermediate compromise.
Dialogue itself is such a dialectic; truth emerges from the interaction;
it does not exist beforehand, it is not imparted by either interlocutor. It is
bom ("discovered") as word leads word.
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The following passage, a portion of Freire's response to a group of
students in Paris (1974, reinforces the indicattons he has already given us of
the centrality of dualism to contemporary educational, and political, problems
and the necessity of the dialectic vision.
This question (the problemmatic of the subjective
factor as agent of change) places us at the very
heart of one of the problems which has always
preoccupied philosophy, particularly in modern
times.
. . the relations between subject and
object; knowledge and reality; thought and
being; theory and practice.
Every attempt to understand these relations
which is based on the dualism of subject-object,
denying their dialectic unity is incapable of
explaining these relations satisfactorily.
(Freire, 1974)
Dualism, divisiveness, anti-dialectics, prescription, pervade all levels of
knowing and teaching, government and economics while the truth is that even
oppressor and oppressed are in a dialectic tension until the system itself is
subsumed into some higher form.
Macmurray signaled the dialectic in the form of the personal, that
of a positive in constant interaction with its negation. The assignment of
"positive" and "negative" to one and another end of the continuum, for example
in the dialectics: action/reflection, or knowledge/consciousness or intention/
motivation, is based less on a value judgement than on a perception as to which
of the two is the more inclusive, the more intentional (human) and the more
flexible in its modes of controlling.
2G1
The metaphors which lead practice in education themselves exemplify
the dialectic of naming and reality. In the measure in which they name, they
help to create the reality they name. Yet it escapes their naming, and
demands a new naming. This demand in American education is now. Each of
the metaphors described in the preceding section has truth; none of them is
truth. The human being subsumes the characteristics of substances, bio-
chemical and bio-physical laws, the organic potential for development, training,
conditioning and responde to stimuli. To make educational use of these
properties is not inappropriate—to speak of "developing the whole child.
"
Would it, however, be more accurate, and less prescriptive, to speak of the
child developing its whole potentiality? The trouble comes when the uniquely
human, intentional pole of the dialectic is suppressed or ignored. As we have
said, the growth of the individual takes place from within in the dynamic
interaction between its internal structuring and all the elements, especially
interpersonal elements in its external environment.
When we speak of the dialectic nature of metaphor and the "leading
power" of the world, we can look at the tension from a different viewpoint.
In the glossary are words which Freire uses, some in rather special ways.
It is an exercise in exploring the life-word tension to attempt to clarify their
meaning. Just as we have seen that applying mechanistic or botanical words
to human children can cause us to treat them, and so to perceive them, in
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non-human ways, so some of the words defined in these ways "lead" our
thought.
Let us look at a few examples of the dialectic tension of key terms.
Conscientizacao or conscientisation : can mean the increasing awareness of
contradictions in a situation. It can mean the planned educational process by
which people are brought to awareness. It can mean the actions committed
persons take together by which they come to discover the causal relationships
which structure a situation, or their lives, or the relationships of a local
episode to a global issue. Freire says:
The effort of conscientisation, which is identified with
cultural action for the liberation of the oppressed
,
(emphasis added) is a process by which, within the
subject-object relationship. . . the subject becomes
capable of grasping, in critical terms, the dialectic
unity between itself and the object. . . there is no
conscientisation apart from praxis, apart from the
unity: theory-practice, reflection-action. (1974)
The fact is that a dialectic exists between conscientised action on one end
of the continuum and fatalistic or oblivious inaction on the other. Action, any
kind of action, if reflected on, starts the upward spiral where increasing
understanding stimulates more aware actions, which stimulate further
conscientisation.
Each of the "definitions" of conscientizacao expresses one inter-
pretation and affects all. To restrict conscientizacao to an educational method
is to distort it, to leave the dialectic and become manipulative, by removing it
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from the dynamic web of person-person and person-world interactions. It
then becomes a gimmick to achieve a limited vision of literacy—limited by a
non-dialectic, usually naive perception of a "goal. "
Conscientisation is a term Freire reserves for a "true" awareness,
a "logos. " He calls "false consciousness" any system of ideas which obscures
either the self’s agency, or perception, or responsibility in a situation. It
often refers to a misconstruing of causes from which even highly educated
people are not exempt magical or naive constructions. However, even in
magical perceptions there is an action-idea dialectic.
One further example of the dialectic under the word:
Naming is praxis, conscientisation and literacy. Literacy is the ability to
read history, and the present historical situation, as well as the ability to
decode communication systems. Literacy training is also in tension—between
the need for minimal decoding skills that will permit access to history and
maximal situational decoding skills that will permit access to comprehension,
and change, of the deep structures.
Dialectic complementarity and tension are important in Freire's
thought. The dialectic concept speaks to all aspects of persons, to what
Macmurray calls the form of the personal, and is the only alternative, at this
point in the evolution of thought, to the dualism that pervades social, political,
and educational spheres. Dualism is not solved by seizing upon and canonizing
one pole, at the expense of the other. I believe the dialectic to be a key insight
into the processes of knowledge and education, community and cultural revolution.
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PART III: Chapter 2: Notes
1. See Macmurray: intention vs selective attention and discussion of
modes of reflection: art as a choice of ends, vs science as a study of means.
2. Dewey in fact escapes the limitations of a strictly organic metaphor
and could be used equally as an example of the dilectic humanistic approach.
3. "These latter years have been marked by a sort of eclipse of the
subjective pole of this dialectic relation (with the belief that revolutionary
action only becomes possible after the integral attainment of certain conditions
of the infrastructure: for example, the development of capitalism in the
surrounding countries as a pre-requisite for the transition to socialism) or
by a kind of perversion of the subjective element, whether by Stalinist
voluntarism or by an over-estimation of the capacity for action of small groups
of avant-garde, drawn out of (coups) the befogged masses.
However, the historical failure of objectivism and of both these
subjectivist deviations have put the problemmatic of the subjective factor as
agent of transformation of reality back at the center of contemporary political
debate. " (from the French, IDAC 1974 Interview of Paulo Freire with militant
students of Paris)
4. Naming, see also dialectic of language in Fishman, Josua A.
The Sociology of Language.
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Chapter 3: Toward A Theory of Pedagogy
A Theory of Pedagogy is founded on a theory of person and a theory
of knowledge. These Paulo Freire has already provided for us. The purpose
of this chapter will be to draw together from the more general statements the
particular implications which can serve as guidelines to develop a theory of
pedagogy/andragogy. Such a theory must contain a working definition of
pedagogy,* assumptions about the learner, about knowledge, about the learning
process, and about the nature, and the role of the teacher, a definition of
Goal in light of the above assumptions and an indication of means to reach these
goals: appropriate content and processes.
Goal
How are persons prepared to take a self-determining part in a free
(non-oppressive) society, and more importantly to take part in creating a self-
determining, non-oppressive society? Our task is somewhat different from the
one Freire undertook in 1963. His subjects were adults who lacked the
educational and social tools to function in a democratic society, if or when
that opportunity arose. The task was to raise consciousness of the social
situation, to begin to develop political skills, as well as to develop the specific
adult literacy which was necessary for entry into the democratic process. The
task of pedagogy/adragogy in the United States is not unrelated, but is
different.
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At the child's level, pedagogy's task is to facilitate the structuring
of mental, emotional, and physical powers in ways that will enable the child,
and later the adult, to function as a free, self-determining, relational human
being. This is done by special kinds of interaction with the environment and
especially with other persons. The task is also to enable the future adult to
participate effectively in a dialogic community: one which promotes the
humanization of persons (in the sense defined in this study): awareness of
what is dehumanizing, commitment to change at a radical level, and skill in
creating that change. If we accept this as the goal, with the built-in difficulties
of consciousness and commitment which we have already seen, what would be
required in predagogy to achieve it? The base under a Freirian theory of
knowledge is that knowledge is dialectic in nature: not only the man/world
and subject/object dialectics already seen, but also the philosophical tension
between individual development and group development, individual ends and
those of the collectivity. Since dialectic tension is fundamental to Freire's
philosophy, it must be also in any pedagogy building on it. It is not here a
question of focusing on individual development at the expense of ignoring or
i
delaying group relationships. Individual development cannot happen without
relationships. Nor can it be a question of placing the whole focus on the
group (even though of itself that is consciousness-raising) without deliberate
attention also to the interior liberation of individuals. These are the two
poles, both necessary. The dialectic is like a stretched rubber band between
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them. The energy developed depends on the existence o£,and the distance
between, the poles. Dialectical humanism, "Rubber Band Pedagogy",
is an education to relationships, balance, and creative use of dialectic tension
seeking synthesis.
Assumptions
The assumptions under dialectical humanism are the relational theory
of persons which we have already seen and the fact that they are intentional:
able, free, and self-determined. There is little difficulty with these when we
are in the area of andragogy. The difficulties arise with questions about the
applicability of these ideas to children, or to those assumed to be in some way
inadequate to control their own lives. Freire does not speak directly of small
children, but there is a compatibility and even a parallel between his thesis
as applied to adults and those of structural developmentalists like Piaget as
applied to children. For the purpose of this study I shall assume the following
position:
The learner is a human being, even from infancy, with
the potential, genetic endowment, and tendency to
structure its mind, affections, and physiological
equipment in certain ways. These ways are conditioned
upon the quality of interaction with the environment:
human and non-human. This potential development
becomes progressively more controlled by the child
himself (not necessarily intentionally controlled) as
the child moves through the pre-ope rational stages
to that of formal operations. (Piaget) Even in the pre-
operational stages there is control by the child in the
process of adaptation (accommodation and assimilation)
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but the child is susceptible to manipulation by the
environment. The environment, by reinforcing some
things and punishing others, greatly affects what will
be internalized; it does not eliminate the possibility
of intentional control. Environmental control can
change the timing and the options but not the stages
through which learners develop, nor the fact that
they move, more or less sequentially through these
stages. During the time of stage development prior
to formal operations, the child evolves psychomotor
skills, ''thinking skills
,
attitudes, values, and a whole
range of behaviors. (Piaget, et al)2
As it has been explained by Freire, I see the development of societies following
a parallel path. This growth also is dependent upon the environment and the
degree to which members of the group can affect the environment. (I, 3) At
the lowest level of interaction, the environment and quality of life are controlled
almost entirely from outside the group. As the group "develops" through
experimenting and affecting the environment in small ways, unimportant at
first, more significant with time, they arrive at the stage equivalent to that of
formal operations in child development: critical consciousness. At this stage
individuals within a social group begin to perceive the ways in which the
environment is organized and operates, and to engage in more critical, strategic
interaction with it. This stage corresponds to, and requires, that the group
members be at the level of formal operations, (Piaget) because it demands that
the individual hold in mind more than one concept, or dimension of reality, or
set of organizers, at a time. This level of operation is potentially present in
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every adult, but to achieve it requires the same kinds ot environmental
structuring on social and political issues that the pre-operational child required
in the physical environment. This structuring is part of what Freire calls
conscientization or liberation and is the role of education.
Summary of Assumptions for Theory of Pedagogy
Assumption 1:
Learners are potentially self-directed, developing
individuals, who make use of the environment to
build mental structures and who, alternately,
structure their environment according to their
needs—if that environment is malleable to their
action.
Neither the environment nor the individual is independent of the other. The
learner makes use of the environment to build only those mental structures
he/she is ready for. But this is subject to outside control because the nature
and quality of the environment, including the people in it, determines what can
be structured into the mind and how. If the child is to learn to trust and
communicate, the people around must provide opportunities and reward trust.
Even Skinner acknowledges (1971) that other elements than environmental
engineering, affect the level of control of the learner. He does not accept
"Purpose" as one of these elements. However, if the environment is deprived,
missing social reinforcers, stimuli, or malleability, learning in a particular
direction stops and other kinds of learning ("the hidden curriculum") take its
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place: for example, frustration, fatalism, feelings of "I'm not OK. " The
same thing applies to social and political environments where people are
submerged in non-malleable, oppressive, or punitive structures.
Assumption 2:
Societies also grow through stages, by means of
effective (change
-making) interaction with their
physical, social, and political environments.
The ability of an individual to effect his/her intention is dependent on awareness
and the openness of the situation to change. Awareness of "the deep structures"
of the situation depends on experiences of its vulnerability, and reflection on
the contradictions in the situation, usually in dialogue.
Assumption 3:
All knowledge is social and dialectic. There is a
continuing dynamic evolution of concept in inter-
actions of learners with each other, as well as with
the objective reality.
Assumption 4:
The "objective reality" with which learners interact
must follow the developmental stages of the learner:
from physical, manipulable materials, to generaliza-
tion about materials and operations; to other people's
ideas, operations, and generalizations; to contra-
dictions; between materials and ideas, between
situations and descriptors, between ends and means,
between ends intended and ends claimed.
Assumption 5: Nature and role of the teacher
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The role of the teacher develops dialectically with
the increasing self-structuring of the learners. The
teacher is a knowing, hence growing, being also in
interaction with the environment which includes other
learners. When these learners are young, only
beginning to develop mental concepts and affective
attitudes, the teacher's focus is on providing the
necessary environmental richness proper to each
stage, including the enrichment of his/her own
interpretations.
Some of the skills enabling the child to use the environment are intuitive:
touching, moving.
. . but they can be sharpened. There are other skills which
are formally taught: decoding, symbolizing, valuing, communicating, deciding.
As the child matures, the teacher's role evolves in the direction of
more egalitarian co-learning until, by the time the child reaches formal
operations, the mode is dialogue, mutual exploration, reflection, and co-decision
making. If the decision-making is real and affects the social situation
and the negotiation of power, the action is praxis. Praxis is the mode most
appropriate in adult education, whether the group is at a submerged, a naive,
or a critical stage. However, at "submerged" stages teachers may need to
take more leadership in organizing learning environments and preparing the
way for increasingly critical perceptions.
The concepts of dialogue and dialectic are guiding concepts for
developmental education and hence reach down into pre-ope rational stages,
to whatever degree the learner is able to dialogue. The norm is not that of the
teacher: "The child cannot make a good decision" but that of the learner's
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matrix of mental constructs. He/she assimilates information or skills that
he is ready to use and leaves the rest.
In the adult social sphere the same thing holds. Revolutionary leader-
ship does not judge: "They would not understand and so we decide for them.
"
If they are not ready for dialogue, Freire recommends dialoguing about
dialogue.
Assumption 6:
Knowledge is a dynamic re-presentation of reality
co-created by persons, in relation. Praxis is
critical to understanding.
Such knowledge is in tension between two positions. On the one hand, there is
the position that assumes knowledge is a body of content: facts and inter-
pretations, to be gleaned from the environment (including the human environ-
ment) and stored for future use. This position implies that themost effective
pedagogy is that which:
(a) enables learners to glean facts: that is,
promotes acquisition skills such as observation,
categorization reading. . .
(b) makes facts readily accessible: by lecture,
readings, teaching
(c) provides interpretations of facts (theory)
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On the other hand, we have seen Freire’s position that knowledge is the
process of continuously analyzing 2nd naming reality, and continuously creating
one's own re-interpretation of it.
Here is the dialectic: knowledge is indeed a highly personal creation,
arrived at by continuing mutual reflection, but it is also a growing ability to
use skills and theory in understanding and interpreting the environment, and
so implies the acquisition of skills and theories (tools of analysis).
Goals and the Utopian Vision
Pedagogy is future-directed and has a double vision: (1) the individual
(and group) enabled to interact with the environment in ways that will permit
the greatest personal development and self-determination, and (2) the creation
of a society which furthers creative self-actualization, and humanization for
all its members. (Hereafter identified as an "open society. ") It is important,
if we are to follow Freire's guiding, to articulate the Utopian vision. Utopia
implies denunciation and annunciation. Throughout this work there has been
denunciation of practices and situations that prevent growth and self-
determination. Educational practice tends to confine itself to the first goal
identified above and deduces from it a number of goals and objectives. But
/
274
the meaning of education rests with the second. What kind of world will we
educate toward? What culture (system of practices) will be maximally
reinforcing, individually and communally ? I postulate that it is a society
characterized by cooperation rather than competition, by communication
rather than prescription or isolation, and by sharing of resources, personal
and material, on a basis that favors the collectivity rather than individuals
at the expense of the collectivity. This is a community in the sense Macmurray
and Freire have described; it is based on love.
The promotion of community does not, however, mean the oppression
of the individual, nor his rights, needs, satisfactions nor ideosyncracies,
nor does communal reflection and public scrutiny eliminate withdrawal to
reflect, experiment and write. That would imply polarity and mutual
incompatibility between individual and group ends. The model is, once more,
dialectic. The withdrawal of a Michaelangelo to pursue a highly reinforcing
work alone was stimulated and bom in the social context, (even though his
motive may not have been community reinforcement but rather satisfaction
of an inner "urge") and was supported and reinforced by the community, who
gained from it. What is in opposition to community is not the individual but
individualistic priorities, the egocentric, competitive pursuit of individualistic
ends that necessitate the oppression or deprivation of other individuals
and the community, the substitution of competitive for cooperative modes,
275
the failure to trust the other’s competence or good-will, and hence the felt
need to provide for self even at the expense of the other.
This articulation is admittedly Utopian. There is a world of change,
in societal structures, economic models, and interpersonal dynamics between
here and there. But if that is where we would like to be, even though we might
not arrive in several life-times, there are some very definite directional
changes implied now.
In the light of this end-state, informed by cooperation and personal
commitment to the good of others, a community may structure its government,
economics, culture and within it, educational and religious practices, in a
variety of ways, experiment with a variety of technologies. Many of these
ways are admirable in their potential for effectiveness and are in practice
already. The defects of the present metaphorical approach fall into one of the
following cases
:
Case I It has the cart before the horse; the technology is focused
on, before we have envisioned or committed ourselves to
an ultimate end- state,
Case n there is an end-state verbalized but there is no significant
commitment to it, and the technology is incompatible with it
Case m — there is a defined, but not public, end desired by the
few who are in control, and pursued by the technological
means available, which end state
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is incompatible with the mythologies that are
current and publically acceptable.
Let me exemplify:
The child-development, organic, or horticultural metaphors,
focus on technologies that allow ’’growth" and development of
potential. By structuring the environment they presuppose
values and control, without having made explicit a total
philosophy of the person or the Utopian end-state. (Case I) Lacking a
direction, they are presumably less coercive, but in fact,
merely less efficient, as they direct (by environmental
structures) now in one direction, now in another.
The inconsistencies become evident in the introduction
of small competitive practices into a self-pacing, "developmental"
mode of learning, in hierarchical, competitive, system organizations
of "open" kinds of classrooms where "open" is supposed to mean
child-directed.
The mechanistic metaphors in education might seem to
escape at least the accusation of undirectedness. But do they?
If the end-state desired is the creation or perpetuation of a
coercive, competitive, hierarchical society where those in
power positions rule, decide for, and reap maximum gains
(of wealth, stability and power) from those ruled, then
the
present mechanistic vision of learner and "system" is
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consistent and directed to that end. This end however is
inconsistent with current mythology. (Case III)
If the end state is verbalized in any measure as a cooperative, mutually
benefitting society, the technology of education, described as machine-
oriented in the preceding section, is inconsistent and counter productive.
(Case n) I suspect that in all cases our education methodology suffers from
a lack of a Utopia.
Freire seems not altogether to escape this criticism. It is possible
—
it has been done—to read him with an excitement about "radical" psycho-
social method and efficiency of approaches to literacy or to politicization,
and still not have understood, or verbalized, much less owned, the Utopian
vision described in Chapter 4 of the Pedagogy . I believe also that Freire
himself was "led by the Word. " He began with a "means-orientation.
"
How promote political awareness? How prepare a semi-feudal people to
participate in democracy? How promote literacy, mechanical, political or
historical? But he was led to evolve a Utopian vision of the human community,
an end-orientation—and to posit it as a necessary philosophical
framework
for cultural revolution, a framework within which denunciation of
present
political, educational, social and religious practice makes sense,
suggests,
and monitors, a new technology.
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Content and Process
Both information and skills constitute the content area of curriculum
development. Process is a term I shall use to indicate the system organization,
including methodology in the classroom but also all the other processes by
which students get into classroom, negotiate the system and arrive, or fail
to arrive, at chosen goals.
The process, at every level in Freire’s approach, is some form of
praxis. Let us consider praxis as a subset of what I have called "interaction
with the environment. " It brings, however, a peculiar characteristic to the
interaction: its content is political and its control is within the subjects involved.
Only in some measure is this possible with very young children, for whom the
environments are arranged by another. But the dialectic tension between this
situation and the ideal of complete subject-centered control keeps the process
evolving—with the age of the child—in the direction of the latter pole. Praxis
is also group action, and as the group become more sophisticated, it identifies
more accurately causal relations and directs action to these points. In the
evolution of consciousness, praxis is to the group what experimentation is to
the child. Both depend upon optimal dissonance (Piaget: "disequilibrium")
between what is known and what actually is, between the "is" and the "ought
to be, " which is another way of viewing the "contradictions. "
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But praxis is only one detail of the total process. Let us return to
the goal and ask: What kind of pedagogy will prepare persons to live as free,
self-dete rmining members of a relational society and to create a relational
society? The skills and content needed will focus on the dialectic: individual/
collectivity, rather than on either pole. The "content" flows from the problems
in that dialectic. As adults, the problems to be solved are societal: political,
economic, interpersonal and intergroup. Many of these problems, perhaps all,
trace to the fear orientation of individuals composing the societies. If
changes for the future are to be in the direction of dialogic community, pedagogy
must be relational today. I learn to live by living; to relate by relating. If I
want to live relationally in an adult world I need to experience a microcosm
of that world in the years of preparation, one where real problems are solved,
rather than live in an irrelevant situation which bears no resemblance to the
problems and activities with which the rest of life will cope.
The "school” microcosm is selective and sequentially designed; not
all the pressures nor the seriousness of adulthood can impinge on children at
once, or before skills to cope have been allowed to derelop. But the problems,
and realities, that are presented must be paradigmatic of the realities of future
living, and must grow out of present living, not be contrived or totally
irrelevant.
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Are reading, writing, and arithmetic part of this schema? Insofar
as they are part of the present and adult needs of these children, yes. Decoding,
symbolizing, expressing and every form of communicating, as well as
analyzing, synthesizing, valuing, problem-solving, decision-making, acting
for change, evaluating, are skills needed in praxis. Hence these are direct
objects of curriculum rather than indirect fringe benefits vaguely hoped for.
Freedom is required in the individual who is to live effectively in dialogic
community. He/she is both liberated and liberator in that community—a life-
long dialectic. But freedom also is a "conquest" (Freire) and part of curriculum.
There is no effort here to detail the curriculum since in every community it
must be based on
-a clear articulation of the goal of dialogic, creative community
-a clear diagnosis of where the individual, the community and
the "educatees" are now
-the strategies and time-frame that will lead toward the goal
-the perceptions and choices of all the learners involved
This concept of a school is now new. Our "schools" could be structured
as real-life laboratories where these skills (and their related content in history,
psychology, science, literature. . . ) could be learned in order to negotiate the
daily living of the students, learned as they become problems in daily living.
In their present structures schools instill concepts of dualism, division,
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competition, and inadequacy of pupils as compared with adults: teachers and
other authorities. The matrix is one of separation and division—categorization
of students by class or track, or even by '’learning style" or "problems. ”
These problems are supposedly in the student who cannot fit into the system,
and are to be eliminated. The problems I am suggesting in a problematizing
education are in the situation, are the content of praxis, and are to be solved.
The matrix within which relational learning can evolve by praxis can only be
one where the qualities of dialogic community are present: heterocentric,
accepting and trusting, cooperating, comfortable with change, communicating.
Such an environment could be progressively created within the micro-
cosm of the "school" if these values were basic to the design. Difficulties
with it would be among the problems for community praxis. The figure on the
following page summarizes some of the appropriate content for curriculum in
this model, but unless it emerges from praxis and in response to problems
reflected on together it too could further prescription and division rather than
the goals described above.
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Conclusion
This study has situated Paulo Freire's work in its social and historical
context and shown the centrality of praxis to his methodology, his philosophy,
and his personal development. By its emphasis on the dialectic it has answered
some of the questions raised by Serious readers of Freire, but not all. However,
the extrapolation of his ideas in this chapter indicates that the solutions lie in
the dialectic tension: both/and rather than in the absolutizing of either pole of
the contradictions described earlier. Still unresolved but also in dialectic
tension are the following:
The contradiction between faith in the people and
awareness of the internalized oppressor in the
people. This contradiction poses a dilemma for
the educator.
The contradiction between the necessity for dialogic
action and the urgency of the need for change, which
seems to mandate more efficieint, prescriptive
methods than praxis.
The seeming impossibility of attainment of the Utopian
vision: a cooperative, dialogic, loving community
—
in tension with the need for radical change of a system
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that is, in essential structures, prescriptive and
oppressive.
The danger of a quasi-mystical obliteration of the
rights and needs of the individual in the glorification
of the collectivity
Macmurray identified the roots of fear and love behind the oppositions and
related the organizations of societies to one or the other climate. The basic
human dialectic is between the requirements for self-preservation and self-
forgetfulness. As already indicated, the latter requires a stronger motive
than ’ 'should's and ought’s, ” a conviction of the value of the Utopia and
commitment to it.
In its implications for pedagogy the study indicates the need for
further study:
(1) to develop and test sequential steps in the individuals'
growing awareness of self, others, the world, the
social and political situation,
(2) to develop methods to bring to bear on educational
practice, knowledge already available about steps
in acquisition of decoding, symbolizing, and
I
information-gathering skills,
(3) to identify, develop, and integrate into curriculum
skills for negotiating the environment: communication
skills, valuing and decision-making skills, planning,
strategizing and action skills, support skills;
(4) to diagnose with the leamer/community the information
required to act effectively upon the existential situation
and develop mastery steps, sequences, codifications to
transmit it.
In all of these
(5) to develop technologies and environments for learning
that will promote sequential development while eliciting
and honoring control and decision on the part of the
individual.
There also needs to be well-controlled research to demonstrate conclusively
that dialogue, cooperation and mutual sharing maximizes creativity and
productivity both of individuals and of the group, rather than lowering efficiency.
But unless there is an integral relationship of these to the content areas of the
political situation, we will once again have a humanistic approach that lacks
the seriousness, the other-centeredness, and the commitment of praxis.
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PART III: Chapter 3: Notes
1. Properly, Pedagogy refers to the instruction of children; andragogy
to adults, but because of common usage and for the sake of simplicity,
Pedagogy will be the term used in this section.
2. See: Jordan & Streets, MThe Anisa Model" and "Guiding the
Process of Becoming" as well as a large body of literature on Piaget.
GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY
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AGENT: a person capable of purposive action effecting change;
BANKING EDUCATION: a mode of instruction which attempts to transfer
(deposit) items of information from the teacher to the
learner, who receives and stores them for future use
CONSCIENTIZACAO : Conscientization: a progressive awakening to awareness
on the part of an individual or a group, of the social,
political, or economic contradictions of a given
existential reality; a perception of alternative structures,
and possibly of means of achievement.
CONTRADICTION: a key concept in Freirean analysis, corresponding to
Marx/ and Mao Tse Tung’s use of ’’dialectic. " It
carries both the literal meaning: opposing conceptions
of reality linked together in the same phenomenon,
and the dialectic requirement: the tension to be
preserved between these "contradictories" until a
higher synthesis is reached.
CULTURE CIRCLE: a discussion group led by a facilitator drawn from the
same population, in which culturally relevant topics
are discussed with a view to increased literacy in all
the senses defined below.
DEVELOPMENT vs. MODERNIZATION: the movement of a people through the
sociological stages and corresponding levels of
consciousness described below, usually including
technological development and autonomy of economic
control.
"Development is achieved only when the locus of
decision for the transformations suffered by a being
is found within and not outside of him. " (1973)
Modernization is an increase in technological skill
and democratic practices without any real change in
the consciousness of the people or the locus of
decision-making.
"Modernization is always associated with the cultural
invasion process, through which the central societies
attempt to lubricate their preponderance in the
dependent ones.
"
(1973)
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FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS: a psychic condition in which the role of the self's
agency (volition, creativity, responsibility) in the
production and maintenance of the social world is
obscured by interpretations of reality which conceal
or disguise these dynamics from the self. (Stanley
1972)
LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: described by Freire as distinctive and more
or less irreversible developmental stages, corresponding
to phases of sociological development. (See also
DeWitt, 1971)
SEMI-INTRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: ("submerged
consciousness") a mode of consciousness corresponding
to a closed society, and characterized by limitation
of attention to biological necessities of survival, by a
lack of a sense of history or causality, by magical
explanations and fatalism, or by unawareness of
oppression.
NAIVE-TRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: ("emerging
consciousness") a mode of consciousness corresponding
to emerging societies, whose members are aware of,
and able to respond to problems posed from the surrounding
world, but are unaware of economic structures, real
causal relations, the cost of change, or the degree to
which their consciousness has been conditioned by the
ideas and mode of life of preceding periods of dependence.
Naive-transitive consciousness is easily manipulated by
charismatic leaders.
CRITICAL-TRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: ("inserting
consciousness") a mode of consciousness corresponding
to an open society, whose members penetrate beneath
the surface phenomena to perceive causal relationships,
recognize problems, and evaluate old and new solutions.
Critical consciousness is bom out of, and gives birth
to, on-going praxis.
FANATACIZED CONSCIOUSNESS: (irrational or
"floating" consciousness) a mode of consciousness
corresponding to a massified society and characterized
by acceptance of myths and propaganda, illusions of
freedom and control, and gullibility in place of criticism.
290
Semi-intransitive, naive-transitive, and fanaticized
FREEDOM:
consciousness are all forms of FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS.
the ability and opportunity to make and carry out
significant choices about one’s own life and destiny.
Closely linked to the concept of oppression is that of
freedom. Human beings who have long been buried in
an oppressive situation ("submerged") are not freed
simply by the fact of removal of restraints. While
"submerged" they are incapable of seeing alternatives
to their situation or to their helplessness. Conscious-
ness-raising over time is needed. In this sense,
education becomes a work of liberation.
GENERATIVE THEME: the prevailing preoccupation of an entire group or
people which is manifest in conversation and metaphor,
and is the key to their existing situation.
Example: the theme of "discipline" in a public school.
GENERATIVE WORD: a word common in the daily vocabulary of a people,
expressive of some facet of the generative theme, and
capable, because of this fact and of its syllabic nature,
of generating other words.
ILLITERACY: unconsciousness of the internalized oppressor.
silence, because depried of one’s own "word" (word =
power and right to "name the world" in the sense
defined below).
lack of realization that "men’s actions as such are
transforming, creative, and recreative".
inability to read and to write material relevant to
one's own life.
INTENTIONAL: able to act with purpose.
purposively choosing the ends of action and the means
thereto.
Conscientization is "effective intentionality.
"
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INTERNALIZED OPPRESSOR: ideas about the world and one’s inadequacy to
take a decision-making role in it, which have been intro-
jected by the oppressed, because of what has been said
and done to them (or to their forebears) by those in
power. Even though the situation may now permit self-
determination, this mental conditioning causes the
people to choose for themselves the same kinds of
things that once were prescribed for them. Similarly,
if they attain positions of power, they maintain the
same oppressive structures over others.
LIBERALISM: (Market liberalism) a mode of social organization indirectly
predicated on the assumption that no public consensus
on values is possible. (Stanley, 1972)
Freire seems to straddle this position, stating that the
educator must not impose his/her own cultural values,
yet defining clearly a value position, and also claiming
that no education can be neutral; i.e.
,
no education can
merely be technical training.
Stanley comments that the result of market liberalism
is that values, purposes, and vocabularies dealing
with them are relegated to the private, "non-objective”
domain, and are not publicly scrutinized or refined.
For example, "Civil Liberties" essentially protect the
right to determine values only on the private level.
(1972)
LIMIT SITUATION: a situation which, by the contradictions it contains,
imposes limits on human beings that make human
development and functioning difficult or impossible, and
imply tasks (LIMIT ACTS) to overcome the contradictions.
The LIMIT SITUATION is a boundary. Beyond it lies
the area of UNTESTED FEASIBILITY, (see below)
LIMIT ACTS: acts which challenge or test the limits of the LIMIT
SITUATION.
LITERACY: a quality of consciousness by which men together
critcally perceive and name, analyze and transform,
reality, whether socio-economic or humanistic.
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NAMING:
PEDAGOGY:
POPULISM:
PRAXIS:
"the ability to speak the word and transform reality.
"
"the ability to read, write and compute with the functional
competence needed for meeting the requirements of
adult living. " (Harmon, 1970)
The first and second definitions are those given by
Freire, into which he assumes the third, or common
understanding. He rejects the adequacy of the third
without the first.
determining and interpreting the nature of some aspect
of reality;
ifentifying the contradictions in some aspect of reality.
In some places Freire seems to imply that NAMING
and PRAXIS are co-extensive.
narrowly defined: theory and methodology of teaching
or instruction.
used by Freire as coextensive with "education."
a new stage of political life for those emerging from the
"culture of silence," characterized by manipulation
of the emerging classes by popular leadership which
mediates between them and the power elites.
reflection-action cycle aimed at transforming reality;
related to "practice" but including the cyclic inter-
vention of reflection on action;
to be distinguished from both ACTIVISM and VERBALISM.
ACTIVISM: action without the modifying effect of
reflection.
VERBALISM: naming, theorizing, reflection, but
without base in action or translation into action steps;
hence not a true "naming.
"
OPPRESSION: any state or situation in which one person, or group,
makes decisions for another, prescribes another's
thought, or circumscribes another's action.
So universal is the theme of domination or oppression
in Freire's eyes that he divides the world into oppressors
and oppressed. The division is criticized on the grounds
that it is simplistic, dangerous, and ignores the real-
life intertwining of the two categories. However, Freire
is aware of this fact and seems not to men that there is
a clean geographical separability between oppressors
and oppressed. He recognizes the INTERNALIZED
OPPRESSOR and the weight of an oppressive system.
OPPRESSED: anyone who lives in a state of "contradiction" with
respect to one or more of the aspects of reality over
which he/she is capable of exerting control;
those for whom another makes significant decisions
without, or against, their will
(not included: those obviously incapable of decision-
making such as infants).
OPPRESSOR: one who prescribes or dictates to another;
one who, knowingly or not, stands in the way of another
person's naming and transforming his/her life situation.
STAGES OF SOCIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT: more or less irreversible
stages through which groups seem to move as they
become progressively more capable of, and involved
in participatory government.
CLOSED SOCIETIES: a society or portion thereof,
characterized by dependence, total lack of popular
participation in public affairs (culture of silence)
and rigid hierarchical social structure.
EMERGING ("splitting") SOCIETIES: societies in
transition from total dependence to self-government,
still silent with respect to external
controlling
societies but beginning to demand a voice in
pub ic
affairs internally; easily controlled by
populist leaders.
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MASSIFIED SOCIETIES: a deterioration of democracy
into a type of society "which makes consumerism,
technological development, and law and order, but
without exercise of justice or freedom, its goals; "and
which excludes, practically speaking, the common
people from a voice in decision-making.
" (1973)
TECHNICISM: (in education) an abortive attempt to teach the means and the
tools associated with education/technical training,
divorced from cultural and value implications;
the mechanization of education, and so of the educatee.
the radical disjunction between the application of
reason to means as opposed to ends; "a situation of
society in which human reason is bent to the service
of instrumental rationality. The ends or purposes
of instruments are not subjected to intensive (public)
rational analysis. Rather ends are either taken for
granted, left for private determination, or articulated
on a level so platitudinous as to be nearly irrational.
"
(Stanley, 1972)
Area of UNTESTED FEASIBILITY: possibilities for action which have not yet
been seriously examined or considered viable.
UTOPIA vs UTOPIC:
UTOPIA: an ideal situation, feasible of attainment, the
annunciation of which requires the denunciation of the
present reality.
Freire calls his vision and method "utopian" by which
he means "one that denounces and announces"; denounces
the present limiting situation, and announces the ideal
to be striven for, at whatever cost. He distinguishes
it (1971) from
UTOPIC: a characteristic of those efforts (for
liberation) which seek quick ideal results but mis-
understand the cost and the depth at which the internalized
oppressor" controls the person.
APPENDIX
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THE USE OF THE NEGATIVE IN MACMURRAY
Macmurray’s use of the term "negative" includes both the concepts of
"contradictory" and of "contrary" in older terminologies. For example,
the negative of "white" is "not-white. " The field included in "not-white"
ranges from the absolute extinction of color: black, which is the contradiction
of white, through a spectrum of colors, all of which qualify as contraries of
white, or "non-white." In a sense "white" ends where "non-white" begins.
So we might say that the contradictory 'hon-white" limits and helps to define
(constitute) "white. " This is the sense in which a positive is defined or
delimited by its negative. The color continuum may approach the white end
through lighter and lighter tones of grey, pink, blue, green, yellow and
cream.
Since black ideally is the absence of all color and white ideally the
fullness of all the colors (colors of light transmitted or reflected) we could
say that the entire spectrum, including black, is contained
in white; i.e.
,
white is a positive which both includes and is bounded by its negative.
This
is a definition, since to define means, etymologically,
to set the boundaries.
Macmurray then looks at human action and concludes that it
bears the
same kind of relation to reflection that white does
to black. Human activity,
or action, must include thought. It is possible
to abstain from overt action
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for the sake of thought. Therefore thought need not necessarily include
action. ("Ivory Tower" thinkers) So, to use a quantitative analogy, action
is the larger quantity; thought is a subset of action. This subset is what
Macmurray calls the "negative" or opposite of action. Consciousness or
human awareness of action has a similar subset, habitual and automatic
activity. Habitual activity can be brought to the level of awareness but
usually is not at this level unless something "goes wrong. " Autonomic
activity is always below the level of awareness and its malfunction is signaled
only by pain. We could consider a number of continua where the model of a
positive defined by and including its own negative are exemplified. These
are drawn from Macmurray and offered at the risk that taken out of context
they may obscure rather than enlighten.
+
Reflection Action
Attention
without purpose defined
Intention
includes attention + purpose
Organic activity
synthesis of nutritional &
other activities in child
Personal action
found in relations with others
beginning with Mother
Fear Love
Total dependence of one person
on another
Mutual interdependence of
free persons
Motivation
valuation is from another
Valuation
of object by self
Autonomic activity
unconscious, unintended
Conscious activity
reflective, intentional
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